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OF DIAGNOSES AND DISCRIMINATION:
DISCRIMINATORY NONTREATMENT OF INFANTS
WITH HIV INFECTION
Mary A. Crossley*
I. INTRODUCTION

In April 1982, in Bloomington, Indiana a newborn with Down syndrome died of starvation six days after his parents refused to consent to
surgery to correct an obstruction of his digestive tract.' The dying of
"Baby Doe," as the infant became known, sparked a public outcry,
spurred regulatory and legislative responses by the federal government, and spawned literally volumes of commentary. 2 Today, over ten
years later, the issue for which the Baby Doe case has become a symbol-selective nontreatment of disabled newborns 3-continues to pro* Assistant Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. B.A.
1984, University of Virginia; J.D. 1987, Vanderbilt University.
1. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Robert F. Weir, Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns:
Moral Dilemmas in Neonatal Medicine (1984); Which Babies Shall Live? Humanistic
Dimensions of the Care of Imperiled Newborns (Thomas H. Murray & Arthur L. Caplan
eds., 1985); Patricia A. Barber et al., Parental Perspectives on Treatment-Nontreatment
Decisions Involving Newborns with Spina Bifida, in Compelled Compassion:
Government Intervention in the Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns 123, 128-29
(Arthur L. Caplan et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Compelled Compassion]; Phoebe A.
Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: Compromise and Moral Dilemma, 34 Emory L.J. 545 (1985);
Hastings Center Newborns Project on the Care of Imperiled Newborns, Hastings Center
Rep., Dec. 1987, at 5 [hereinafter Newborns Project]; C. Everett Koop, Life and Death
and the Handicapped Newborn, 5 Issues L. & Med. 101 (1989); Legislative Workshop,
Baby Doe: Problems and Legislative Proposals, 1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 601; Stephen A.
Newman, Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the Federal Treatment
Standard for Impaired Infants, 15 Am. J.L. & Med. 1 (1989); Nancy K. Rhoden,
Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts, 58 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1283 (1985); Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76
Cal. L. Rev. 151 (1988); George P. Smith, II, Murder, She Wrote or Was It Merely
Selective Nontreatment?, 8J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 49 (1992); Special Section on
the Treatment of Handicapped Newborns, 11 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 195 (1986).
3. Baby Doe was not the only, or even the first, infant whose selective nontreatment
caught the public's attention. See Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 8; see also infra
notes 86, 100. Moreover, treating Baby Doe's case as a paradigm in analyzing the legal
and ethical issues raised by selective nontreatment fails to acknowledge the diversity of
treatment issues that arise from the wide variety of congenital defects infants can suffer.
Nonetheless, this Article will use the terms "Baby Doe" and the "Baby Doe controversy"
as representative of the debate that commenced in the early 1980s over selective
nontreatment.
The literature on selective nontreatment uses the terms "imperiled," "severely
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yoke debate. Today, however, the issue is also finding a new
embodiment.
Less than a year after Baby Doe's death, a group of physicians in
NewJersey made the first diagnosis of pediatric Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).4 In 1982, there probably seemed to be little
connection between the death of Baby Doe and this first diagnosis. But
in 1991, theJournal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) published the results of a survey of health professionals involved in the care
of critically ill newborns at six hospitals in New York City (the JAMA
survey).5 The results of this survey, which was designed to investigate
beliefs about appropriate management for a series of hypothetical infants, some at risk for 6 or infected with human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), 7 made the connection between Baby Doe and the growing
number of pediatric AIDS cases disquietingly clear: A significant
number of those polled indicated that they would be less likely to recommend aggressive treatment of a life-threatening condition for a newborn infected with HIV than they would if the infant suffering the life8
threatening condition had no known HIV risk.
defective," "anomalous," and "handicapped," among others, to describe infants born
with congenital defects or extremely prematurely. Because this Article seeks to draw
connections and distinctions between those infants whose treatment dilemmas have
already been debated and infants with HIV infection, it will primarily use the term
"disabled infant" as an inclusive term to describe all such infants.
4. See James Oleske et al., Immune Deficiency Syndrome in Children, 249 JAMA
2345, 2345 (1983) [hereinafter Oleske, Immune Deficiency]. The first cases of pediatric
AIDS reported to the federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in December 1982
involved children who had received blood transfusions. Later that month, four children
under the age of two years with AIDS-like symptoms and no history of blood
transfusions were reported to the CDC. In early 1983 the CDC established a definition
for pediatric AIDS. See id. at 2347-49.
Although pediatric AIDS was not diagnosed until 1982, it appears that sporadic
cases of children with HIV infection occurred in the mid to late 1970s. The first known
case of pediatric AIDS occurred in 1978 in a child who may have acquired the infection
either perinatally or from a blood transfusion. At the time, the child's physicians were
mystified by the child's illness, and the AIDS diagnosis was not made until years later
when a serum specimen saved from 1978 tested positive for HIV. SeeJames M. Oleske,
AIDS in Our Children-Who Cares for Them?, 5 Issues L. & Med. 437, 437 (1990)
[hereinafter Oleske, AIDS in Our Children].
5. See Betty W. Levin et al., Treatment Choice for Infants in the Neonatal Intensive
Care Unit at Risk for AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976, 2976-80 (1991).
6. An infant is deemed "at risk" for HIV if it is born to a mother who is infected
with HIV. See id. at 2976.
7. HIV is the virus that causes AIDS. The term "HIV positive" describes someone
who has tested positive for the virus and is used interchangeably with "HIV infected."
See infra note 37 for a description of methods of testing for HIV.
8. The survey asked respondents, who included neonatologists, neonatal fellows,
pediatric residents, and neonatal nurses, to indicate treatment recommendations
regarding treatment for hypothetical cases involving an infant (1) whose mother is
known to have AIDS; (2) who is known to be HIV infected; (3) who has Down syndrome;
(4) who has cystic fibrosis; (5) who has Tay-Sachs disease; (6) who has Trisomy 13
syndrome; and (7) who has no genetic condition or specific AIDS risk. For a description
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In its design the JAMA survey consciously referred back to the
Baby Doe case. 9 It sought to determine how respondents' treatment
recommendations for infants with life-threatening conditions unrelated
to HIV, such as duodenal atresia 10 or chronic kidney failure, would vary
depending on whether the infant (1) suffered from one of a number of
genetic conditions, (2) was at risk for HIV infection, (3) was known to
be HIV infected, or (4) had no genetic condition or known HIV risk.
That a higher percentage of the respondents would recommend aggressive treatment for infants with Down syndrome than would recommend such treatment for infants with HIV infection both reflects a shift
in the decade since Baby Doe in physicians' attitudes towards aggressive treatment of Down syndrome infants and reveals a reluctance on
the part of a significant number of respondents to treat HIV-infected
of Trisomy 13 syndrome and Tay-Sachs disease, see Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1288,
1292. In each case, the survey asked whether the respondent would recommend a
specified treatment for a condition suffered by the infant. The hypothetical conditions
(and corresponding treatments) posed by the survey included duodenal atresia
(intravenous feedings or intestinal surgery), ventriculoseptal defect (open-heart
surgery), chronic kidney failure (kidney dialysis), and chronic kidney failure combined
with cardiac arrest (cardiac resuscitation). The survey instructed respondents to assume
that the infant's parents' views were the same as their own. See Levin et al., supra note
5, at 2977.
Of the 316 surveys distributed, 247 (78%) were returned. The researchers
summarized the results of the survey as follows:
Although there were some statistically significant differences, the proportions
of respondents recommending each treatment for the infant whose mother had
AIDS were similar to those for an infant with Down syndrome (a chromosomal
abnormality causing mental retardation) or cystic fibrosis (a chronic,
debilitating condition from which patients often die during adolescence or
early adulthood). The recommendations for an infant known to be infected
with HIV were similar to those for an infant with Tay-Sachs disease (a severe,
deteriorating neurological condition that causes death within the first 2 years of
life).
Id. at 2979.
For example, for an infant with a ventriculoseptal defect, the following percentages
of respondents would recommend open-heart surgery:
no other condition or AIDS risk
cystic fibrosis
Down syndrome
at risk for HIV
known HIV infection

97%
84%
84%
77%
42%

Tay-Sachs disease

31%

Trisomy 13 syndrome

9%

Id. at 2978.
9. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2977 ("Seven vignettes were patterned after a

well-known case of an infant with Down syndrome.").
10. Duodenal atresia is a form of intestinal obstruction that involves either the
absence or obstruction of a portion of the duodenum. Surgery can successfully correct
the obstruction, though not the absence, of a portion of the duodenum in a great
majority of cases. Infants who do not receive the surgery die. See Weir, supra note 2, at

44.
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infants aggressively. For example, in the case of an infant with duodenal atresia, 99.6%&of the respondents would recommend corrective intestinal surgery for a full-term infant with no other concurrent
conditions; 97% would recommend such surgery for an infant with
Down syndrome; and 75% would recommend surgery for an infant infected with HIV."
Responses regarding treatment decisions for infants at risk for or
infected with HIV were based on both social and medical considerations, although survey data indicated that many of the health professionals were not knowledgeable about current information concerning
perinatal HIV infection. 12 Reasons cited by respondents for recommending less aggressive treatment for HIV-infected infants included
their concern for the poor quality of life and short life span that an
HIV-infected infant could anticipate. Their quality-of-life concerns related not simply to the infant's expected suffering from AIDS, but also
to the likelihood that the infant's mother would die of AIDS and that
the infant would live in a "poor social environment." 1 3 While acknowledging that selective nontreatment of infants with HIV-infected
mothers may not yet present a significant practical problem, 14 the au11. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2978. Although the issue that the Baby Doe
case has come to symbolize is commonly referred to as "selective nontreatment," while
theJAMA survey's results describe hypothetical failures to provide aggressive treatment,
the issues are usually one and the same. Only infrequently would cases of selective
nontreatment involve a failure to provide any treatment or care whatsoever. The more
common scenario involves a choice between aggressive and conservative treatment of a
condition. See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984)
(considering propriety of parental choice of conservative rather than aggressive surgical
treatment of child with multiple birth defects).
12. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2980. Moreover, although some respondents
may have decided to withhold treatment for HIV-infected infants solely on a medical
basis, these decisions would not be consistent with the "medical effects approach"
proposed in this Article because the questions posed by the survey did not include the
particularized information regarding an individual infant's condition and prognosis that
would allow respondents to engage in an individualized decision-making process. See
infra text accompanying note 269.
13. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2980. In open-ended questions, the survey
asked respondents to explain decisions to withhold treatment both from infants known
to be infected with HIV and from infants at risk of HIV infection. The published report
contains no further indication as to what respondents meant by "poor social
environment."
14. See id. at 2980. The authors themselves were unaware of any case in which the
infant of an HIV-positive mother had been denied appropriate treatment in a neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU). They attributed the small number of actual cases presenting
ethical dilemmas about the aggressiveness of treatment for such infants to the fact that,
to date, relatively few newborns admitted to a NICU had been identified as infants of
HIV-positive mothers. The authors, however, reasoned that these ethical dilemmas are
likely to arise more frequently in the future "if more mothers are identified as infected
with HIV, if more newborns are screened and found to be positive for antibody, and/or
if a test is developed and adopted in clinical practice that can identify infected
newborns." Id.
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thors were troubled by the survey's results, in terms of both the inaccuracy of medical information on which a number of responses were
based and the willingness of respondents to withhold from infants at
risk for AIDS life-sustaining treatment that would be provided for infants who may not similarly be at risk. 15
Do the JAMA survey's findings simply present a case of "same
song, second verse?" Does the JAMA survey merely demonstrate the
failure of some health care professionals to generalize the controversy
over Baby Doe and the resulting legal proscriptions regarding nontreatment to the emerging population of HIV-infected infants? Despite
the obvious parallels the JAMA survey drew between medical decisionmaking for infants with genetic conditions and those infected with HIV,
to what extent are the ethical and legal issues raised by the potential
nontreatment of HIV-infected infants distinctive from those so exhaustively, if not conclusively, addressed in the 1980s?
As a general matter, it is unclear whether the federal government's
response to Baby Doe was effective in ending the practice of selective
nontreatment, for finding reliable evidence of the extent of selective
nontreatment is as difficult today as it was in the early 1980s. 1 6 As
before, our best clue to the continuing prevalence of selective nontreatment may be the attitudes of the medical profession toward the practice, as revealed in recent 1 7 medical literature.
That literature sends somewhat mixed messages. Although members of the medical profession have criticized the federal government's
15. See id. at 2981. The authors also expressed their own view regarding the

appropriate response to the ethical dilemmas posed by the survey:
We believe thoughtful consideration of all relevant information, including upto-date information on the prognosis for children with perinatally acquired
HIV infection as well [as] the prognosis for the other concurrent conditions,
will be needed. Future suffering is relevant in assessing treatment choices. If
an infant is likely to live only a short time and during that time to suffer from
the illness and treatment, we believe aggressive treatment may not be in the
child's best interest. However, if an infant will have a good chance to live and
enjoy life for meaningful period of time, we believe neonatal treatment ought
to be provided at least until the child's condition deteriorates. Judgments will
need to be made about the value of particular treatments for individual infants.
Id. This approach to treatment decisions appears to be both consistent with the "best
interests" approach described infra in Part IV.B and permissible under the proposed
"medical effects" interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act articulated infra
in Part VI.B.3.
16. See infra Part III.A. In the heyday of the Baby Doe debate, proponents of

federal intervention claimed that deaths like Baby Doe's were commonplace, while
opponents claimed that selective nontreatment occurred only rarely. Then, as today, no
reliable figures were available regarding the extent of the practice. See generally H.
Rutherford Turnbull III, Incidence of Infanticide in America: Public and Professional
Attitudes, I Issues L. & Med. 363, 379-83 (1986) (detailing paucity and relative

inconclusiveness of data).
17. I use the term "recent" broadly to include medical literature that postdates the

Baby Doe controversy and the federal government's response by at least several years.
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attempts to regulate nontreatment, t8 recent surveys suggest that at
least some physicians have responded to regulation by changing their
practices. A study of Massachusetts pediatricians published in 1988
found that 73% would recommend corrective intestinal surgery for a
newborn with Down syndrome,' 9 and theJAMA survey found that 97%
of its respondents would provide such surgery for a Down syndrome
infant.2 0 This shift in medical attitudes towards infants with Down syndrome, however, may be as much the product of society's increasing
18. One national survey of neonatologists has been interpreted as showing that
many respondents believed that the federal standards issued under the Child Abuse
Amendments were a mistake and that their mandates could conflict with a
neonatologist's duty to act in the best interests of a specific infant. See Loretta M.
Kopelman et al., Neonatologists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regulations, 318 New Eng. J.
Med. 677, 679, 683 (1988). Eighty-one percent of the neonatologists disagreed with the
statement that the regulations would result in improved care for all infants, and more
than 75% disagreed with the statement that the regulations were needed to protect the
rights of handicapped infants. See id. at 679. But see Glyn Y. York et al., Baby Doe
Regulations and Medical Judgment, 30 Soc. Sci. Med. 657, 659-64 (1990) (disputing
Kopelman's interpretation of the data).
A related concern frequently voiced by physicians is that the federal standards act to
increase infants' suffering by promoting overtreatment in some cases. See Jeanne H.
Guillemin & Lynda L. Holmstrom, Mixed Blessings: Intensive Care for Newborns 14,
281-82 (1986) (stating that overtreatment is the "more common jeopardy"); Kopelman
et al., supra, at 679; Sarah Glazer, Born Too Soon, Too Small, Too Sick: Whatever
Happened to Baby Doe?, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1991, Health Supp., at 8 (quoting
physicians who question the wisdom of providing "heroic treatment at exorbitant cost").
Physicians have also criticized the federal Baby Doe rules as diverting attention and
resources away from the more pressing, and easily addressed, problem of infant
mortality associated with low birth weight. SeeJohn Lantos, Baby Doe Five Years Later:
Implications for Child Health, 317 New Eng. J. Med. 444, 445 (1987).
19. See I. David Todres et al., Life-Saving Therapy for Newborns: A Questionnaire
Survey in the State of Massachusetts, 81 Pediatrics 643, 643 (1988). Both the sample
population and the question posed in the Massachusetts survey varied slightly from
those in the JAMA survey. In the Massachusetts study, the questionnaire asked
pediatricians: "Baby A has Down syndrome and was born with duodenal atresia. The
parents have been consulted and do not want to consent to surgery to repair the
intestinal obstruction ....
Do you feel this baby should be operated on?" Id. at 647.
While similarly posing the scenario where an infant with Down syndrome is found to
have duodenal atresia correctable by routine surgery, the JAMA survey asked health
professionals involved in neonatal care whether they would provide corrective surgery,
assuming the infant's parents' views were the same as their own. See Levin et al., supra
note 5, at 2977. It should be noted that physicians in the Massachusetts survey who
recommended surgery did so despite the parents' objection to surgery. It is reasonable
to speculate that the percentage of respondents recommending surgery might have been
higher had the question posed assumed, as theJAMA survey's question did, the parents'
agreement with the physician's view.
20. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2978. A comparison of these figures to those
obtained by similar studies in the mid-1970s demonstrates the shift in attitudes. See
Anthony Shaw et al., Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of
Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 Pediatrics 588, 591-92 (1977) (finding that
19.9% of pediatric surgeons and 43.7% of pediatricians would recommend surgery for
Down syndrome infant with duodenal atresia); I. David Todres et al., Pediatricians'
Attitudes Affecting Decision-making in Defective Newborns, 60 Pediatrics 197, 197-98
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acceptance of persons with mental
retardation as it is the response to
21
changed legal requirements.
Moreover, although these surveys reflect shifts in attitudes, the
shifts may simply be at the margins; in other words, some physicians
may still condone selective nontreatment when the infant's disability is
more severe or when the life-saving intervention required is more extreme. For example, in theJAMA survey, only 67% of the respondents
would surgically correct the duodenal atresia of an infant with TaySachs disease 22 (as compared to over 99% who would perform the surgery on an infant without concomitant disability), and only 60% would
provide kidney dialysis for a Down syndrome infant with chronic kidney
failure (as opposed to 89% who would provide dialysis to an infant
without concomitant disability). 23 Thus, in light of recent evidence of
medical attitudes, it may be safe to speculate that while the extent of
selective nontreatment may have abated since the early 1980s, some
instances of nontreatment of severely disabled newborns continue to
occur.
Although selective nontreatment may not be unique to cases
involving HIV infection, several factors peculiar to HIV infection in infants make any analysis of nontreatment decisions in the context of
AIDS particularly complex. First, most infected infants are either
African-American or Latino, poor, and born into families racked by intravenous drug use (IVDU).24 These social factors, in combination
with HIV infection, make an infected infant's life particularly vulnerable
to devaluation. Second, because of the family disintegration caused by
AIDS 25 and IVDU, medical decisions for a significant number of HIVinfected infants will be made not by the infant's parents, but by the
state, in providing foster care, or even by a member of the medical profession. 26 The compounded minority status of HIV-infected infants,
(1977) (reporting that 46.3% of responding pediatricians recommended surgery for

Down syndrome infant with duodenal atresia).
21. See Glazer, supra note 18, at 12. But cf. Koop, supra note 2, at 112 (reasoning

that greatest protection for newborns is not federal legislation, but physicians' fear of
litigation).
22. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2978. Tay-Sachs is an inherited metabolic
disorder that may show no manifestations until an affected infant is a few months old.
At that point, the infant's muscle tone begins to degenerate progressively, leading to
paralysis, spasticity, deafness, blindness, and convulsions. Tay-Sachs infants become
vegetative by the age of two or three and die by four or five. See Rhoden, supra note 2,

at 1292.
23. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2978. For further evidence that pediatricians
continue to debate the treatment and nontreatment options for imperiled newborns, see
Donna A. Caniano & George A. Kanoti, Newborns with Massive Intestinal Loss:
Difficult Choices, 318 New Eng.J. Med. 703 (1988).
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See Jill Armstrong & Edward Bos, The Demographic, Economic, and Social
Impact of AIDS, in AIDS in the World 195, 196-97 (Jonathan Mann et al. eds., 1992).
26. See infra Part IIB.2.
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coupled with the relatively high likelihood of nonparental decisionmaking, suggests that the bundle of issues relating to medical decisionmaking for infants infected with HIV is not simply a reprise of the Baby
Doe controversy.
The emergence of a population of infants whose social characteristics increase the likelihood that necessary medical treatment may be
withheld, particularly in light of the results of the JAMA survey, which
indicate that a significant number of health care professionals would
advocate such withholding, suggests that the time is ripe to reassess the
legal status of selective nontreatment. The recently enacted Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the ADA), 2 7 which prohibits virtually all
public and economic actors in American life from discriminating on the
basis of disability in providing services or benefits, enriches the legal
context in which nontreatment of infants with HIV may be analyzed.
The ADA's express purpose is to end the pervasive discrimination that
persons with disabilities, including HIV infection, currently face, so
that all such persons can share fully in the benefits our society offers,
including the provision of health services. This legislative focus on
equal opportunities for persons with disabilities has implications for
our analysis of discriminatory medical treatment decisions.
A reassessment of selective nontreatment in light of the passage of
the ADA also provides a useful context for addressing a more fundamental question, namely: Can we speak meaningfully of discrimination
based on disability in the context of medical treatment decision-making, and, if so, how can we distinguish illegitimate discrimination from
the ethical exercise of sound medical judgment? Although this question has arisen most notably in the past as part of the selective nontreatment debate, the spread of the HIV epidemic, the skyrocketing costs of
medical services, and our society's heightened sensitivity to disability
discrimination in all aspects of life, among other factors, make it likely
that the foregoing question will arise in a variety of patient populations. 28 For example, decisions made by physicians, hospitals, or state
agencies regarding the availability of treatment for either competent or
incompetent disabled patients may give rise to claims of discrimination
in the recommending or providing of medical treatment. 2 9 The task
27. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 and 47
U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (1991).
28. Cf. Glanz v. Vemick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D. Mass. 1990) (finding refusal to
perform elective surgery on HIV-positive patient to support cause of action for
discrimination under Rehabilitation Act); Karen J. Merrikin & Thomas D. Overcast,
Patient Selection for Heart Transplantation: When is a Discriminating Choice
Discrimination? 10J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 7, 14-21 (1985) (examining legal definition
of discrimination in choosing heart transplant recipients).
29. As discussed infra Part VI.A, to constitute illegal discrimination under the ADA,
treatment recommendations or decisions must be made by public entities or public
accommodations as defined by the ADA. Thus, private decision-makers, such as the
parents of a newborn or the proxy named under a durable power of attorney for health
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ahead for decision-makers, regulators, and courts will be to assess the
legitimacy of medical decisions that take a patient's disability into
account.
Thus, while this Article focuses primarily on examining the legality
of withholding needed medical treatment from an infant with HIV infection, it ultimately concerns itself with the more fundamental question of how medical decision-makers may legitimately take into account
HIV infection or other disabilities in making treatment decisions and
recommendations. In other words, how can the concept of disability
discrimination be meaningfully applied in the context of individual
medical treatment? The scenario hypothesized by the JAMA surveytreatment decisions for an HIV-infected infant who also suffers from an
unrelated life-threatening condition-provides a convenient springboard for analyzing the legitimacy of treatment decisions for HIV-infected infants, but the survey's results alone do not address the moral
adequacy ofjustifications for selective nontreatment. A full assessment
of this question must consider both the social and medical characteristics of perinatally infected infants3 0 and the legal and ethical legacy left
by Baby Doe.
Part II of this Article describes both the medical features of perinatal HIV infection in terms of its incidence, diagnosis, and prognosis,
and the social context characteristic of perinatal infection. Part III
briefly reviews the controversy generated by the Baby Doe case and the
federal responses, which took the form of regulations promulgated
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the enactment
of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. It then considers to what
extent the legal issues raised by Baby Doe have been addressed by the
legal and medical communities. In light of the lack of resolution
achieved by legal responses to Baby Doe, Part IV turns to ethical discussions of selective nontreatment for insights into a normative basis
for regulating the practice. There, although ethicists and other commentators have failed to reach complete consensus on what moral standards should guide decision-making for disabled infants, we will find
that many commentators agree that treatment decisions should be
made in the best interests of a disabled infant, based upon an individualized assessment of the infant's condition and prognosis.
In Parts V and VI, this Article examines whether the legal apcare, would not be covered. Nor would the decisions made by a competent disabled
patient with respect to her own treatment be covered. It is entirely conceivable,
however, that discriminatory treatment recommendations made by a disabled patient's
caregiver, could be covered by the ADA. For example, a physician who recommends a
screening test for prostate cancer for all his male patients over a certain age except for
those who are also HIV positive makes discriminatory treatment recommendations, as
opposed to treatment decisions.
30. Perinatal transmission of HIV occurs from mother to fetus before or during
birth. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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proaches by which the federal government sought to regulate selective
nontreatment in the mid-1980s apply to medical treatment decisions
for infants with HIV infection, and, if so, whether these approaches adequately address the ethical concerns raised by selective nontreatment.
Part V asserts that although the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, in
which the government approached selective nontreatment as a problem
of child abuse and neglect, appear to prohibit the kinds of nontreatment hypothesized in theJAMA survey, the problems of enforcing that
legislation are likely to be particularly acute in those cases when nontreatment of HIV-infected infants is most ethically problematic. The
government's second approach to Baby Doe-treating selective nontreatment as a problem of disability discrimination-appears to provide
a more satisfying response to the issues raised by the growing numbers
of HIV-infected infants. Part VI focuses on the ADA as a vehicle for
addressing selective nontreatment problems and proposes that the
ADA be interpreted to apply to medical decision-making generally in a
way that both recognizes and respects the complexity of the decisionmaking process, but that condemns decisions distorted by prejudice
and misconceptions of disabilities.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that disability discrimination law
should be interpreted to apply to medical treatment decision-making
and, as so interpreted, provides a vehicle for addressing the nontreatment of HIV-infected infants in a fashion that is consistent with the
standards developed in the ethical ferment prompted by Baby Doe.
Reading the ADA as prohibiting nontreatment decisions for infants
based on the mere existence of HIV infection and, more generally, as
prohibiting treatment decisions or recommendations for any patient
based on the mere existence of a disability reinforces, rather than intrudes on, existing ethical standards of the medical profession. Ideally,
drawing on our ethical experience to inform our reading of the ADA
will allow us to accord HIV-infected infants and all persons with disabilities protection against discrimination in medical decision-making and
to avoid creating between patients and decision-makers the adversarial
relationships that a civil rights approach may sometimes engender. If
learning from experience enables us better to protect the true interests
of the growing number of infants born infected with HIV and, indeed,
all patients with disabilities, perhaps Baby Doe's death will not have
been in vain.
II.

PLACING THE QUESTION IN CONTEXT

A. The Medical Context
1. Perinatal Transmission of HIV and Difficulties of HIV Detection.Although AIDS entered the public's consciousness as a disease affect-
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ing homosexual and drug-using men 3 ' and although the total number
of infected women in the United States remains relatively small, the
rate of increase of new cases of AIDS among women in the United
States is now greater than among men.3 2 As HIV infection among wo-

men increases, so does infection among children. It is estimated that
more than three quarters of the women diagnosed with AIDS3 3 in the

United States are of childbearing age, and a 1989 study estimated the
incidence of HIV infection in women actually giving birth in that year
34
to be 1.5 women out of 1000 nationwide.
Although perinatally acquired AIDS was first diagnosed over a decade ago, much about the exact mechanism and timing of the transmission of HIV from the mother to the fetus or newborn remains a
mystery. Medical research suggests that transmission may occur during
pregnancy by transplacental passage of the virus, during delivery by
contact with maternal blood or genital tract secretions, and following
birth by breastfeeding. The exact nature of these modes of transmission and their relative importance have not yet been determined.3 5
Whatever the mode of transmission, not all infants born to HIV-posi31. See Karposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual
Men-New York City and California, MMWR, July 3, 1981, at 305.
32. See Margaret C. Heagarty & ElaineJ. Abrams, Caring for HIV-Infected Women
and Children, 326 New Eng.J. Med. 887, 887 (1992). As of 1992, 22,000 women with
AIDS have been reported to the federal Centers for Disease Control. See id. In July
1992, officials of the World Health Organization reported that worldwide, women are
becoming infected with HIV about as frequently as men and that by the year 2000, most
new infections are expected to be in women. See Lawrence K. Altman, Women
Worldwide Nearing Higher Rate for AIDS than Men, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1992, at B8;
see also Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Cases from Sex on Rise for Women, N.Y. Times,
July 23, 1993, at A12; Boyce Rensberger, HIV Increasing Faster Among Young Women,
Report Says, Boston Globe, July 29, 1993, at 15 (citing newly released United Nations
Development Program report that women between ages 15 and 25 represent 70% of the
3000 women a day who contract HIV).
33. HIV has a relatively lengthy incubation period; the period from infection to the
development of AIDS ranges from several years up to a decade. See John Modlin &
Alfred Saah, Public Health and Clinical Aspects of HIV Infection and Disease in Women
and Children in the United States, in AIDS, Women and the Next Generation 29, 39
(Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991) (reporting median time of 8 to 11 years from infection
to the development of AIDS in homosexual men). As a result, any reporting of
diagnosed AIDS cases will greatly underrepresent the number of persons infected with
HIV.
34. See Marta Gwinn et al., Prevalence of HIV Infection in Childbearing Women in
the United States: Surveillance Using Newborn Blood Samples, 265 JAMA 1704, 1704
(1991). As the title of this article suggests, HIV prevalence studies among childbearing
women usually detect maternal antibodies to HIV by assaying dried blood specimens
routinely collected from newborns. The 1.5 per 1000 figure is a nationwide estimate;
prevalence estimates vary widely by both geographic location and racial groups. See
infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
35. See European Collaborative Study, Risk Factors for Mother-to-Child
Transmission of HIV-1, 339 Lancet 1007, 1011 (1992) [hereinafter Risk Factors];
Modlin & Saah, supra note 33, at 40-41.
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tive women will be infected with the virus; studies suggest that approximately one in three will be infected.36 Prompt determination of
whether an infant born to an HIV-infected mother is itself infected with
the virus, however, has proved quite difficult. Serologic tests3 7 gener-

ally used to detect HIV antibodies in blood, when performed on an
infant less than fifteen months old, may reflect passively acquired maternal antibodies to the virus and thus produce a false positive result.3 8
Consequently, in diagnosing HIV infection in younger infants, physicians have had to rely either on the presence of the virus in the infant's
blood or tissue or on symptoms meeting the CDC's definition of pediatric AIDS. 39 Although recent studies demonstrate the success of the
36. Although studies have reported a risk of infection among infants born to HIVinfected women ranging from 7% to 39%, see, e.g., Risk Factors, supra note 35, at 1008,
experts currently believe that the overall estimated vertical mother-to-child transmission
rate approximates 20% to 30%. See Steven A. Miles et al., Rapid Serologic Testing with
Immune-Complex-Dissociated HIV p24 Antigen for Early Detection of HIV Infection in
Neonates, 328 New Eng.J. Med. 297, 297 (1993). The study described in Risk Factors
found an overall rate of vertical transmission of only 14.4%, but found that the risk of
transmission was greatest (31%) for infants born to women already diagnosed with
AIDS. See Risk Factors, supra note 35, at 1008-09. A linkage between full-blown
maternal AIDS and a heightened transmission rate, if confirmed, would suggest that the
responsibility for caring for a large proportion of infants so infected will be borne by
someone other than the mother in light of her inability to care for the infant. See infra
Part II.B.
37. The enzyme immunoassay (EIA), also called the enzyme linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA), is the most common serologic test for antibodies to HIV in serum or
plasma. The EIA first screens test sera as single specimens. If the test result is positive,
the test is repeated twice more from the same serum specimen. The serum specimen is
deemed reactive by EIA if at least one of these two repeat tests is positive; otherwise, the
serum specimen is deemed negative.
If the serum specimen is deemed reactive by EIA, a Western blot is usually done to
confirm the EIA results. The Western blot is a more virus-specific test. It can determine
whether the antibody that reacted in the EIA is specific for HIV antigens or whether it
cross-reacted with nonviral components of the EIA system. Confirmation of EIA results
by the Western blot is determinative of HIV infection. See Modlin & Saah, supra note
33, at 32-37.
38. See Russell B. Van Dyke, Pediatric Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection
and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 145 Am. J. Diseases Children 529, 530
(1991). In addition to the problem with false positives, serologic testing may also
produce false negative results in some infected children whose immune systems are so
debilitated by the virus at an early age that they are never able to produce HIV
antibodies that would be detected. See Cheryl P. Weinstock, Children with AIDS, FDA
Consumer, Oct. 1990, at 8. In contrast to these explainable false negatives, a few rare
and unexplained cases have been reported of children who show no signs of being
immuno-compromised and whom serologic tests show not to be infected, but who
become ill some time later. See AIDS-Infected Babies, 5 AIDS Report, Feb. 1992, at
1-2.
39. See Oleske, AIDS in Our Children, supra note 4, at 439. The clinical features
of pediatric AIDS typically include growth failure, developmental delay,
hepatosplenomegaly, lymphadenopathy, recurrent bacterial infections, and chronic
Candida infections. In many children, the virus manifests itself in the form of chronic
parotitis (inflammation and swelling of one or more mump glands), pneumonias, and
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technique of polymerase chain reaction in detecting HIV infection in
infants less than a month old, 40 and a recent report indicates that a new
rapid assay for detecting a specific HIV antigen may be of value in diagnosing HIV in neonates, 41 the reliability of these means of detection is
not yet established, and their use is likely to remain limited in the short
42
run.
Because the exact rate of perinatal transmission of HIV remains
unknown and diagnosis of the infection in young infants remains problematic, any estimate regarding the number of young children infected
with HIV and projections regarding future numbers must be tentative.4 3 As of June 1993, 4710 cases of pediatric AIDS had been reported to the CDC, of which 4121 cases, or 87.5%o, were attributable to
perinatal infection. 4 4 This number, however, vastly understates the
prevalence of HIV infection among children: experts estimate that for
each reported case of AIDS, another two to ten children are infected
thrombocytopenia (persistent decrease in the number of blood platelets, usually
associated with hemorrhaging). See Irah L. Hand et al., Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Seropositivity in Critically Ill Neonates in the South Bronx, 11 Pediatric Infectious
DiseaseJ. 39, 41 (1992); Van Dyke, supra note 38, at 529.
40. See Anne Marie Comeau et al., Detection of HIV in Specimens from Newborn
Screening Programs, 326 New Eng. J. Med. 1703, 1703 (1992).
41. See Miles et al., supra note 36, at 298-301.
42. See id. at 301. Cf. Task Force on Pediatric AIDS, Perinatal Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Testing, 89 Pediatrics 791, 791 (1992) (recommending
that the use and interpretation of PCR tests be limited to those research centers
experienced in their evaluation).
43. Cf. Robert H. Parrott, Childhood Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection:
The Spectrum of Costs, 4 J. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 122, 122-24
(1991) (reporting estimates of the.prevalence and number of new cases of HIV infection
among children).
44. See Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, July 1993, at
3, 6 [hereinafter CDC, Surveillance Report]; cf. Margaret C. Heagarty, Pediatric
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, Poverty, and National Priorities, 145 Am. J.
Diseases Children 527, 527 (1991). The percentage of HIV-infected children who
acquire the infection perinatally is expected to increase as universal blood screening
programs prevent further transmission to children through blood transfusions. This
trend is reflected in CDC reports. Of the first 100,000 AIDS cases reported in the
United States from 1981 to 1989, 81% of 1683 children with AIDS were born to women
with or at risk for HIV infection. Of the second 100,000, which were reported from
September 1989 to November 1991, 87% of the 1702 children diagnosed with AIDS
were born to women with or at risk for HIV. See Centers for Disease Control, The
Second 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States, 267
JAMA 788, 788 (1992) [hereinafter CDC, The Second 100,000 Cases].
Another possible mode of transmission of HIV to the pediatric population is
through child sexual abuse by an HIV-positive attacker. See George A. Gellert et al.,
Situational and Sociodemographic Characteristics of Children Infected with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus from Pediatric Sexual Abuse, 91 Pediatrics 39, 39 (1993)
(finding that although current statistics of transmission are unknown, HIV transmission
through sexual abuse may emerge as a "minor but significant" mode of transmission to
children in the future).
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with HIV. 4 5 Despite our ignorance regarding the number of children

infected with HIV who have not developed HIV-related symptoms or
AIDS, one conclusion seems unavoidable: in the absence of an effective method of preventing perinatal transmission of HIV46 or effective
measures, whether educational or coercive, for identifying and limiting
reproduction by women infected with HIV, 4 7 the rate of increase in

perinatally infected infants seems likely to continue to rise, following
48
the infection rate of women.
2. The Prognosisfor Perinatally Infected Infants.-Only several years
ago, the medical community expected most infants perinatally infected
with HIV to become ill and die "an agonizing death" within a few
years. 4 9 Recent studies, however, suggest a brighter prognosis: some
children are being identified who have lived their first decade with few
45. See CDC, Surveillance Report, supra note 44, at 6; cf. Josephine Gittler &
Merle McPherson, HIV Infection Among Women of Reproductive Age, Children, and
Adolescents: An Introduction, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1283, 1294 (1992) (citing Secretary's
Work Group on Pediatric HIV Infection and Disease, U.S. Dep't Health and Human
Servs., Final Report 12 (Nov. 1988)).
46. Incomplete understanding of the timing and mechanism of perinatal
transmission of HIV and of why only one in three infants born to HIV-infected women
become infected themselves currently limits the ability of researchers to devise a method
of preventing perinatal transmission. See Van Dyke, supra note 38, at 531.
47. Issues regarding screening women of reproductive age for HIV and its
implications for public health and reproductive freedom have been the subject of much
debate in both legal and medical literature. See infra note 81. Related issues are raised
by proposals for testing newborns for the HIV antibody, since at this time serologic
testing of the infant is essentially a test of the mother's serologic status. See Task Force
on Pediatric AIDS, supra note 42, at 792.
48. Because factors such as intravenous drug use, poverty, transience, lack of access
to family planning services, prostitution, and cultural influences may affect the birth
rates of women infected with HIV, it would be unwise simply to assume that an
increased infection rate among women of childbearing years will result in a parallel
increase in the number of perinatally infected infants. Several studies, however, have
indicated that women with knowledge of their infection are not significantly less likely
than uninfected women to become pregnant or to carry their pregnancies to term. See,
e.g., Reproductive Behavior in HIV-Infected Women, 46 Am. Fain. Physician 1804,
1804 (1992) (quoting study cited in Obstetrics & Gynecology which found that 18.8%0 of
seronegative women, as compared to 23% of seropositive women, had subsequent live
births); Peter A. Selwyn et al., Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status and Decisions to
Continue or Terminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 3567,
3568 (1989) (reporting results ofJAMA study which found that 50% of seropositive and
56% of seronegative pregnant women interviewed chose to carry their pregnancy to
term). Religious and cultural values, as well as poor access to contraceptive and
abortion services, may help to shape some women's decisions to give birth even though
they are infected with HIV. See Taunya L. Banks, Women and AIDS-Racism, Sexism,
and Classism, 17 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 351, 375 & n.132, 380-81 (1989). See
also infra text accompanying note 211.
49. See Weinstock, supra note 38, at 8-9 ("According to CDC, the average age of
diagnosis of AIDS in infants is 9 months. Often, they die shortly thereafter."); see also
Children and HIV Infection: Hearings Before the Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmental
Operations, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1989) [hereinafter Children and HIV Hearing]
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or no apparent symptoms of HIV infection, and officials at the CDC
now say that a majority of perinatally infected children survive beyond
age five. 50 Evidence that perinatally infected infants may enjoy years of
active, relatively unimpaired life if provided with aggressive medical
treatment highlights the human costs that can result from a decision
not to provide medical treatment based on a patient's disability.
Although the threat posed to some infants by HIV infection may be
less immediate than previously believed, the frequent coincidence of
perinatal HIV infection with other health risks, such as exposure to
other sexually transmitted diseases and to drugs, 5 ' may create treatment dilemmas in early infancy. HIV-infected infants typically display
no symptoms of infection in the weeks following birth,5 2 and one study
suggests that a woman's asymptomatic HIV infection in itself creates no
additional risk of an adverse pregnancy outcome such as low birth
weight or prematurity. 53 Nonetheless, a disproportionately large
number of infants perinatally exposed to HIV need critical medical care
at and following birth, apparently as a result of the coincidence of other
54
health risks.
(statement of Gwendolyn V. Scott on behalf of the Pediatric AIDS Coalition) ("HIV-1
infection in children is primarily a disease of infants and toddlers.").
50. See Mireya Navarro, Growing Up in the Shadow of the AIDS Virus, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1993, at 33.
51. See Hand et al., supra note 39, at 41 (finding that in study of HIV seropositivity
of infants born at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, maternal drug use played a "major role" in
the need of critical care for the infants).
52. See Hermann Mendez & Jose E. Jule, Care of the Infant Born Exposed to
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 17 Obstetrics & Gynecology Clinics N. Am. 637, 638
(1990) ("Characteristically, the newborn who subsequently is found to be infected is
asymptomatic during the nursery stay.").
53. See Peter A. Selwyn et al., Prospective Study of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Infection and Pregnancy Outcomes in Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 1289,
1291-94 (1989). This study surveyed women in a methadone program, all of whom
were current or former IV drug users. The study compared the pregnancy outcomes of
HIV seronegative women with the outcomes of seropositive women. The results
suggest that the HIV status of the mother by itself does not contribute to complications
and that any complications noted in the HIV seropositive group were usually
attributable to active IVDU prior to delivery. See id. at 1292. It is unclear whether the
study's findings are generalizable to non-IVDU populations of HIV-infected women.
54. See Hand et al., supra note 39, at 41. In this study, conducted at a 600-bed
hospital providing comprehensive care to an indigent population with multiple risk
factors for HIV infection, the incidence of HIV-positive infants was 3.17%, but the
incidence of HIV-positive infants among the neonatal intensive care unit population was
four times that figure. See id. at 40-41. Researchers identified several factors
associated with the HIV-positive infants' need for critical care, including prematurity,
low birth weight, drug withdrawal, and microcephaly. See id. See also Levin et al.,
supra note 5, at 2976 ("Although infection with [HIV] does not appear frequently to
lead to illness during the neonatal period, many infants who are infected with HIV are
also at high risk for premature delivery and other serious conditions that lead to
admission to an NICU."). These increased risks are primarily associated with maternal
drug use, whose association with maternal seropositivity is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 55-57. Some conditions suffered by HIV-positive infants, however,
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The primary coincident health risk for HIV-infected infants is prenatal exposure to drugs. Over two-thirds of the cases5 5 of maternally
transmitted HIV infection are associated with intravenous drug use,
either because the mother became infected through her own IVDU 5 6 or
because she was infected through heterosexual transmission from a
partner engaged in IVDU.5 7 This linkage between maternally transmitted HIV and IVDU has dismal implications not only for the family's
ability to care for a baby, but also for the infant's physical condition.
Women who use drugs during pregnancy are more likely to give birth
to low birth weight babies and to suffer perinatal complications, either
of which may create serious medical problems for the newborn. In addition, the newborn may require intensive medical care for drug withdrawal. 58 Thus, maternal prenatal drug use not infrequently takes a
heavy toll on infants infected with HIV and may set the stage for selective nontreatment by giving rise to a condition requiring life-saving
treatment for the infant. 59
are "classical signs of congenital infection." These include low birth weight, small size
for gestational age, hepatosplenomegaly, thrombocytopenia, jaundice, anemia, and
elevated liver function tests. See Oleske, AIDS in Our Children, supra note 4, at 444.
55. This figure has been broken down by race and ethnic group as follows: of
perinatally acquired AIDS cases among African-American and Hispanic infants, 73%
were associated with IVDU; of such cases among white infants, 69% were associated
with IVDU. See Modlin & Saah, supra note 33, at 31.
56. Based on AIDS cases reported to the CDC in 1990,47.6% of women with AIDS
reported a history of IVDU. See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome-United States 1981-1990, 265JAMA 3226, 3226 (1991)
[hereinafter CDC, Update 1981-1990].
57. See Modlin & Saah, supra note 33, at 31. Until the late 1980s, the vast majority
of IV drug users were heroin addicts. Since that time, however, an increasing number
are cocaine addicts who inject the drug ten or more times daily. The frequency of
injection by cocaine addicts places them at greater risk of HIV infection from shared
needles than heroin addicts, who usually inject the drug only three or four times daily.
See Children and HIV Hearing, supra note 49, at 194 (statement of Charles P. Schuster,
Director, Nat'l Institute on Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Admin.). In
addition, persons using crack cocaine or other mind-altering substances have a
disproportionately high incidence of HIV infection resulting from their increased sexual
activity. See Constance M. Ryan &Jean Emery, Meeting the Challenge of HIV Infection
in Family Foster Care 19 (1991).
58. See Hand et al., supra note 39, at 41.
59. Although I have found no figures regarding what percentage of all HIVinfected infants suffer unrelated complications, one study suggests that infants born to
HIV-infected women are significantly more likely than other infants to suffer a
complication requiring intensive care. See id. at 40-41 (finding incidence of HIV
seropositivity among all infants born at hospital in South Bronx to be 3.17%, while
incidence of seropositivity in hospital's NICU was 11.6%). These complications may be
linked to maternal drug use during pregnancy, to the presence of other sexually
transmitted diseases, and to inadequate prenatal care. See id. at 41. The dearth of
figures regarding the percentage of HIV-positive infants suffering other complications
may be attributable in part to the common failure in the past to identify an infant as HIV
positive during the neonatal period. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2980-81.
The negative effects of prenatal maternal use of cocaine and of heroin have been
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With respect to the clinical course of the infant's HIV infection,
however, recent studies suggest that prognoses may vary depending
both on when the infant or child first manifests signs of HIV infection
and on what the presenting clinical signs are.6 0 For example, infants
whose HIV infection is first manifested by Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) tend to be diagnosed at an early age and to survive for
only a short time, while those who first present with lymphocytic interstitial pneumonitis (LIP) tend not to develop symptoms until around
the age of two and to live several years longer. However, survival
figures even for infants diagnosed with PCP appear to be improving,
possibly as a result of more aggressive therapy and the use of prophy61
lactic antibiotics.
Despite the tentative nature of current findings regarding prognosdocumented. Physicians have found a high incidence of prematurity and low birth
weight among cocaine babies. See John L. Goldman, Cocaine's Tiniest Victims: A
Struggle from the Start, L.A. Times, May 30, 1988, at 1, 16. Fetal growth, including
head and brain size, may be impaired, strokes and seizures may occur, and
malformations of the kidneys, genitals, intestines, and spinal cord may develop. See
John Langone, Crack Comes to the Nursery, Time, Sept. 19, 1988, at 85.
Cardiovascular abnormalities, including atrial and ventricular septal defects, have also
been documented. See Steven E. Lipshultz et al., Cardiovascular Abnormalities in
Infants Prenatally Exposed to Cocaine, 118J. Pediatrics 44, 44-49 (1991). Additionally,
these children experience speech and hearing problems, dyslexia, "emotional problems,
aggressiveness, organization and language problems, difficulties with personal
relationships and trouble experiencing pleasure and other emotions." Peggy McCarthy,
Prenatal Drug Exposure Shadows Children in School, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1991,
§ 12CN, at 1. It has also been observed that heroin babies endure classic withdrawal
symptoms: they are irritable and jittery; they scream and scrape their elbows and knees
raw in their restlessness. See Mothers' Drug Use Causes An Epidemic Of Damaged
Babies, Chi. Trib., Sept. 5, 1988, at 15.
60. Pediatric.AIDS experts now have identified three distinct patterns of clinical
courses followed by pediatric AIDS cases. In the first type of case (which describes up to
25% of perinatally infected infants), the child develops symptoms of infection within his
first 18 months, and the disease progresses quickly to death. In the second type of case,
the virus attacks the child's immune system less aggressively so that the child may suffer
milder or transient symptoms and live until he is three to five years of age. Finally,
experts arejust now recognizing that a number of children infected from birth are living
with few or no symptoms for many years; these children may not even be diagnosed with
AIDS until they are nine or older. Experts suggest that the different courses of pediatric
AIDS cases may be related to factors such as the viral strain carried and at what point
during pregnancy or birth transmission occurred. See Navarro, supra note 50, at 33, 36.
61. See Pauline Thomas et al., Trends in Survival for Children Reported with
Maternally Transmitted Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in New York City, 1982
to 1989, 11 Pediatric Infectious Disease J. 34, 38 (1992) (noting that although the
improvement in survival following biopsy-proved PCP must be reviewed with caution,
the improved survival was "undoubtedly real"); P.A. Tovo et al., Prognostic Factors and
Survival in Children with Perinatal HIV-1 Infection, 339 Lancet 1249, 1252 (1992).
Antibiotics can be used both prophylactically to prevent the development of
opportunistic infections such as PCP and therapeutically to combat infections once
developed. Therapies for pediatric AIDS also include antiviral drugs and
immunotherapy in combination with supportive nutrition.
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tic factors and the effectiveness of existing therapies for perinatally infected infants, three important conclusions flow with some certainty
from the medical literature: First, survival in cases of maternally transmitted HIV remains markedly variable. 62 Second, children with perinatally acquired HIV infection are living longer than previously
expected. 6 3 Third, a physician cannot currently predict, in advance of
clinical manifestations of HIV infection, what a given infant's clinical
course and survival will be.64
This combination of improving, but variable, survival with prognostic uncertainty has significant implications for analyzing the propriety of selective nontreatment of HIV-infected infants. Because a
physician treating a young infant with HIV infection usually cannot reliably forecast the infant's prognosis, the physician or other decisionmaker cannot easily balance the benefits of providing life-saving treatment against the risks and burdens of providing that treatment. As a
result, any attempt to assess what treatment is in the best interests of
the infant 65 must remain speculative. In light of this uncertainty, erring
on the side of providing treatment that might enable a child to enjoy
many years of life seems preferable to erring on the side of letting the
infant die as a result of nontreatment.
B. The Social Context
For most people who ever have the occasion to read a law review
article, imagining with any accuracy the world into which most perinatally infected infants are born is probably difficult: The setting is
urban and poor. The family is ravaged by intravenous drug use, AIDS,
62. See Thomas et al., supra note 61, at 38 (finding a "marked variability" in
survival from birth for children with maternally transmitted AIDS in New York City to be
supported by other studies).
63. See id.; see also Nancy Hutton & Lawrence S. Wissow, Maternal and Newborn
HIV Screening: Implications for Children and Families, in AIDS, Women and the Next
Generation, supra note 33, at 105, 108 (citing report of perinatally infected children
living to 10 or 11 years); Navarro, supra note 50, at 33 (reporting infected children as
old as 14); Tovo et al., supra note 61, at 1252 (showing approximately 70% of HIVinfected children in study alive at 6 years). It is unclear to what extent an improvement
in survival figures reflects more effective prophylaxis and therapy as opposed to
reflecting a time lag in diagnosing cases of perinatally acquired AIDS in older children.
Cf. Mendez & Jule, supra note 52, at 638 (predicting that as more cases of AIDS are
diagnosed in older children, the average incubation time will increase); Thomas et al.,
supra note 61, at 38 (finding that at least part of improved survival rates must be
attributed to earlier diagnosis).
64. See Hutton & Wissow, supra note 63, at 107; see also Tovo et al., supra note
61, at 1252 (suggesting that because children at risk for those infections that cause most
early pediatric AIDS deaths cannot be prospectively identified, prophylactic measures in
all at-risk infants may be needed). For further discussion of the clinical course and
manifestations of pediatric HIV infection, see generally Gittler & McPherson, supra note
45, at 1295-98.
65. The best interests standard and alternative standards for guiding treatment
choices for infants are discussed infra in Part IV.
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or both, and may not have the financial, social, or emotional wherewithal to care for the baby. The infant itself may be addicted to drugs
even before birth and he or she belongs to a minority group whose
members frequently suffer discrimination. This is not the most auspicious of beginnings.
While this combination of social factors makes most perinatally infected infants particularly vulnerable to decisions to withhold needed
medical treatment, it is ultimately the mother's (and perhaps father's)
HIV infection, either alone or in combination with familial drug use,
that most often triggers a separate factor figuring significantly in our
analysis of nontreatment: involvement of the state in making medical
decisions for perinatally infected infants. The coexistence of familial
HIV infection and drug use with an infant's HIV infection means that at
some point the family may become either unable or unwilling to pro66
vide the special care the infant needs.
Consequently, many infants and children with perinatally acquired
HIV infection at some point need foster care placement. 67 Finding foster families willing to care for an HIV-infected infant can be difficult,
66. See Phyllis Gurdin & Gary R. Anderson, Quality Care for Ill Children: AIDSSpecialized Foster Family Homes, 66 Child Welfare 291, 291 (1987). Cf. Heagarty &
Abrams, supra note 32, at 888 (reporting estimate from New York City Department of
Health that in that city alone, some 40,000 children may be orphaned by AIDS in the
1990s); Hutton & Wissow, supra note 63, at 115 (noting that belief that an infant is HIV
infected may increase the chance that she will be abandoned or rejected after birth); Van
Dyke, supra note 38, at 530 ("As the HIV infection progresses in the child's parents,
they are unable to care adequately for themselves and their child.").
A mother whose dependency on illegal drugs leaves her incapable to care
adequately for her child may recruit assistance from members of the child's extended
family. If the family learns that the child is HIV positive, however, this caregiving
arrangement may be jeopardized, and the child may be forced into the formal foster care
system. See Hutton & Wissow, supra note 63, at 114.
67. See Task Force on Pediatric AIDS, Infants and Children With Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Placement in Adoption and Foster Care, 83 Pediatrics
609, 609 (1989); see also J. Curtis McMillen & Victor Groze, Child Welfare Policies
Affected by the Difficulty in Diagnosing HIV Infection in Infants and Young Children, 6
AIDS & Pub. Pol'yJ. 59, 59 (1991) (estimating that 25% to 33% of infants born with
HIV infection will not receive care from their biological parents); Oleske, AIDS in Our
Children, supra note 4, at 439 (estimating that more than 30% of pediatric AIDS cases
are in foster care).
HIV-positive children are put in state custody under a variety of circumstances.
The unflattering popular image of a drug dependent mother abandoning her infant to
feed her habit suggests one reason why HIV-positive infants may fall under the state's
care, but it is by no means the only way that such infants are taken into the foster care
system. For example, a child may be placed in a transitional home for children with HIV
when its mother, suffering from the final stages of AIDS, is taken to the hospital. Or,
what is considered "abandonment" may represent an effort by the mother to insure that
her child will receive the nutrition and medical care that she is financially unable to
provide. See Field Hearing on the Abandoned Infants Assistance Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
Newark, New Jersey, May 10, 1991, at 25-26 [hereinafter AIAA Hearings].
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and as a result, infants left in a hospital nursery by their mothers may
stay in the hospital longer than is medically necessary.6 8 For these
69
"boarder babies," the hospital fills the gap left by a lack of foster care.
Options for placing an infant or child with HIV infection depend
on what programs are available locally and on the child's legal status
with respect to its natural parents; possibilities may include placement
in a temporary shelter or group care facility, kinship care, or placement
with a regular or specially trained foster family. 70 A number of programs designed to address the special foster care needs of HIV-positive
infants and children have been developed, 71 but for the foreseeable future it is likely that the number of infected children in need of place72
ment will remain greater than the number of available homes.
The removal of approximately 30% 7 3 of perinatally infected infants and children from parental custody and their placement in some
kind of foster care raises the question of who has legal authority to consent to medical treatment for these children. Are the foster parents,
the state child welfare agency, the family court, or the biological parents responsible for making treatment decisions? Although there
68. See McMillen & Groze, supra note 67, at 59; Van Dyke, supra note 38, at 530.
69. See, e.g., James D. Hegarty et al., The Medical Care Costs of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus-Infected Children in Harlem, 260 JAMA 1901, 1903 (1988)
(reporting that at Harlem Hospital medically unnecessary social days accounted for 20%
of the total cost of care for children with HIV infection). Although the boarder baby
problem has received the most public attention in the context of drug-exposed infants,
the population also includes a significant number of HIV-positive infants. See AIAA
Hearings, supra note 67, at 60 (reporting Child Welfare League of America survey
findings that 69% of babies boarding in surveyed hospitals were born to drug
dependent mothers and that in many cases one or both of the parents of the boarding
infants were HIV positive or had AIDS); Hutton & Wissow, supra note 63, at 114
(estimating that 1 in 10 boarder babies in New York City may be infected with HIV).
70. See AIAA Hearings, supra note 67, at 65-67; McMillen & Groze, supra note 67,
at 61-62. Although permanent adoption is also an option, it is infrequently used for an
abandoned HIV-infected infant, both because courts and child welfare agencies may be
loath to sever ties with a living biological parent and because prospective adoptive
parents may be fearful of making a commitment in the face of the infant's special
medical needs. See id. Even when an infant has been abandoned, proceedings to
terminate parental rights are frequently contested. Although termination could
theoretically take place in about 18 months, depending on the jurisdiction, the process
usually takes about three years. See id. at 67.
71. See Abigail English, The HIV-AIDS Epidemic and the Child Welfare System:
Protecting the Rights of Infants, Young Children and Adolescents, 77 Iowa L, Rev.
1509, 1547-48 (1992). In addition, it has been suggested that child welfare agencies
operate small boarding homes for HIV-positive children who are too sick or disabled to
receive care in a foster home so that those children will have an alternative to long
hospitalizations. See Gurdin & Anderson, supra note 66, at 301.
72. See Gurdin & Anderson, supra note 66, at 301.
73. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. If we estimate that currently
approximately 12,000 children in the United States have been perinatally infected, see
supra text accompanying notes 44-45, then we can estimate that 3600 of these children
are likely to end up in some form of foster care.
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seems to be no uniform answer to this question, it appears that in most
states, the commitment of a child to the Department of Social Services
does not necessarily deprive the parents of medical guardianship of
their child, so that parents may continue to have some voice in medical
decision-making. 74 Nonetheless, as a practical matter, in the frequent
cases involving parents who are seriously ill themselves or involved in
IVDU, the parents may not play an active role. In addition, although
most states allow foster parents to consent to routine medical care, the
appropriate decision-maker regarding nonroutine care is less clear. 75
What does seem clear, however, is that when an infant's biological parents are either legally or practically disabled from making treatment
decisions for an infant in foster care, some agent of the state must assume that responsibility.
As if this social landscape were not disheartening enough, fully
grasping how the deck is stacked against most perinatally infected infants requires us to consider the broader context in which questions
involving their medical treatment will be addressed. First, decisions regarding infected infants' medical care will be made under conditions of
scarcity, in terms of both medical and social service resources. The
AIDS epidemic has placed an enormous burden on federally and state
funded medical programs at a time when expenses for those programs
were already soaring. 76 Moreover, child welfare agencies already
stretched to their limits by the need to place infants born to drug-addicted parents are unlikely to be able to provide zealous advocacy for
77
HIV-positive infants' access to aggressive medical care.
74. See Deborah Weimer, Beyond Parens Patriae: Assuring Timely, Informed,
Compassionate Decisionmaking for HIV-Positive Children in Foster Care, 46 U. Miami

L. Rev. 379, 381 (1991).
75. See Jonathan D. Moreno, Foster Parents as Surrogates for Infants and Young

Children, 58 Mt. SinaiJ. Med. 393, 396 (1991).
76. Former HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan estimated that, by the end of 1993, $17

billion in federal funds will have been spent on AIDS-related programs. This
expenditure is more than that spent for any other infectious disease. On research and
prevention, only cancer-related programs receive more federal funds. See Statement by
Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan, Fed. News Serv., Sept. 25, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire file. Each year $300 million in federal funding is
distributed to hundreds of community organizations for AIDS education. See Brenda
Wilson, All Things Considered: AIDS Advertising Campaign Unveiled by HHS

(National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 26, 1992).
Federal funds are allocated to states through a formula tied to the number of
reported AIDS and HIV cases. Cities with more than 2000 AIDS cases qualify for
emergency federal funding. Although this fund was authorized to receive $875 million
in 1991, it received only approximately $275 million. See Rebecca Kolberg, More

Emergency Funds Sought for AIDS, UPI, June 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI file. The National Commission on AIDS has recommended that the 1994
federal budget for AIDS research be expanded by 19.4%. See Jacqueline Frank, AIDS
Commission Blasts Bush On Lack of AIDS Plan, The Reuter Library Report, June 25,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter file.
77. See English, supra note 71, at 1512-13 ("[T]he child welfare system must
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In addition, medical decisions regarding the treatment of infants
infected with HIV are likely to be influenced by the negative attitudes
of a significant number of physicians towards persons with AIDS. This
negative attitude manifests itself in part by a desire to avoid personally
caring for AIDS patients. For example, in a survey of a random sample
of office-based primary care physicians in Los Angeles County, 48% of
physicians in the sample had elected not to care for, or said they would
not provide care for, patients with HIV infection. 78 Another survey
suggests that this reluctance to care for adult patients with HIV flows
from a combination of factors, including negative attitudes towards
homosexuals and IV drug users, fear of contagion, and the time demands imposed by caring for an HIV patient. 79 It is not yet clear to
what extent this negative attitude extends to HIV-infected infants, but
at least some of the factors identified will be present in infant care.
This negative attitude may also be displayed by a reluctance to allocate
scarce medical resources to individual AIDS patients.8 0
Finally, racial or ethnic bias may also play a role. Mirroring the
increasing percentage of all AIDS cases that are found among persons
respond to the complex issues associated with perinatal drug exposure and pediatric and
adolescent HIV infection at a time when their resources are already stretched thin by
limited funding and increasing numbers of abused and neglected children."); Hutton &
Wissow, supra note 63, at 114.
78. See Charles E. Lewis & Kathleen Montgomery, Primary Care Physicians'
Refusal to Care for Patients Infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 156 WJ.
Med. 36 (1992). See also Molly Cooke & Merle A. Sande, Sounding Board: The HIV
Epidemic and Training in Internal Medicine, 321 New Eng.J. Med. 1334, 1334 (1989).
In a study of interns and residents in New York City, 36% of medical house officers
and 19% of pediatric house officers responded that their experience with AIDS patients
had led them to plan a career path less likely to involve the care of AIDS patients, and
one quarter of the respondents said they would not continue to care for AIDS patients if
given a choice. See Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, AIDS and Discrimination:
Public and Professional Perspectives, in AIDS and the Health Care System 77, 82-83
(Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 1990) (citing R.N. Link et al., Concerns of Medical and
Pediatric House Officers about Acquiring AIDS from their Patients, 78 Am. J. Pub.
Health 455 (1988)).
The unwillingness to treat patients infected with HIV is inconsistent with the
American Medical Association's position which recognizes the moral obligation of
physicians to care for persons with HIV. See The Duty to "Attend upon the Sick"
(Editorial), 266JAMA 1876 (1991); see generally Josephine Gittler & Sharon Rennert,
HIV Infection Among Women and Children and Antidiscrimination Laws: An
Overview, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1313, 1362-64 (1992) (describing response of medical
community to needs of HIV patients).
79. See Barbara Gerbert et al., Primary Care Physicians and AIDS: Attitudinal and
Structural Barriers to Care, 266JAMA 2837, 2838 (1991).
80. See Children and HIV Hearing, supra note 49, at 59 (testimony of Mary
Boland, R.N.) ("There are many-unfortunately-health care providers who think that
because you have AIDS you should be written off and why should you want to be
involved? Why should you have a right to treatment? It's just AIDS. You're going to
die anyway."); see also Michael R. Flick, The Due Process of Dying, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 1121,
1159 (1991) ("One argument for disconnecting Mr. B from his ventilator that arose
even before he was attached to it was that AIDS rendered all treatment futile.").
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of color,8 1 perinatally acquired pediatric AIDS has evolved as a threat
primarily to children in minority groups. Of the perinatally infected
children in the United States, 84% are either African-American or Hispanic.8 2 By contrast, African-American and Hispanic children together
81. Of the first 100,000 cases of AIDS reported in the U.S., 27% were in AfricanAmericans and 15% were in Hispanics. Of the second 100,000 cases, 31% were in
African-Americans and 17% were in Hispanics. See CDC, The Second 100,000 Cases,
supra note 44, at 788. The concentration is even greater when only AIDS cases
reported in women are considered. See CDC, Update 1981-1990, supra note 56, at
3226 (finding that 51.9% of all AIDS cases in women were in African-Americans and
21.9% were in Hispanics). The accuracy of the CDC estimates, however, is not beyond
question. Because the CDC receives its data primarily from state departments of public
health, who in turn receive their data from hospitals, public health clinics, and private
providers, the CDC estimates may fail to reflect the full extent of HIV infection among
white women. See Banks, supra note 48, at 354 & n.13 (discussing debate in medical
literature over the accuracy of CDC estimates).
The heavy concentration of AIDS cases in women in these groups has added
another dimension to policy discussions regarding HIV screening of women of
childbearing age as a method of preventing perinatal transmission of HIV. See id. at
351-54; cf. Oleske, AIDS in Our Children, supra note 4, at 442 ("Simplistic approaches
of recommending avoidance of pregnancy do not take into consideration cultural-social
pressures for such women to bear children as an expression of self-worth."); Michael T.
Osterholm & Kristine L. MacDonald, Facing the Complex Issues of Pediatric AIDS: A
Public Health Perspective, 258 JAMA 2736, 2736 (1987) (arguing that, in light of the
disproportionate level of infection in the African-American and Hispanic communities,
the control of HIV infection in the pediatric population raises "many difficult issues that
touch the core of the social fabric among America's urban poor").
As Professor Banks, who considers the history of sterilization abuse and racist
medical experimentation in the United States, states: "Given the racial composition of
women currently thought to be at risk, HIV screening and counseling proposals
designed to somehow prevent perinatal transmission have genocidal overtones." Banks,
supra note 48, at 354. In addition, in the urban ghettoes where the vast majority of
vertically acquired cases of HIV infection are found, community and religious leaders
have raised charges of genocide in response to calls for infected women voluntarily to
postpone or forgo pregnancy. See Ronald Bayer, Perinatal Transmission of HIV
Infection: The Ethics of Prevention, in AIDS and the Health Care System, supra note
78, at 62, 70; see also infra note 84 with respect to the legacy of mistrust left among
African-Americans by the Tuskegee syphilis study.
82. See Modlin & Saah, supra note 33, at 31. According to the CDC's 1990 figures,
77.5% of all children with AIDS in the United States are either African-American or
Hispanic. See Heagarty & Abrams, supra note 32, at 888.
Geographic concentration also characterizes the pediatric AIDS population. As of
1990, 84% of pediatric AIDS cases in the United States occurred in metropolitan areas
of over half a million people, with New York City, Newark, Miami, Los Angeles, and San
Juan accounting for 45% of these cases. See Mendez & Jule, supra note 52, at 637.
Newark alone is home to 20% of all HIV-infected children in the United States. See
AIAA Hearings, supra note 67, at 1, 3-4. The figures are similarly distressing for New
York City: the Bronx has 10% of all pediatric AIDS cases in the United States, see AIAA
Hearings, supra note 67, at 3-4, and as long ago as 1987, one in sixty-three newborns in
the Bronx were found to be seropositive. See Children and HIV Hearing, supra note
49, at 50 (testimony of Dr. Joanne E. Lukomnik). The current geographic concentration
of HIV-infected children, however, does not suggest that other areas will escape having
to face issues regarding the care of children with HIV infection; it simply means the
crisis is temporarily confined. As of 1990, eighty of ninety-three metropolitan areas had
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comprise only 10% of the general pediatric population.8 3 Evidence of
continuing racial bias in medicine suggests that decisions regarding the
medical care of more than three quarters of HIV-infected infants may
be subject to further negative influence.8 4
Taking all the foregoing factors together, a disturbing picture
emerges of the medical and social contexts in which medical treatment
decisions for the growing number of infants infected with HIV are
likely to be made. First, because of coincident health risks suffered by
many of these infants, they run a relatively high chance of suffering potentially life-threatening complications in the neonatal period. Second,
many of these infants will have their medical treatment decisions made
for them by the state rather than by their parents. Third, because these
infants are HIV infected and are likely to be either African-American or
Latino, they may trigger biases on the part of those involved in their
medical care. Perinatally infected children have been called the "ultimate minority,"8 5 and they are a minority that cannot effectively advocate for themselves. More to the point, they are a minority that cannot
even begin to make decisions for themselves, and in many instances
medical decision-making power will be vested in the hands of decisionmakers who may be motivated by concerns and biases inconsistent with
the best interests of the HIV-infected infants needing medical treatment. Thus, while vulnerability may not in itself justify legal protection, the extreme vulnerability of perinatally infected infants to
selective nontreatment should justify our close scrutiny of existing law
reported at least one 'case of pediatric AIDS. See Mendez & Jule, supra note 52, at
637-38. See also Hutton & Wissow, supra note 63, at 106 (noting that in inner city
Baltimore, approximately one in eighty infants is born to a seropositive mother);
Osterholm & MacDonald, supra note 81, at 2737 (citing Minneapolis as example of city
where the disproportionate racial and ethnic concentration of pediatric AIDS cases is
being replicated).
83. See McMillen& Groze, supra note 67, at 60.
84. The most notorious example of racism in American medical science is the
Tuskegee syphilis study, which studied the natural course of untreated syphilis by
following approximately 400 poor black men infected with syphilis without providing
treatment to them, even when penicillin was developed as an effective treatment for
syphilis in the 1940s. The study began in 1932 and continued until 1972, when it was
publicly exposed. For a full account of the Tuskegee study, see James H. Jones, Bad
Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (1981). Although blatant examples of
racism in medicine may be less common today, several studies continue to suggest that a
more subtle form of racism continues. See Banks, supra note 48, at 359, 360 n.35 (citing
studies in the medical literature providing evidence of continuing racial bias in
medicine). Cf. Gittler & Rennert, supra note 78, at 1331 n.87 (" 'The continuing
widespread stigmatization of people of color creates enormous difficulties for effectively
combatting the HIV/AIDS epidemic.' ) (quoting National Comm'n on AIDS, The
Challenge of HIV/AIDS in Communities of Color 2-3 (1992)); James H. Jones, The
Tuskegee Legacy: AIDS and the Black Community, Hastings Center Rep., Nov.-Dec.
1992, at 38 (suggesting that the Tuskegee study's legacy of suspicion and distrust has
hampered efforts to control AIDS in the black community).
85. Children and HIV Hearing, supra note 49, at 31.
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to determine whether it provides any protection. That scrutiny seems
especially imperative in light of the state's role in providing foster care
and making medical decisions for a significant number of infected
infants.
III.

THE LEGAL LEGACY OF BABY DOE

Although controversy over the selective nontreatment of handicapped newborns was brewing in the 1970s,8 6 the death of Baby Doe in
April 1982 catapulted the debate to national prominence. When Baby
Doe was born on April 9 in Bloomington, Indiana, he was diagnosed
with Down syndrome and an obstruction of the esophagus that precluded normal feeding but was surgically correctable; on the advice of
their obstetrician, Baby Doe's parents refused to consent to surgery to
correct that obstruction. 8 7 The hospital sought a judicial hearing to
override the parents' decision, but neither the Indiana Superior Court
nor the local Child Protection Committee found any reason to interfere
with the parents' decision.8 8 Baby Doe died when he was six days
86. Several articles published in medical journals in the 1970s displayed the
interest of some pediatricians in establishing criteria for nontreatment of infants born
with congenital anomalies and the willingness of practitioners to acquiesce in parental
decisions not to treat such infants. See, e.g., Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell,
Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 New Eng. J. Med. 890,
891 (1973) (reporting that over a two and a half year period, 43 of 299 deaths in the
special care nursery of Yale-New Haven Hospital resulted from the withdrawal of
treatment); John Lorber, Early Results of Selective Treatment of Spina Bifida Cystica, 4
Brit. Med. J. 201, 203 (1973) (examining list of contraindications to acute therapy for
infants with spina bifida cystica); Shaw et al., supra note 20, at 588 (reporting results of
survey concerning treatment decisions for infants born with congenital abnormalities).
See generally Koop, supra note 2 (describing the medical debate over nontreatment in
the 1970s); StanleyJ. Reiser, Survival at What Cost? Origins and Effects of the Modern
Controversy on Treating Severely Handicapped Newborns, 11 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L.
199 (1986) (describing technological innovations, emergence of bioethics movement,
growth of government involvement in health care, and social and medical debate on
abortion as background for controversy over selective nontreatment).
87. See Koop, supra note 2, at 109.
88. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 617 (1986) (plurality
opinion). The trial judge reasoned that because the parents were faced with two
competent medical opinions regarding the appropriateness of corrective surgery, they
could choose to follow either opinion without government interference. See Lawrence
D. Brown, Civil Rights and Regulatory Wrongs: The Reagan Administration and the
Medical Treatment of Handicapped Infants, I J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 231, 233 (1986).
Additional attempts to obtain judicial intervention were to no avail: the Indiana
Court of Appeals denied a request for an immediate hearing, In re Infant Doe, No. GU
8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982), and the Indiana Supreme Court
rejected a petition for a writ of mandamus, State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482-S140 (Ind. 1982). Baby Doe died while a stay was being sought in the United States
Supreme Court, which subsequently denied certiorari in the case. See Infant Doe v.
Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983). See also Bowen, 476 U.S. at 617 n.5.
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old.8 9 The stark facts of this six-day-long drama set in motion a chain
of legal events that would take four years to play out,90 but would resolve little. Instead, the federal responses to Baby Doe, as discussed
below, ultimately have failed to resolve the confusion surrounding the
legal status of selective nontreatment. 9 1
A. Baby Doe as a HandicapDiscriminationProblem
Just weeks after Baby Doe's death, acting on a directive from

President Reagan, 9 2 the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of
Health and Human Services sent a notice to most of the nation's hospi-

tals "remind[ing]" them that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibited
a recipient of federal financial assistance from withholding from a handicapped infant nutrition or medical treatment necessary to correct a
life-threatening condition. 93 The statutory authority cited, section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, provided: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
89. For a fuller account of the turmoil of Baby Doe's brief life, see Koop, supra note
2, at 109-10.
90. I do not mean to suggest that the legal issues raised by the Baby Doe case were
fully resolved by 1986. Nonetheless, since the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen, the
law regarding nontreatment of disabled infants has been relatively static, if not
uncontroversial.
91. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin, Two Puzzles, 1984 Ariz. St. LJ. 667, 668.
Professor Mnookin noted the "striking dichotomy between the law on the books ... and
the law in action" with respect to parental withholding of life-sustaining treatment for
disabled newborns. He supported his observation by comparing a formalistic approach
to the legality of nontreatment, as exemplified in John A. Robertson, Involuntary
Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 213 (1975), which
finds selective nontreatment to be outlawed, with a legal realist's approach, which finds
no criminal prosecutions and few neglect proceedings triggered by parental
nontreatment. Mnookin therefore concluded that parents have a legal right to select
nontreatment. See Mnookin, supra, at 668-71. Cf. Carl E. Schneider, supra note 2, at
152 (noting "a troubling disjunction between the law on the books, which seems to
make neonatal euthanasia criminal, and the law in action, which does not punish it").
92. See Brown, supra note 88, at 233-35 (describing President Reagan's reaction
to Baby Doe's death). The Reagan administration's conviction that federal law should
prohibit the withholding of medical treatment from handicapped infants was closely
linked to the administration's opposition to abortion. See Koop, supra note 2, at 101
("The death of handicapped newborn infants ... is extraordinarily important to those of
us who are interested in the sanctity of human life because this practice could never have
come about had it not been for abortion."); Constance Paige & Elisa B. Karnofsky, The
Antiabortion Movement and Baby Jane Doe, 11 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 255, 258
(1986). One commentator in 1985 linked the fervor with which right to life groups
pursued the issue to their inability in the 1970s to prevail on the abortion front. See
John D. Arras, Ethical Principles for the Care of Imperiled Newborns: Toward an Ethic
of Ambiguity, in Which Babies Shall Live?, supra note 2, at 83, 83. Following this
reasoning, the inroads made on abortion rights since the late 1980s may explain in part
why right to life groups have recently paid little attention to newborn nontreatment
issues.
93. 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982).
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subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." '9 4 The Department followed up on this
notice in March 1983 with the promulgation of an "Interim Final
Rule," requiring hospitals to post in a conspicuous place a notice titled:
"DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW." 9 5
The Interim Final Rule was promptly challenged by a group of
medical organizations and struck down by the D.C. District Court in
April 1983 on the grounds that it was "arbitrary and capricious and
promulgated in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act."'9 6 Undeterred by this setback, the Department recommenced the rulemaking
process and promulgated Final Rules by the beginning of 1984. 9 7 For

the most part, the new set of rules varied only slightly from the invalidated Interim Final Rule. 9 8 In a substantial departure, however, the

Final Rules required state child protective services agencies that received federal funds to use their "full authority pursuant to state law to
prevent instances of unlawful medical neglect of handicapped infants." 9 9 Like the Interim Final Rule, the Department's Final Rules
94. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). In enacting the Rehabilitation Act in 1973, Congress's
purpose was to develop and support programs for vocational rehabilitation and
independent living for persons with handicaps. See infra note 238. The civil rights
provision of the Act, § 504, drew scant legislative attention and was included in the
legislation by congressional staffers who were concerned that the vocational
rehabilitation programs' goal of allowing disabled persons to enter the mainstream of
society might be impeded by discriminatory attitudes of employers. See Richard K.
Scotch, From Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal Disability Policy 51
(1984).
95. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630, 9631-32 (1983). The Interim Final Rule also required the
notice to advise of the availability of a confidential "hotline" for reporting violations and
authorized expedited investigations and access to medical records when HHS officials
believed such access was necessary to protect a handicapped infant. Although these
provisions were decried by medical personnel as being disruptive of hospital routine and
infant care, see American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 399
(D.D.C. 1983), they were consistent with "fundamental standard operating procedures"
for enforcing federal civil rights laws. See Brown, supra note 88, at 235-36 (describing
the drafting of the Interim Final Rule).
96. American Academy of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 404. The court found the Interim
Final Rule arbitrary and capricious because HHS failed to consider important aspects of
medical decision-making and found an additional violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) in the Secretary's failure to solicit public comment before issuing
the rule. See id. at 399-401.
97. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b)(3) (1983) (codification of Final Rules).
98. The Final Rules required hospitals to post informational notices on one of two
approved forms and authorized expedited access to records and expedited compliance
actions. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(b), (d), (e).
99. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(c)(1). As part of this mandate, the Final Rules set forth
certain procedures that the state agencies would be required to establish and maintain
for receiving and reviewing reports of medical neglect. See 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.55(c)(1)(i)-(v).
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were promptly challenged in court by a group of medical organizations.
The fate of the challenge to the Final Rules, however, was shaped by a
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals arising out of another
highly publicized instance of nontreatment.10 0
At issue in that case, United States v. University Hospital,'0 t was the
Department of Health and Human Services' authority pursuant to section 504 to obtain from a hospital the medical records of an infant
whose parents had refused to consent to corrective surgery for spina
bifida. 10 2 The court framed the question as one of statutory construction: Did Congress intend section 504 to reach medical treatment decisions for infants with handicaps?' 0 3 After reviewing the regulatory
history of section 504 and parsing the statutory language, the court
concluded that the statute could not sensibly be applied to such decisions. Although the infant might be a "handicapped individual" under
section 504, its very handicap was likely to give rise to the need for
medical services,' 0 4 and the infant therefore could not be "otherwise
qualified" for those services, as required by section 504's express language. Likewise, the court rejected the idea that a medical treatment
decision could be found to be discriminatory "[w]here the handicap100. See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). This
decision was one of several dealing with issues raised by the nontreatment of an infant,
known as "Baby Jane Doe," born with multiple congenital defects, including
myelomeningocele (spina bifida or imperfect closure of the spinal column),
microcephaly (an abnormally small head), and hydrocephalus (fluid in the cranial vault).
Baby Jane Doe's parents declined to consent to corrective surgery for the spina bifida
and hydrocephalus, choosing instead to follow a "conservative" course of medical
treatment, involving good nutrition, administration of antibiotics, and measures to
prevent infection. See id. at 146. Litigation challenging the parents' choice in the New
York State courts ultimately failed because the petitioner seeking an order directing
University Hospital to perform the corrective surgery had no interest in or relationship
to the family and had not requested the aid of the responsible state agency. See Weber
v. Stony Brook Hosp., 456 N.E.2d 1186, 1187-88 (N.Y. 1983) (per curiam). The matter
found its way into federal court when, during the course of the state court proceedings,
HHS received a complaint that Baby Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied
treatment in violation of § 504. When HHS's request to the hospital for access to all of
Baby Jane Doe's medical records was denied, the federal government brought suit
alleging that University Hospital had violated § 504 and 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) (an access
provision in the general regulations promulgated under § 504). See University Hosp.,
729 F.2d at 147-48.
For a follow-up story on Baby Jane Doe's life after the litigation, see Glazer, supra
note 18, at 8.
101. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
102. Because this litigation commenced after the Department's Interim Final Rule
had been held invalid, but before its Final Rules were promulgated, at issue in University
Hospital was the Department's authority under § 504 itself and an implementing
regulation that predated the Baby Doe case, 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) (1982), as incorporated
by 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1982). See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 146.
103. See 729 F.2d at 150.
104. See id. at 155-57.
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ping condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated."' 0 5 Thus,
the court refused to sanction HHS's attempt to conduct an investigation of alleged nontreatment pursuant to section 504.106
Judge Winter dissented from the majority's conclusion, largely in
reliance on Congress' treatment of handicap discrimination as analogous to race discrimination.10 7 Once that analogy is drawn, according

to Judge Winter, the analytical task of applying the law to medical treatment decisions becomes more straightforward: "A judgment not to
perform certain surgery because a person is black is not a bonafide medicaljudgment. So too, a decision not to correct a life threatening digestive problem because an infant has Down's Syndrome is not a bonafide
medical judgment."1 0 8 Thus, Judge Winter concluded that section 504
applies to the provision of medical services to handicapped infants.
University Hospital's holding that Congress did not intend section
504 to apply to medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants
provided clear authority to the district court hearing the challenge to
HHS's Final Rules to declare the Rules invalid, a decision the Second
Circuit summarily affirmed in accordance with its own earlier decision. 10 9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bowen v. American
Hospital Association 1o and affirmed, but on narrower grounds.
The plurality opinion"'I in Bowen limited its consideration to the
validity of the Final Rules' "four mandatory components" ' 1 2 and dis105. Id. at 157.
106. See id. at 161. In so doing, the Court of Appeals affirmed thejudgment of the
district court without confirming its reasoning. In granting summary judgment for the
hospital, the district court reasoned that the hospital's failure to perform the corrective
surgery could not be a violation of § 504 because it was based on Baby Jane Doe's
parents' refusal to consent to the surgery, not on the infant's handicap. See United
States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144
(2d Cir. 1984).
107. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 162 (Winter, J., dissenting). In finding this
analogy, Judge Winter cited to the Senate Report on § 504, which stated: "Section 504
was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of section
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... " Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6390).
108. Id. Judge Winter, however, failed to apply his reasoning to the judgment not
to perform surgery to correct the myelomeningocele suffered by Baby Jane Doe and
thus failed to confront the question of how to apply antidiscrimination law when the
disabling condition is the very one needing treatment. For a discussion of the difficulty
of applying antidiscrimination law to such a situation, see infra text accompanying notes
253-254.
109. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541, 542 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
794 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1984).
110. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
111. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joined in the opinion authored by
Justice Stevens. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment. Justices White,
Brennan, and O'Connor dissented. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision. See
id. at 611.
112. Id. at 624. The four mandatory provisions required (1) that health care
providers receiving federal funds post certain notices; (2) that state child protective
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claimed any need to determine "whether § 504 ever applies to individ1 I3
ual medical treatment decisions involving handicapped infants."'
Leaving this fundamental issue unaddressed, the Court focused on
whether the Department had sufficiently justified its promulgation, pursuant to section 504, of rules authorizing the federal government
to
1 14
intervene in medical treatment decisions for handicapped infants.
The Secretary of HHSjustified the need for federal intervention by
pointing out that hospitals could be violating section 504 in one of two
ways: either by failing to treat a handicapped infant when its parents
have consented to treatment1 5 or by failing to report incidents of medical neglect of handicapped infants to state child protection agencies. 11 6 The plurality found insufficient evidence in the administrative
record to support either justification. 1 7 Accordingly, the plurality invalidated the four mandatory provisions of the Final Rules for lack of a
proper evidentiary foundation.'1 8
In dissent, Justice White found that the appeal directly posed the
question whether section 504 authorized the Secretary to regulate medservices agencies establish certain procedures; (3) immediate access to patient records;
and (4) expedited compliance actions. See id. at 613-16 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.55
(1985)).
113. Id. at 624.
114. Before assessing the Secretary's justifications for intervention, the plurality
emphasized that prior to the regulatory activity triggered by the Baby Doe case, the
federal government played no role in the process of medical decision-making for infants.
See id. at 627-28.
115. The Department's first attempts at rulemaking following the Baby Doe case
sought to prescribe hospitals' obligations under § 504 without addressing the absence
of parental consent to treatment as an issue. See id. at 617-19. In promulgating the
Final Rules, however, the Secretary recognized that § 504 does not mandate that a
hospital may override a discriminatory parental decision. See 49 Fed. Reg. 1631 (1984)
(preamble to Final Rules).
116. See 476 U.S. at 637.
117. The plurality found no evidence that hospitals refused treatment authorized
by an infant's parents. See id. at 631. Instead, the instances cited by the Secretary as
support for the regulations involved parental refusal to consent to treatment. See id. at
631-32. No § 504 violation is involved in such cases, however, because "without the
consent of the parents or a surrogate decisionmaker the infant is neither 'otherwise
qualified' for treatment nor has he been denied care 'solely by reason of his handicap.'"
Id. at 630.
In response to the Secretary's other asserted justification, the plurality conceded
that a hospital's selective failure to report medical neglect of handicapped infants when
it would report neglect of a similarly situated infant could violate § 504, but again found
no specific evidence that such a violation had occurred. See id. at 637-38. Moreover,
the plurality reasoned that the Final Rules did not directly require hospitals to report
instances of medical neglect of handicapped infants, but instead imposed an obligation
on state agencies to require such reports, an imposition the plurality found "totally
foreign" to the Secretary's authority to prevent discrimination under § 504. See id. at
639-40.
118. See id. at 643. The lack of an evidentiary basis for the Final Rules particularly
concerned the plurality in light of the unprecedented federal intrusion into an area of
traditional state governance that enforcement would entail. See id. at 643-44.
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ical treatment decisions for handicapped newborns. 119 Addressing that
issue, the dissent disagreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion in University Hospital and found that in some situations section 504 may apply
to medical treatment decisions for newborns. For example, the dissent
suggested that in cases involving medical treatment for a problem completely unrelated to an infant's handicapping condition, the failure to
provide treatment that an otherwise healthy child would receive could
constitute discrimination on the basis of handicap.' 20 In addition, in
response to the plurality's conclusion that no need for the Final Rules
had been shown, the dissent argued that a "more elusive discrimination" justifying federal regulation could be found in physicians' influence on parental decisions regarding consent to treatment for
21
handicapped newborns.'
Thus, the four years of legal wrangling following Baby Doe's death
came to an end when the Supreme Court pulled the rug out from under
efforts 12 2 by the Reagan administration to use handicap discrimination
law to save the lives of handicapped infants denied life-saving treatment. 123 The legal battles that flowed from the Administration's reliance on section 504 illustrate some of the difficulties inherent in
adopting a disability discrimination approach to the problem of selective nontreatment. Although the Administration's instinct that treating
some infants differently based simply on their handicapped status was
unjust and contrary to the spirit of the nondiscrimination provision of
the Rehabilitation Act was sound, the government's response failed to
address adequately the implication of section 504's "otherwise qualified" standard. The series of regulations issued under section 504
raised but did not answer the question of what it means for a handicapped infant like the infant in University Hospital to be "otherwise qualified" for medical treatment that would not be called for in the absence
of her handicap.
The Supreme Court did not respond to this difficulty directly, for
119. See id. at 648 (White, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 655-56 (White, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 658-59 (White, J., dissenting). The plurality rejected this theory of
justification as "find[ing] no support in the text of the regulation, the reasoning of the
Secretary, or the briefs filed on his behalf in this Court." Id. at 636 n.22.
122. Bowen left in force the nonmandatory provisions of the Final Rules
recommending that health care providers establish Infant Care Review Committees
(ICRCs) and describing a model ICRC. The purpose of the ICRCs was to assist in the
development of treatment standards for handicapped infants and to provide assistance
in making individual treatment decisions. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (a), (f) (1992).
123. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion chastised the Secretary of HHS: "[N]othing
in the statute authorizes the Secretary to dispense with the law's focus on discrimination
and instead to employ federal resources to save the lives of handicapped newborns,
without regard to whether they are victims of discrimination by recipients of federal
funds or not." 476 U.S. at 647. What the plurality opinion failed to address, and what
this Article seeks to clarify, is what the concept of discrimination means in the context of
medical treatment decision-making.
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their decision in Bowen invalidated the section 504 regulations based on
the Secretary's procedural failure to develop a record justifying the regulations, but conspicuously left open the question whether medical
treatment decisions for those infants could ever fall within the scope of
section 504's protection. Moreover, although the Second Circuit concluded in University Hospital that medical treatment decisions for a disabled infant were beyond the scope of section 504, its reasoning
reflected the facts of the case before it, where the infant's disability itself gave rise to the need for medical treatment.12 4 Thus, neither Bowen
nor University Hospital needs be read to preclude application of section
504 to selective nontreatment when, for example, the parents of a disabled infant do not refuse to consent to the treatment and the condition requiring treatment is unrelated to the infant's disabling condition.
Thus, the question of whether and how disability discrimination law 1 25
can be appropriately applied to medical treatment decision-making remains open. By the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Bowen, however, the federal government was already using a new mechanism for combatting selective nontreatment: in 1984 Congress
amended the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act' 26 to include
provisions addressed to nontreatment of infants.
B. Baby Doe as a Child Welfare Problem
In enacting the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 (the Amendments or CAA),' 2 7 Congress cast the issue of selective nontreatment as
a child welfare issue properly within the authority of state child welfare
agencies. Rather than protecting disabled infants from discrimination,
the Amendments sought to protect them from medical neglect, which
Congress defined as including "instances of withholding of medically
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions." 128 This phrase, moreover, is defined as meaning "the failure to
respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication)
which, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical
judgment, will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or cor124. See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 155-57 (2d Cir. 1984);
see also supra text accompanying notes 101-106.
125. Although this Article focuses its analysis on how the ADA should be
interpreted to apply in the context of medical treatment decision-making, this analysis is
also largely applicable to interpreting § 504 in that context. While either disability
discrimination law may thus be applicable, infra Part VI.A discusses why the ADA may
provide a better vehicle for addressing disability discrimination in medical decisionmaking.
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1988).
127. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5106 (1988)).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1988).
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Backing away from an absolute treat-

ment mandate, however, Congress limited the broad sweep of the
statutory definition of medical neglect by making exceptions for a failure to provide treatment
when, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable
medical judgment-(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would-(i)

merely prolong dying; (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions; or (iii)
otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or (C)
the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment
itself
30
under such circumstances would be inhumane.'
The regulations issued by HHS under the Child Abuse Amendments and the interpretative guidelines published as an Appendix to
the regulations provide an administrative gloss on the meaning of the

statutory standards.15 1 The Appendix indicates that HHS expects to
construe narrowly the three exceptional situations when failure to treat
will not constitute medical neglect;' 3 2 in particular, the Appendix lets it
be understood that quality of life considerations must not be the basis
133
of a decision not to treat a disabled infant.
Despite the Department's attempt to provide interpretative guidance, much disagreement remains aboutjust how far the Amendments
and regulations go in requiring continued treatment of severely ill or
disabled infants.' 3 4 For those who focus on the statutory exceptions'
129. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10).
130. Id.

131. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.15, 1340 app. (1992). The Appendix includes interpretations that were contained in the Department's proposed rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160
(1984) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984), but withdrawn by the Department following
objections by commentators. In publishing the Appendix, the Department disavowed
any attempt to establish the interpretations as binding rules of law. "Rather," the
Appendix states, "this guidance is intended to assist in interpreting the statutory
definition so that it may be rationally and thoughtfully applied in specific contexts in a
manner fully consistent with the legislative intent." 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app., at 297.
132. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app., at 300-01 (stating that the "merely prolong
dying" provision does not apply "where the prognosis is not for death in the near
future, but rather the more distant future"); id. at 302 (interpreting "virtually futile" to
mean that "the treatment is highly unlikely to prevent death in the near future").
133. See id. at 298 (stating that the definition "does not sanction decisions based
on subjective opinions about the future 'quality of life' of a retarded or disabled
person"); id. at 303 (stating that HHS "strongly believes" an interpretation of the
inhumaneness exception that would allow consideration of the infant's future "quality of
life" is inconsistent with the statute).
134. The two, and apparently only, instances in which courts have applied the
standards of the CAA to treatment decisions for individual infants shed little light on the
scope of the standards. In In re Steinhaus, No. J-86-92 (Minn. Redwood County Ct.,
Juv. Div. Sept. 11, 1986), reprinted in Order in the Steinhaus Case, 2 Issues L. & Med.
241, 251 (1986), the court had to decide whether antibiotics and resuscitation could be
withheld from an infant suffering from severe brain damage as a result of an abusive
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strict language, the requirements seem overbroad and harsh: "A slim
chance of survival apparently justifies inhumane treatment as does
some chance of a survival wracked by excruciating pain, severe abnormalities and a torturous regime of medical interventions." 13 5 By contrast, for those who focus on the directive that decisions reflect
"reasonable medical judgment," 13 6 the regulations appear to leave
some latitude in decision-making.1 3 7 And despite the Appendix's firm
stance that quality of life judgments are off limits, Professor Nancy
Rhoden argues that, to the extent the three exceptions allow some degree of discretion, they embody "an implicit recognition of the rele13 8
vance of quality of life concerns."
State child protective service agencies, rather than HHS, are rebeating. The court's holding turned on whether the infant was in a chronic and
irreversible coma or a persistent vegetative state, since the CAA provides that treatment
may be withheld from infants in the former condition, but not the latter. A further
hearing found that the infant was chronically and irreversibly comatose and that
resuscitation was not required. See In re Steinhaus, No. J-86-92 slip op. at 3 (Minn.
Redwood County Ct., Juv. Div. Oct. 18, 1986).
In In re Baby Girl Muller, described in James Bopp, Jr. & Mary Nimz, A Legal
Analysis of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, in Compelled Compassion, supra
note 2, at 73, 91-92, the court was confronted with the issue of whether ventilator
support could be withdrawn from an infant born one month prematurely with severe,
permanent mental and physical disabilities. The infant could neither breathe without
the assistance of a ventilator nor be fed except through intravenous means. The court
found that (1) the infant was terminally ill despite the aid of life-support systems; and (2)
the use of the ventilator was thus merely prolonging death and was not effective in
ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions. Since the CAA
did not require treatment under these conditions, the court held that the ventilator
could be withdrawn provided that all other medical care, including nutrition and
hydration, continue. See id.
135. Newman, supra note 2, at 4; see also Loretta M. Kopelman et al.,
Neonatologists, Pediatricians, and the Supreme Court Criticize the "Baby Doe"
Regulations, in Compelled Compassion, supra note 2, at 237, 262-65 (arguing that the
regulations may be interpreted as requiring physicians to act inconsistently with the
infant's best interests); Robert F. Weir, Pediatric Ethics Committees: Ethical Advisers or
Legal Watchdogs? 15 L. Med. & Health Care 99, 104 (1987) (arguing that the
Amendments reflect an inflexible rule that "whenever current technology can prolong
life (that is, can prolong noncomatose life beyond the 'near future'), it must be
employed") (quotingJ.C. Moskop & R.L. Saldanha, The Baby Doe Rule: Still a Threat,
14 Hastings Center Rep. 10 (1984)).
136. The regulations define "reasonable medical judgment" as "medical judgment
that would be made by a reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case
and the treatment possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved." 45
C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(3)(ii) (1992).
137. See Lantos, supra note 18, at 445. Physicians' confusion regarding the
meaning and effect of the regulations is evidenced by the results of a survey of perinatal
pediatricians. See Kopelman et al., supra note 18, at 678-79. The authors posed three
hypothetical case histories and asked respondents, among other questions, what
response the federal regulations would require in the hypothetical cases, and found little
agreement among respondents as to what action the regulations required in specific
cases. See id.
138. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1313.
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sponsible for enforcing the Amendments' protections by establishing
procedures for receiving and responding to reports of medical neglect.
As part of their enforcement role, the Amendments call for state agencies to have authority to initiate legal proceedings "to prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with
1 9
life-threatening conditions." 3
In marked contrast to the flurry of regulatory and judicial activity
spawned by HHS's attempts to regulate selective nontreatment under
section 504, the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 have faced no judicial challenges and have generated little litigation. 140 This paucity of
litigation may be partly attributable to the Amendments' genesis as a
political compromise among right to life activists, disability rights
groups, and the medical profession, 14 1 or it may suggest that the
Amendments, as implemented, have done little to challenge the nature
of medical decision-making in the neonatal or pediatric intensive care
units.
In fact, the efficacy of the Amendments in combatting nontreatment of disabled newborns is commonly questioned. Although evalu42
ating the impact of the Child Abuse Amendments is a difficult task,'
as a practical matter the Amendments may be difficult to enforce for a
combination of reasons. First, the Amendments delegate enforcement
responsibility to a chronically overburdened, understaffed group: state
child protective services agencies.' 43 The obligation to take on this
new task of policing against selective nontreatment is not mandatory on
the state agencies, but is only a condition of receiving federal grant
139. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10)(C) (1988). The requirement that the state agency
have such procedures in place is not directly binding on the states, but is a condition of

receiving federal grants for child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment programs.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10).
140. For a description of two cases decided under the Amendments, see supra note

134.
141. In proposing regulations under the Amendments, HHS commented that the

regulations had developed through the cooperation of medical and disability advocacy
organizations. See 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160 (1984) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984). Right to life
groups also influenced the enactment of the legislation. See Martin H. Gerry & Mary
Nimz, The Federal Role in Protecting Babies Doe, 2 Issues L. & Med. 339, 343 (1987).
142. SeeJanna C. Merrick, Conflict, Compromise, and Symbolism: The Politics of
the Baby Doe Debate, in Compelled Compassion, supra note 2, at 35, 60. Merrick
suggests that the following factors complicate the evaluation: the substantial
disagreement about the extent of selective nontreatment prior to the federal
government's initiatives; the vagueness of the Amendments' language; and the lack of
adequate information regarding changes in medical practice and any causal relationship
to the Amendments.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1988); cf. Koop, supra note 2, at 111-12
(reasoning that the Amendments' standards, because they are left to states with different
child abuse regulatory procedures and are not enforceable against individuals,
effectively are unenforceable); Newman, supra note 2, at 6 ("[T]he law selects the
understaffed, often overwhelmed personnel of state and local child abuse agencies to
carry out its mandate.").
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Yet this carrot may not be inducement enough' 4 5 for the

state agencies to rechannel scarce resources away from growing
problems of physical and sexual abuse and drug-exposed infants to
Baby Doe enforcement activity. Moreover, the Amendments, by their

very terms, 14 6 focus solely on whether a state has in place procedures

for the purpose of responding to reports of medical neglect; they
im1 47
pose no obligation to implement those procedures aggressively.
The nature of the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), where most
decisions regarding the treatment or nontreatment of disabled
newborns are made, presents an additional structural barrier to strict
enforcement of the federal standards. 148 The process of making treatment decisions for infants in the NICU has been described as a "closedworld phenomenon," where external influences, including legal authority, are frequently denied and where neonatologists may usurp parental decision-making authority. 149 In addition, the tightly knit
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (1988).
145. In 1992, the Child Abuse and Neglect Basic State Grants distributed nationally
amounted to a total of $17,518,000. Indiana, Maryland, and Pennsylvania did not apply
for Basic State Grants. Telephone conversation with Mary McKeough, National Center
for Child Abuse and Neglect (Feb. 23, 1993). Cf. Newman, supra note 2, at 6 (citing $9
million as the total outlay for 1987).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10) (1988) provides:
In order for a State to qualify for a grant under subsection (a) of this
section, such State shall(10) have in place for the purpose of responding to the reporting of
medical neglect (including instances of withholding of medically indicated
treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions),
procedures or programs, or both (within the State child protective services
system), to provide for(A) coordination and consultation with individuals designated by and
within appropriate health-care facilities;
(B) prompt notification by individuals designated by and within
appropriate health-care facilities of cases of suspected medical neglect
(including instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment
from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions); and
(C) authority, under State law, for the State child protective services
system to pursue any legal remedies, including the authority to initiate
legal proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, as may be
necessary to prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment
from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.
147. The only enforcement provision in the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Program Act is a provision allowing the Secretary of HHS to withhold funds
from a state, after reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing, when the
Secretary finds a failure to comply with any provisions of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 5116e
(1988). Cf. Note, Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1519, 1592-93 (1990) (suggesting that procedural uncertainty and
procedural safeguards may also limit the enforceability of the Amendments).
148. See Guillemin & Holmstrom, supra note 18, at 281 ("The closed world of the
Level III nursery may permit greater discretion than the rule allows.").
149. See id. at 141-42, 171-72 (describing NICU as a place where "[t]he influence
of the law was ...kept at bay" and where staff interaction with parents was "based on
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hierarchical structure among physicians and nurses working in the
NICU may tend to quell any dissension in the ranks regarding treatment or nontreatment decisions and thus prevent the reporting of nontreatment to state agencies.' 50
In light of these factors, the fact that federal monitors of the
151
Amendments' implementation have questioned their effectiveness
should come as no surprise. Nonetheless, the federal standards may
have served a symbolic, if not practical, purpose of appeasing the anti152
abortion and disability rights groups that influenced their passage.
Thus, the legal legacy of Baby Doe is one of uncertainty. Neither
the viability nor the appropriateness of either of the federal government's responses to Baby Doe has been fully confirmed or denied. In
the context of this uncertainty, Congress passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act in 1990. Although neither the language of the ADA nor
its legislative history makes express reference to nontreatment of disabled newborns,' 5 3 the ADA can and should be construed as prohibiting discriminatory nontreatment based on disability, in much the same
way that section 504 can be construed as prohibiting nontreatment
based on handicap. It is into this arena of legal uncertainty on the
question of nontreatment decisions that the HIV-infected infant needthe . . . assumption that . . . power of guardianship passes to the physicians on

admission").
150. See id. at 118-24 (discussing interactions between physicians, residents,
nurses, and other hospital staff in the NICU).
151. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Medical Discrimination Against Children
with Disabilities 148-49, 152 (1989) [hereinafter U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights] (finding
"substantial failure" by state child protective agencies to enforce the Amendments and
charging that "discriminatory denial of medical treatment . . .has not dramatically
changed since the implementation of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984"); Newman,
supra note 2, at 9 (" 'It is not clear what impact the Federal legislation and increased
State responsibility have had on the incidence or handling of baby Doe reports.' ")
(quoting Office of Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Survey
of State Baby Doe Programs 13 (1987)).
Of course, determining "effectiveness" requires identifying a base point from which
to measure change. Since there is little agreement over the extent of selective
nontreatment prior to the Child Abuse Amendments, the debate over the effectiveness
of the Amendments begins to sound like an argument over whether a glass of water is
half empty or half full. Compare Bopp & Nimz, supra note 134, at 94-95 (citing Civil
Rights Commission's findings of widespread failures by state agencies to implement the
Amendments and of the agencies' abdication of their authority to hospital infant care
review committees, hospital staffs, and medical associations) with Arthur L. Caplan,
Hard Cases Make Bad Law: The Legacy of the Baby Doe Controversy, in Compelled
Compassion, supra note 2, at 105, 113 ("The information that does exist [regarding the
treatment of newborns] does not support the view that federal intervention was
necessary, nor does it support the position that federal action has been beneficial for
infants or their families.").
152. See, e.g., Guillemin & Holmstrom, supra note 18, at 255, 281 (discussing
influence of Life, an anti-abortion pressure group, in prosecution of pediatrician for
nontreatment of infant with Down syndrome); Mnookin, supra note 91, at 675-76.
153. See infra text accompanying note 252.
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ing medical treatment is thrown. In light of the mixed legal responses
to selective nontreatment, we need also to consider what the Baby Doe
controversy taught us regarding the ethics of selective nontreatment
and whether those ethical lessons can lend normative insights to our
legal analysis of selective nontreatment based on HIV infection.
IV.

THE ETHICAL LEGACY OF BABY DOE

A fundamental ethical question posed by both the Baby Doe controversy and the hypothetical scenarios of selective nontreatment revealed by the JAMA survey is what standards should guide medical
decision-makers making treatment choices for an infant incapable of
making its own autonomous choices. The general model of medical
decision-making, discussed below, requires physician deference to patient autonomy and thus does not suit treatment decision-making for a
disabled infant. The ethical principle of respect for autonomy is premised on a decision-maker who is capable of making decisions that are
voluntary and that are informed by his own values and priorities.15 4 By
definition, an infant, whether or not disabled, has no decisional autonomy that demands respect.
This lack of autonomy has two main implications with respect to
disabled infants. First, someone other than the patient must choose
among treatment options. 155 Second, that decision-maker may need
ethical guidance in determining what treatment option is preferable for
a particular infant. In terms of the relevance of that ethical guidance to
legal analysis, identifying appropriate ethical norms for making treatment decisions for disabled infants may help us decide whether and
how existing legal standards could be applied consistently with ethical
decision-making for HIV-infected infants.
For example, Part VI proposes a standard for interpreting the
ADA's sweeping mandate as applying to nonparental decision-making
for HIV-infected infants. In light of the ADA's extremely broad and
inclusive general prohibitions, as contrasted with the failure of either
the statute itself or its legislative history to address specifically this particular application, Part VI must confront an essentially normative
154. See generally Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, Principles of
(refiguring the concept of autonomy for use in
moral theory). The principle is extended, however, to respecting the former autonomy
of patients who are no longer competent to make autonomous choices. Under a
"substituted judgment" standard, courts have deferred to refusals of treatment based
upon a now-incompetent patient's past expressions of values and priorities or of desires
regarding medical treatment. See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 72 (N.Y. 1981).
155. The ordinary presumption is that parents are the proper decision-makers
regarding medical treatment for minor children. See Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care
for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645,
645-46 (1977). Much of the commentary on the Baby Doe controversy occupied itself
with whether that presumption should remain intact in cases involving severely disabled
newborns.

Biomedical Ethics 67-71 (3d ed. 1989)
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question: Should the ADA's indeterminacy be resolved by interpreting
the statute to apply to nonparental treatment choices for infants with
HIV and to medical decision-making more generally? Considering the
ethical debate sparked by Baby Doe's death can both help us answer
this question and suggest an answer to a related question: What should
it mean to "apply the ADA" in the context of medical decision-making?
More specifically, having considered ethical arguments regarding the
appropriateness of selective nontreatment based on disability will enable us better to assess the normative implications of the different ways
that the ADA could be interpreted as applying (or not) to medical decision-making, particularly decision-making for infants with HIV
infection.
Before plunging into Baby Doe's ethical maelstrom,1 56 however, a
brief examination of ethical standards for medical decision-making in
general is in order. As a general proposition, the intrinsic purpose of
medicine is to promote health, a goal more specifically described as
seeking to preserve life and to eliminate or lessen pain and suffering, all
while respecting patients' autonomy. Because these goals may at times
conflict, for example when measures necessary to preserve a patient's
life will increase her physical suffering, they should be pursued in a
balanced manner. In other words, no single goal will always take prece57
dence over the others.'
In deciding what treatment to recommend for a patient, a physician should adhere to the principles of beneficence and
156. While the issue discussed in the text is substantive in nature, the other central
issue raised by selective nontreatment is procedural: Who is the appropriate party to
decide whether a disabled newborn should receive life-saving medical treatment?
Secondary, but difficult, issues raised by selective nontreatment include the following:
Is there any ethical distinction between withholding treatment and withdrawing
treatment once it has been commenced? Can nutrition and hydration ethically be
withheld or withdrawn? What role should institutional ethics committees play in the
decision-making process? What are the respective obligations of the family and society
to care for a disabled infant whose life is saved by medical treatment? Can the costs of
treatment ethically be considered in deciding whether to treat? For a comprehensive
analysis of these ethical issues, see Newborns Project, supra note 2.
157. See David C. Blake, State Interests in Terminating Medical Treatment,
Hastings Center Rep., May-June 1989, at 5, 6. The balancing of these sometimes
incompatible goals occurs most clearly in cases where patients seek to refuse medical
treatment that would prolong their lives, but cause either physical or mental suffering
that the patient is unwilling to bear. If the patient is competent, courts almost invariably
respect the patient's autonomous choice to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Public Health Trust
of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97-98 (Fla. 1989). If the patient is
incompetent, the courts are likely either (1) to seek to determine, based on evidence
regarding the patient's expressed desires and values, what decision regarding treatment
the patient would make if competent (the "substituted judgment" test) or (2) to decide
what treatment decision is in the patient's "best interests." See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209, 1229-30 (N.J. 1985); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 72.
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nonmaleficence. 158 Both principles are embodied in the ethical precept
that physicians should make decisions consistent with the best interests
of the patient. 159 This norm, which is concordant with the standard of
care applied in medical malpractice cases, 160 requires that the benefits
expected to flow from proposed medical treatment outweigh any harms
that may accompany the treatment. 161 The best interests of the patient
158. The principle of beneficence requires that a moral agent act to promote good
or minimize or prevent harm. The principle of nonmaleficence requires that an agent
refrain from doing harm. See Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 154, at 194-95. Of
these two general principles, the latter comports with the primary principle of medical
ethics: "First, do no harm." Id. at 120.
Until the past few decades, physicians were expected to rely exclusively on the
principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence in making decisions for the benefit of a
patient. In the past twenty years, however, patients have demanded, and medical ethics
has come to recognize, that the patient, not his physician, should be primarily
responsible for determining the patient's best interests. Consequently, many of the
ethical issues that physicians face today arise from a perceived conflict between the
physician's ethical obligations both to respect the patient's autonomous decision
regarding treatment and to pursue the treatment that the physician believes is in the
patient's best interests. See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino & David C. Thomasma,
The Conflict Between Autonomy and Beneficence in Medical Ethics: Proposal for a
Resolution, 3J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 23 (1987) (proposing beneficence model of
medical treatment as alternative to patient autonomy and medical paternalism models).
159. Evidence that the medical profession's fundamental ethical obligation lies in
promoting the patient's well-being is present throughout the American Medical
Association's code of ethics. See, e.g., AMA Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., Current
Opinions, op. 2.17 (1989) (stating that in making treatment decisions concerning the
severely ill, the primary consideration is the best interests of the patient and not those of
the family or society); id. op. 2.20 (specifying that when a patient is incompetent to act in
his own behalf and did not indicate his views on withholding or withdrawing lifeprolonging medical treatment prior to becoming incompetent, the family or the
patient's proxy, with the physician's aid, must act in the patient's best interest); AMA
Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., Reports, op. 2.22 (1987) (listing as one of seven
considerations in drafting a statement of policy regarding do not resuscitate orders:
"[t]he social commitment of a physician is to sustain life despite disabilities, handicaps,
or advanced age, except in circumstances where efforts to prolong life would be
inhumane and unconscionable" and are not in accord with the patient's best interests.).
160. Cf. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians
be Changed to Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1809, 1816 (1992) ("[O]ne major theme followed [by medicine and law] is that the
best interests of the patient should be the overriding concern when determining what
care should be provided.").
161. See Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 154, at 228-34; Rhoden, supra note
2, at 1314 (arguing that dying newborns may not live long enough to develop an ability
to appreciate their last days in a way that outweighs the pain of present medical
procedures). Although many people may think of medical treatment as being inherently
beneficial, most treatments carry with them some level of physical invasiveness, pain,
risk of side effects, or risk of iatrogenic injury or nosocomial infection. See, e.g.,
Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1322. An iatrogenic injury is any adverse condition suffered by
a patient as a result of medical treatment, especially infections acquired during the
course of treatment, and a nosocomial infection is an infection acquired after admittance
to the hospital. See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 812, 1151 (27th ed. 1988).
Thus, few medical treatments can be regarded as purely benign. Moreover, neither
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standard also prescribes that a physician's treatment recommendation
reflect an individualized assessment of the patient's interests 16 2 and
that those interests take priority over any conflicting interests of a
health care provider in personal financial benefit or of society in con1 63
serving or allocating scarce resources.
Because these general norms do not fit a situation involving medimedical ethics nor the legal standard of care necessarily require a physician to
recommend every procedure or treatment that potentially offers some benefit, no matter
how minimal or how uncertain, to the patient. Thus, some medical care that offers some
potential benefit may nonetheless be deemed unnecessary. See Hirshfeld, supra note
160, at 1828-31. But see Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding
that standard of care required glaucoma testing for young patient even though
glaucoma occurs in only one out of every 25,000 people under age forty).
162. See Hirshfeld, supra note 160, at 1817-18 ("Decisions about necessity... are
based on case by case determinations ...as opposed to the application of a set of
predetermined criteria."). Cf. AMA Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., Current Opinions,
op. 2.20 (1992) (directing physicians to consider such factors as "the possibility for
extending life under humane and comfortable conditions; the patient's values about life
and the way it should be lived; and the patient's attitudes toward sickness, suffering,
medical procedures, and death").
163. See AMA, supra note 162, op. 2.09 ("[S]ocial policy expects that concern for
the care the patient receives will be the physician's first consideration."); id. op. 4.04
("[W]here the economic interests of the hospital are in conflict with patient welfare,
patient welfare takes priority."); id. op. 8.03 ("If a conflict develops between the
physician's financial interest and the physician's responsibilities to the patient, the
conflict must be resolved to the patient's benefit.").
Of course, the current debates over whether and how to ration scarce health care
resources suggest that situations may exist when, as a matter of social policy, a patient's
interest in receiving a particular beneficial medical treatment may be subordinated to
society's interests in conserving or efficiently allocating resources. For discussions of
rationing from a variety of perspectives, see generally Symposium, The Law and Policy
of Health Care Rationing: Models and Accountability, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1505 (1992).
A distinction can and should be made, however, between decisions made by policymakers, whose charge is to act in the interests of society, and decisions made by
physicians, whose charge is to act in the interests of individual patients. Cf. Hirshfeld,
supra note 160, at 1840-42 (suggesting that a societal decision to engage in explicit
rationing need not be incompatible with physician decision-making based on a patient's
best interests). This distinction is discussed further infra in the text accompanying notes
291-302.
Some commentators, however, suggest that the medical malpractice standard of
care should be changed to accommodate current efforts towards cost containment in
health care and new models of health care delivery like health maintenance
organizations. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard under Health Care
Cost Containment, 17 L. Med. & Health Care 347, 347-52 (1989) (examining the view
of commentators on the role of cost containment in establishing a standard of care for
physicians in malpractice cases); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard
of Medical Care, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1719, 1745-63 (1987) (discussing several ways in which
the current malpractice standard may be modified). But see Andrea J. Lairson,
Reexamining the Physician's Duty of Care in Response to Medicare's Prospective
Payment System, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 791, 804 (1987) (arguing against changing the
standard of care to take into account economic considerations). Changes to the medical
malpractice standard of care would seem implicitly to suggest a change in a physician's
ethical obligations.
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cal decisions for a nonautonomous newborn, however, it is necessary to
extrapolate from these norms to identify the appropriate standard for a
decision-maker to adhere to in such a situation. Although commentators have advocated a variety of substantive standards against which to
judge treatment decisions for disabled infants, most of those standards
can be described as reflecting either a "sanctity of life" approach or
"quality of life" approach. 64
A. Sanctity of Life Approaches
Those who condemn selective nontreatment on sanctity of life
grounds have staked out two basic positions. The more extreme of the
two positions insists that, because all life is sacred, treatment of a disabled infant is ethically mandated as long as the infant is alive, no matter how disabled or how near death the infant might be. This vitalist
approach has few adherents, in part because it loses any appeal it has
when applied to an infant in the process of dying. In that situation,
vitalists would argue that decision-makers are morally required to subject a dying infant to painful and invasive medical interventions until
the moment of death, even though the interventions have no prospect
16 5
of saving the infant's life.
Most advocates of a sanctity of life approach find no moral requirement that medical interventions be used to prolong the dying of a terminally ill infant. 16 6 They do argue, however, that because each
infant's life has intrinsic value, no infant should be allowed to die from
selective nontreatment simply because of a disability or an expected
poor quality of life. According to this view, therefore, the only morally
relevant consideration in deciding whether to provide medical treatment to an infant who is not dying is whether the treatment offers a
medical benefit to the infant.' 6 7 The Child Abuse Amendments reflect
this "medical indications" approach, for example, in their provision
164. The following discussion draws heavily from the Hastings Center Newborns
Project, supra note 2, at 13 (Section 3: Standards of Judgment for Treatment). The
Hastings Center Newborns Project assembled a group of experts from disability groups,
family self-help associations, right-to-life associations, medical societies, state and
federal agencies, and academia to discuss the ethics of neonatal care.
165. See id. at 13-14.
166. For example, according to former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop: "For
such [dying] infants, neither medicine nor law can be of any help, and neither medicine
nor law should prolong these infants' process of dying." Treatment of Infants with
Handicapping Conditions: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Select Education House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982).

167. See Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 14; Paul Ramsey, Ethics at the Edges of
Life: Medical and Legal Intersections 154, 181-88 (1978). This stance is not consistent

with the "best interests" approach, as discussed infra at text accompanying notes
177-184, because it does not inquire whether the benefit received from the treatment
justifies the burdens imposed by the treatment. Proponents of this approach reject a
consideration of burdens as requiring an improper reference to the infant's future
quality of life. See Arras, supra note 92, at 96.
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that a failure to provide "medically indicated treatment" (i.e., treatment deemed most likely to ameliorate or correct an infant's life-threatening conditions) will constitute medical neglect unless the treatment
1 68
would merely prolong dying.
In addition, because it decrees willful blindness to an infant's disability, the medical indications approach appears to reflect the principle
of nondiscrimination, that is, that no one should be denied benefits on
the basis of a characteristic that is morally irrelevant to the purpose of
the distribution of benefits in question.' 69 Critics of this approach,
however, suggest that while an infant's Down syndrome may be morally
irrelevant to deciding whether she should receive relatively routine lifesaving corrective surgery for an esophageal blockage, not all disabilities
that an infant may suffer are in fact morally irrelevant to treatment decisions for the infant. For example, a disability may so compromise an
infant's health, life expectancy, or potential cognitive ability that the
pain and risk of complications posed by a contemplated treatment are
so great that the treatment offers no net benefit to the infant and therefore is not truly in the infant's best interests.17 0 Thus, critics reject the
medical indications approach as an overly simplistic response to the
complexities of medical decision-making for disabled infants. 17
B. Quality of Life Approaches
While the label "sanctity of life" can be applied to two different
substantive standards for judging the morality of treatment decisions
for disabled infants, the phrase "quality of life" describes a wider diversity of ethical standards. At the end of the spectrum furthest from
either sanctity of life approach are those commentators who argue not
only that an infant's expected future quality of life is an ethically valid
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10) (1988). For a discussion of the Amendments and
their other exceptions to the treatment requirement in the context of treatment for HIV-

infected infants, see infra notes 190-204 and accompanying text. But see Rhoden, supra
note 2, at 1313-17 (arguing that the Amendments' exceptions implicitly recognize the

validity of quality of life considerations).
169. See Arras, supra note 92, at 97. In this sense, the medical indications

approach is consistent with the antidiscrimination approach of HHS's regulations under
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 96-97, 100.

170. For further discussion of the possible moral relevance of disabilities to
treatment decisions, see infra Part VI.B.2.
171. See Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 14; Arras, supra note 92, at 98-99
(arguing that while the death of Baby Doe was morally objectionable, the Reagan
administration's response was to propound a "hopelessly simplistic rule"). Professor
Nancy Rhoden made the following observation:
It is crucial to recognize that making treatment decisions [for infants requiring
intensive care] is a complex task, and that this complexity is a function of th[e]
wide range of possible disorders and treatment dilemmas they present. All too
often, analyses of this problem oversimplify its medical parameters by focusing
on only one or two birth defects (e.g., Down's syndrome).
Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1287.
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consideration, but that assessing quality of life should include a utilitarian consideration of how the infant's life will affect other individuals
and society, including the burdens that caring for a disabled infant may
2
place on the infant's family. 17
An alternative quality of life standard might be used to measure an
individual infant's life against some norm of an "acceptable life." From
this perspective, the Child Abuse Amendment's exception for an irreversibly comatose infant arguably reflects a quality of life standard with
the threshold for what constitutes an "acceptable life" placed quite
low. 17 3 Other advocates of such an approach, however, could raise the
threshold to an objectionably high level.' 7 4
Consequently, the danger of quality of life standards that either
consider the social worth of a disabled infant or measure the infant's
life against an "acceptable" life lies in their subjectivity and variability.
These characteristics describe a moral landscape in which "slippery
slope" objections carry considerable force, particularly when surrounding circumstances (such as movements towards health care rationing
and the social stigma attached to HIV infection and IVDU) increase the
danger that morally unacceptable decisions may be made. 175 In other
words, once we accept that the burdens an individual imposes on soci172. See Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 14. Professor George Smith describes
the utilitarian ethic in the following terms:
Life-viewed as a human resource-should be developed and preserved
along those lines which allow for the achievement of its fullest potential for
total economic realization, maximization or productivity ....
Viewed thusly,
attainment of the quality of purposeful, humane living becomes a coordinate or
complement to total economic utility.
George P. Smith, II, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in
Resource Allocation, 3 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 47, 63 (1987). But see James F.
Childress, Triage in Neonatal Intensive Care: The Limitations of a Metaphor, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 547, 556 (1983) (arguing that considerations of social utility are inappropriate in
allocating resources for neonatal intensive care).
173. See Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 15. Nancy Rhoden made the point
cogently:
The exception that most clearly rests on quality of life concerns ... is the
one that allows nontreatment for comatose infants ....
The reason for this exception is that unconscious infants have no potential
for human life as we know it .... When the capacity to consciously experience
life is wholly absent, nontreatment decisions are relatively uncontroversial.
Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1316-17. Although Rhoden's approach resembles a version of
a best interests approach, she can also be seen as adopting a standard for what
constitutes a minimally "acceptable" life: "Any disorder that reliably restricts life to
infancy (e.g., a few years) will most likely render its victims unable to experience those
characteristically human pleasures of relating to their environment and to others. Thus,
withholding aggressive treatment from such infants ... can be justified." Id. at 1319.
174. See, e.g., Lorber, supra note 86, at 204 (suggesting that an infant's predicted
ability to work or marry may be a factor for guiding the treatment decision).
175. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 381-82 (1985)
(arguing that persuasive slippery slope arguments must be based on empirical
circumstances that skew the risk of dangerous decisions).
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ety are a valid consideration in deciding whether to provide medical
treatment to that individual, how are we to assess how severe the burden must be before we ethically can consider it? Should the burdens a
prisoner or a chronically mentally ill person imposes factor into decisions whether those persons should receive life-saving medical treatment? If not, where and how should the line be drawn?1 76
Another approach accepts the validity of considering an infant's
quality of life, but attempts to conduct the assessment solely from the
infant's own perspective. This quality of life approach directs that
treatment decisions accord with the "best interests of the child," so that
the only relevant benefits and burdens to be weighed are those experienced by the child. While resembling the "medical indications" approach discussed above, this best interests of the child standard
recognizes that in some cases medical treatment and continued life may
impose a burden on an infant that is not outweighed by any benefits to
be gained by continued life. Moreover, this standard accepts that an
infant's mental and physical condition, including the effects of any disability, should weigh in the benefits-burdens calculus.
Not only does the best interests standard limit consideration of
benefits and burdens to those experienced by the infant; it also seeks to
weigh alternatives from the disabled infant's point of view. In other
words, the proper comparison is not between the quality of life experienced by a "normal" infant and the quality of life expected for this
disabled infant, but between this infant's prospective quality of life and
no life at all. Thus, a severe disability may justify withholding medical
176. The most notorious historical example of a society sliding down a slippery
moral slope is, of course, that of Germany in the 1920s through the 1940s. This
example holds particular power in the context of selective nontreatment because the
Nazi practice of killing those whose lives were deemed not worth living was rooted in the
Weimar Republic's introduction of euthanasia as a "treatment option." The idea that
selected categories of patients may benefit from euthanasia developed in Germany
during the 1920s. These categories included willing patients competent to make such a
decision, as well as those whose decision would be made for them such as the disabled,
particularly disabled children. Though proponents emphasized the compassionate
nature of euthanasia, they also justified it by focusing on the cost and burden imposed
on society as a result of maintaining the lives of the sick and disabled. The latter
justification developed over time, especially in relation to disabled children who would
require a lifetime of care. Reports began to appear comparing the cost of educating the
disabled child with that of the "normal child," criticizing the undue burden placed on
the community in caring for the disabled. Thus, the value and cost of lives were weighed
and balanced in considering "treatment options."
Over time, novels and movies joined scholarly works in advocating euthanasia.
Ultimately, the general public and medical community bowed to the propaganda and
accepted it. Under the Nazi regime, an advisory committee was formed to organize a
program for terminating the life of those children who were deemed to have no prospect
of a meaningful life. Means of death used included starvation and failure to provide
heat-means meant to sidestep any accusations of murder since they were simply the
withholding of treatment. See Rita L. Marker et al., Euthanasia: A Historical Overview,
2 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 257, 265-275 (1991).
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treatment from an infant, but only when the burdens resulting from the
disability are so extreme that, from the infant's perspective, continued
77
life offers no overriding benefit.'
While even advocates of a best interests standard have acknowledged its "staggering problems of interpretation and application,"'17
including the potential influence of the decision-maker's subjective biases, many commentators have embraced it as the morally preferable
approach to making treatment decisions because it seeks to focus exclu79
sively and realistically on the infant's welfare.'
By focusing on the child's interests, this standard avoids morally dubious utilitarian justifications based on the well-being of
other interested parties, such as parents, siblings, or even of
society at large; and by givingfull weight to the child's interests,
this approach can justify nontreatment in certain cases without
having to make the (usually pernicious) assumption that the
child is a nonperson with no standing in the human
community. i8 0
This approach also best satisfies the principle of justice by holding
medical decisions for disabled newborns to the same standard-a best
interests standard-as medical decisions for other noncompetent patients who have not previously expressed their autonomous desires regarding treatment choices.18 '
177. See President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medical and
Biomedical and Behavior Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: A
Report on the Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment Decisions 218-19 (1983)
[hereinafter President's Commission].
178. Arras, supra note 92, at 106; see also Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1307-12
(discussing interpretive problems of best interests standard as set forth by President's
Commission). One of the difficulties inherent in the best interests approach-that of
predicting any infant's future quality of life-is complicated by the prognostic
uncertainty that physicians face with respect to many infants for whom treatment
decisions must be made. See President's Commission, supra note 177, at 220. For
further discussion of the implications of prognostic uncertainty, see infra Part IV.C.
179. See Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 15; President's Commission, supra
note 177, at 215-16 (arguing that child's best interests should override parental
decision-making rights when the two conflict); Weir, supra note 2, at 17-18. Weir
describes the essence of decision-making under a best interests standard: "Such
decisions should focus on the child's medical condition, concern suffering and
irremediable handicap rather than projected social worth, and involve comparative
judgments about the continuation of the child's injurious existence as opposed to the
child's nonexistence." Id.
180. Arras, supra note 92, at 105-06. Arras's reference to "nonpersons" responds
to the argument advanced by, for example, Tooley, who would find death by selective
nontreatment morally acceptable on the ground that severely disabled newborns, and in
fact all newborns, are not "persons" entitled to moral consideration because they lack
qualities necessary for personhood, chief among which are the capacities to have a
concept of self and to entertain desires about one's future. See Michael Tooley,
Abortion and Infanticide, 2 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 37, 62-64 (1972).
181. See, e.g., In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
that decision-makers should use best interests standard in cases involving never-
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One criticism of using a best interests standard to guide decisionmaking for severely disabled infants is that its calculus of weighing burdens against benefits is inapt for an infant whose prognosis is "bereft of
any distinctly human potentiality," for example, a comatose infant or an
infant who is profoundly retarded, blind, and deaf.18 2 In other words,
the argument goes, a patient who lacks any potential for present or future human relationships is properly described as having no real interests at all, except to be free from pain.' 8 3 Because such an infant has
no interests of its own to which a best interests standard can apply,
allowing the interests of others to weigh in that infant's treatment decision is morally acceptable. The general applicability of a best interests
standard may be limited by infants who are so severely neurologically
impaired that they have no relational potential and therefore no interi8 4
ests of their own.
competent persons or immature minors); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (NJ. 1985)
(holding that in absence of trustworthy evidence that a formerly competent patient
would have refused treatment, treatment may be withheld if "the net burdens of the
patient's life with the treatment.., clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the
patient derives from life"); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Wis. 1992) (holding that
decision whether to withdraw treatment for patient with a long history of schizophrenia,
who may never have been competent and who is now in persistent vegetative state,
could be made by guardian consistently with patient's best interests). These cases
reflect the principle that, except to the extent respect for a patient's autonomous choice
dictates otherwise, all medical decisions should be made in the best interests of the
patient. Cf. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1337 ("Decisions involving patients other than
newborns thus show that reasonable quality of life judgments, even if not designated as
such, are appropriate and lawful. This must also be true with infants ... .
What a patient's best interests are has been described as follows:
[The concept of "best interests" can be used to capture the most fundamental
future interest that persons have when they are patients, namely, an interest in
not being harmed on balance during the course of medical treatment. For
most patients in most clinical situations, this vital interest in not being harmed
on balance means that they prefer continued life to death-unless intractable
pain and other suffering have made continued life more harmful than the
prospect of death.
Weir, supra note 2, at 21.
182. Arras, supra note 92, at 119-21.
183. See Richard A. McCormick, To Save or Let Die, 229 JAMA 172 (1974)
(arguing that inJudeo-Christian tradition, life is not to be preserved for its own sake, but
for capacity of the person to form human relationships).
184. See Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 15-16. Arras describes the case of the
profoundly neurologically impaired infant as illustrating the limits of the best interests
standard:
The presence or absence of such characteristics as the ability to think, to
communicate, to give and receive love, seems to be highly relevant from a
moral point of view. Indeed, in the absence of these capacities, it is
problematical in the extreme how we can attribute any human interests to the
child on which a best-interest standard might operate. By narrowing the range
of meaningful data to the presence or absence of unrelievable pain, the best
interest standard consigns itself in extreme cases to operating in a moral
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C. Process and the Problem of Uncertainty

Compounding the difficulty of settling on the ethically correct substantive norm to guide medical treatment decisions for disabled
newborns is the inextricably related issue of how and when decisionmakers should apply the chosen norm. Because of the uncertainty inherent in establishing prognoses and predicting the risks of treatment,

treatment decisions for a disabled infant must be made without complete information that would allow confident prediction of the infant's

future quality of life.1 85
This uncertainty has led to three decision-making strategies for imperiled newborns: (1) treat an infant until it is certain that continued
treatment cannot benefit the infant (the "wait until certainty" approach); (2) decide whether to start treating an infant based on a statistical prediction of its likelihood of benefitting from treatment (the
vacuum. The result is an indiscriminate mandate to treat, to keep alive, that
flies in the face of common sense.
Arras, supra note 92, at 121.
In proposing a set of guidelines for when treatment is nonobligatory, Nancy
Rhoden expanded the concept of relational capacity to include an assessment of how the
burdens of medical treatment affect the ability of the infant to "experience those
characteristically human pleasures of relating to their environment and to others."
Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1319. Noting that virtually all medical treatments impose
burdens, Rhoden proposed that aggressive treatment should not be mandatory if an
infant:
(1) is in the process of dying; (2) will never be conscious; (3) will suffer
unremitting pain; (4) can live only with major, highly restrictive technology
which is intended to be temporary (e.g., artificial ventilation); (5) cannot live
past infancy (i.e., a few years); or (6) lacks potential for human interaction as a
result of profound retardation.
Id. at 1322-23.
185. Uncertainty regarding the prognoses of disabled newborns is but a particular
example of the uncertainty that characterizes medical decision-making generally:
[M]edicine is inherently a probabilistic profession. Diagnoses are rarely 100
percent certain and in spite of the traditional jargon, very few diagnoses are
ever "ruled out." Prognosis ... is rarely certain.., because all treatments vary
in their efficacy from patient to patient and from time to time. Furthermore,
the risks of treatment are not always predictable....
Diagnostic and prognostic uncertainty can be generated by a data base
which is incomplete, unclear or inconsistent.
Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 10. The rapid development of new technologies for
treating newborns has heightened this general uncertainty, particularly in the context of
neonates who are either extremely premature or severely asphyxiated at birth, two of the
most common problems that require neonatal intensive care and treatment decisions for
a newborn. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Treating Baby Doe: The Ethics of Uncertainty, 16
Hastings Center Rep., Aug. 1986, at 34; cf. Carol L. Berseth, Ethical Dilemmas in the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, 62 Mayo Clinic Proc. 67, 68 (1987) ("[A)lthough statistics
can provide the family and the physician with general perceptions of survival and
morbidity, such statistics cannot specifically predict the survival or morbidity for any
individual infant."). Likewise, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 49-65, the
prognosis for infants infected with HIV is extremely uncertain.
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"statistical prognostic strategy"); and (3) start treating an infant but
constantly reevaluate, based on information accumulated in the course
of treatment, whether continuing treatment is likely to benefit the infant (the "individualized prognostic strategy")186 Although positive
aspects commend each strategy,' 8 7 the individualized prognostic strategy is morally preferable because it focuses on the situation of the particular infant whose life is at stake and thus comports with the ethical
precept that treatment decisions should be based on an individualized
assessment of the patient's interests.18 8 As a practical matter, the individualized prognostic strategy means that the decision-maker responsible for making treatment choices-whether the infant's natural parent,
a foster parent, a physician, or whoever-should assess on an ongoing
basis whether the provision or withholding of treatment is in the in18 9
fant's best interests.
In conclusion, based on the foregoing discussion, combining the
best interests standard with an individualized prognostic strategy appears to offer the ethically preferable approach to making medical
treatment decisions for disabled infants. In other words, decision-makers should seek only to further the infant's own interests and should
reevaluate treatment decisions as accumulated information lends
greater certainty to the nature of those interests. The question that
remains for us to address, however, is whether our ethical conclusion
186. See Rhoden, supra note 185, at 38-40; Newborns Project, supra note 2, at
11-12.

187. Both the "wait until certainty" approach and the "statistical prognostic
strategy" seek to pursue a consistent, plausible goal. The former approach seeks to
ensure that all infants who could receive an overall benefit from treatment not be
allowed to die, i.e., it errs on the side of life. The latter approach, by contrast, seeks to
minimize the likelihood of any infants surviving with unacceptable impairments. See
Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 12-13.
188. See Rhoden, supra note 185, at 38-40. Rhoden also endorsed the
individualized approach because using it in individual cases will entail the agonizing
deliberations that are commensurate with the moral weight of the questions involved.
See id. at 40; see also Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 13 ("[W]here mistakes at either
end are so serious, it is morally preferable to decide on the basis of the individual
infant's prognosis.").
189. Although the individualized prognostic strategy is ethically preferable and
consistent with the philosophy of the ADA, see infra note 279 and accompanying text, it
may prove expensive, both in terms of time and energy allocated to decision-making and
the resources allocated to the resulting treatment. Thus, situations may exist when this
mode of decision-making, while morally preferable, is practically infeasible. For
example, a state social worker may be practically unable constantly to reassess all the
medical information regarding numerous ill children in foster care under her
supervision. Nonetheless, to the extent the state agency is compelled to depart from
using an individualized prognostic strategy in making decisions for its wards, a more
time- or cost-effective strategy should be used for all children under the state's care and
not simply for children with HIV infection or other disabilities. See infra notes 294-296,
301 and accompanying text.
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can help illuminate the applicability of existing law to medical decisionmaking for infants infected with HIV.
V. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE HIV-INFECTED INFANT
AND CHILD WELFARE LAW

Having recognized the ethically problematic nature of selective
nontreatment and identified the preferable ethical norms for guiding
treatment decisions for disabled infants, including infants infected with
HIV, we now must consider whether and how the law responds to selective nontreatment of HIV-infected infants. Assessing the legal status
of medical treatment decisions for infants with HIV proves particularly
difficult because of the mix of medical and social factors characterizing
perinatal HIV infection. From a medical viewpoint, testing to detect
HIV infection during the neonatal period is not yet reliable; a perinatally infected infant's prognosis is likely to be extremely uncertain
and variable; and the infant's health may be compromised, independently of HIV infection, by prenatal exposure to drugs or inadequate
prenatal care. From a social viewpoint, the infected infant faces a relatively large chance that decisions regarding its care will be made effectively not by its parents but by the state or a treating physician, and that
those decisions may be influenced by such factors as negative attitudes
towards persons with HIV, racial or ethnic bias, and a perceived need
to ration medical resources. Are existing laws capable of supporting an
appropriate and adequate response to the troubling practice of selective nontreatment in this setting? This Part begins to address that
question by focusing on the applicability of federal child welfare law to
the problem.
A. Applying the CAA to Infants with HIV Infection
Attempting to apply the Child Abuse Amendments and regulations1 90 to the case of an HIV-infected infant who also suffers some
other life-threatening condition (i.e., the kind of case hypothesized by
the JAMA survey) illustrates how elusive the precise bounds of the
CAA's treatment mandate remain. The first step is relatively straightforward: The Amendments' basic standard prohibits a failure to provide whatever treatment for an infant's life-threatening conditions that
reasonable medical judgment indicates will be most effective in ameliorating or correcting those conditions. 1 9 ' Thus, unless an exception applies, an infant infected with HIV should receive whatever treatment is
judged to be most effective for any concurrent medical conditions that
he suffers.
One could argue, however, that withholding treatment from an
190. See supra notes 127-138 and accompanying text for a description of the
standards erected by the Amendments and their implementing regulations.
191. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (1992).
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HIV-infected infant with a concurrent life-threatening condition falls
within the exception for treatment that "would merely prolong dying,
not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's lifethreatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of
the infant." More plainly stated, because no cure for HIV or AIDS is
currently known, treating an infected infant's other medical conditions
arguably will not be effective in correcting all the infant's life-threatening conditions and, by postponing the inevitable death from AIDS, will
merely prolong the infant's dying.
This argument, however, ignores the Department's interpretation
of the exception. According to the Appendix, the inability to correct a
condition that, while not life-threatening in the near future, may become life-threatening in the more distant future does not permit the
withholding of treatment for another condition that can be corrected or
ameliorated. 1 9 2 Likewise, the Department interprets the "merely prolong dying" prong of the exception as applying only when the infant's
prognosis is for death in the near future, rather than in the more distant
93
future.'
These distinctions between the "near future" and the "more distant future," while suggesting that the current inevitability of death
from HIV infection does not, in and of itself, except an HIV-infected
192. The interpretative guidelines provide:
With respect to the context of a future life-threatening condition, it is the
Department's interpretation that the term "not be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions" does not permit the
withholding of treatment on the grounds that one or more of the infant's lifethreatening conditions, although not life-threatening in the near future, will
become life-threatening in the more distant future.
45 C.F.R. § 1340 app. at 301 (1992).
193. In its proposed rule, the Department described the "merely prolong dying"
provision as referring to "situations where death is imminent and treatment will do no
more than postpone the act of dying." Id. at 300. Because commentators objected to
the sense of immediacy connoted by the term "imminent," the Department deleted the
term from its final rule and did not adopt it for purposes of the interpretative guidelines.
See id. at 300-01.
The guidelines do provide some further guidance on the meaning of the "merely
prolong dying" provision:
The Department interprets the term "merely prolong dying" as referring
to situations where the prognosis is for death and, in the treating physician's
'*. reasonable medical judgment, further or alternative treatment would not
alter the prognosis in an extension of time that would not render the treatment
futile.
Thus, the Department continues to interpret Congressional intent as not
permitting the "merely prolong dying" provision to apply where many years of
life will result from the provision of treatment. . . . [T]he Department's
interpretation is that reasonable medical judgments will be formed on the basis
of knowledge about the condition(s) involved, the degree of inevitability of
death, the probable effect of any potential treatments, the projected time
period within which death will probably occur, and other pertinent factors.
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infant from the protection of the CAA, fail to provide clear guidance 94
on how to weigh an eventuality whose nature and timing are both uncertain. Hypothetically, if current data were to show that a majority of
perinatally infected infants die within three years of birth, could physicians exercising reasonable medical judgment conclude that treating an
infected infant's other conditions would "merely prolong dying," even
though the number of perinatally infected children living to four or
more years was increasing? 19 5 Is death in three years in the "near" or
"more distant" future? Even if three years is considered the near fu96
ture, how certain must the prognosis of such a near death be?1
Turning to the exceptions for treatment that would be "futile in
terms of the survival of the infant" or "virtually futile" and under the
circumstances "inhumane" provides little respite from this ambiguity.
Consistent with its explication of the other exceptions, the Department
defines "virtually futile" as meaning that the "treatment is highly unlikely to prevent death in the near future."i 9 7 Again, we seem to be
thrown back to speculating whether the certain death of an infant infected with HIV will occur in the near or more distant future.
Upon closer examination, however, the inclusion in the definition
of "virtually futile" of a standard regarding the certainty of death suggests that withholding treatment is permissible only when the infant is
194. Analysis by commentators has likewise failed to suggest clear standards. See,
e.g., Bopp & Nimz, supra note 134, at 86 ("[T]reatment may not be withheld from any
and every infant diagnosed as terminally ill. The child's death must be expected to
occur relatively soon .... ).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 49-64 for a discussion of the uncertainty
and variability of prognoses for perinatally infected infants.
196. The ambiguity in these exceptions is also illustrated by attempting to apply
them to treatment for infants with Tay-Sachs disease, a metabolic disorder described
supra note 22. While HHS has interpreted the CAA not to allow treatment for
concurrent conditions to be withheld from infants with Tay-Sachs, commentators have
argued that treating a remediable condition only to allow the child to suffer an agonizing
and prolonged death is itself an act of abuse. See Terry Walman, Decision Making in the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit: The Impact of the 1984 Child Abuse Amendments, in
Compelled Compassion, supra note 2, at 299, 311; cf. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1313-23
(arguing that to the extent exceptions permit discretion, they imply a recognition of
quality of life considerations).
197. 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app. at 302 (1992). The guidelines do not separately define
the term "futile." The definition provided for "virtually futile," however, suggests that
a treatment will be considered futile if it will not prevent the infant's death in the near
future. The debate within the medical community over the meaning and the usefulness
of the concept of futility limits its value as a legal standard. See, e.g., Robert D. Truog et
al., The Problem With Futility, 326 New Eng. J. Med. 1560, 1561-62 (1992) (asserting
that the notion of futility fails to provide an ethically coherent ground for limiting lifesustaining treatment as a result of (1) the difficulty in defining futility because of
differences in social values, (2) the difficulty in estimating the probability of treatment's
success, and (3) the possibility that assertions of futility may provide a method of
allocating resources without fair procedures). This ambiguity may -be partially avoided
by the statute's express reference to futility "in terms of the survival of the infant." See
42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10)(B)(iii) (1988).
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highly likely to die in the near future. 198 While such a conclusion may

be medically justified once an infant with HIV develops an opportunistic infection like PCP, 199 it is far less certain for an infected infant who

is asymptomatic or who displays milder symptoms. 2 0 0 Because the
prognosis and the estimated life expectancy for such an infant are un-

certain, ranging from less than a year to more than five years, 2 0 1 treating the infant's immediately life-threatening condition would seem to
be neither futile nor virtually futile.
Although neither the exception for treatment that "merely prolong[s] dying" nor that for treatment "not effective in ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions" expresses an
applicable standard of certitude, in light of the inherently probabilistic
nature of medical judgments, it seems impossible to apply these exceptions without asking how certain the exception's applicability must be.
The statute and regulations simply defer to "reasonable medical judgment" in this regard. For the regulations to make sense as a consistent
whole, however, it seems a fairly high standard of certainty should be
20 2
read into all the exceptions.
198. Commentators on the proposed rules, which eventually became the Appendix,
expressed concern that the "highly unlikely" standard required a level of certitude that
is medically impossible. The Department responded that the pervasive reference to
"reasonable medical judgment" in determining whether an exception to the treatment
requirement is present obviates an "impossible or unrealistic standard of certitude." 45
C.F.R. § 1340 app. at 302 (1992).
199. See supra text accompanying note 61.
200. The first published opinion addressing treatment decisions for a perinatally
infected child involved an infant who was diagnosed with HIV infection before her first
birthday. See In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 610
N.E.2d 1264 (Il. 1993). Born prematurely, the infant experienced interventricular
hemorrhaging-a spontaneous rupture of weak blood vessels in the brain-and required
a cardiac monitor and mechanical ventilation for weeks after birth. As she grew, C.A.
became neurodevelopmentally delayed, but remained fully conscious and aware of her
surroundings. The infant also suffered from necrotizing of the bowel, "an infection of
the bowel that results in the death of tissue and requires removal." Id. at 1173-74. At
the time of the trial, C.A. was receiving central line feedings, intravenous feeding, and
tracheostomy, had already been resuscitated twice, and had had a catheter inserted into
her heart. The court authorized the guardian appointed by the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) to consult with C.A.'s treating physicians and to
enter a do not resuscitate (DNR) order when the guardian and the physicians believed
the order was necessary and proper. In his dissent, Judge McMorrow disagreed with the
majority's decision that a DNR order was in C.A.'s best interests because the
precedential and statutory standards for making such a determination had not been met.
In addition, the dissent pointed out that Illinois' Health Care and Surrogate Act does
not supersede the provisions of the CAA and drew the Court's attention to the
significance of the Amendments in determining whether to withhold medically indicated
treatment.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
202. In other words, it would not make sense for the "virtually futile" exception to
apply only when it is highly unlikely that treatment will prevent death in the near future,
but for the "merely prolong dying" exception to apply any time the treating physician
determines it is unlikely, i.e., less likely than not, that prognosis is for death in the more
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So interpreted, the regulations implementing the GAA indicate
that a failure to provide treatment for an HIV-infected infant's lifethreatening conditions, 20 3 at least while the infant's infection is asymptomatic or only mildly manifested, is unlikely to fall within an exception 20 4 permitting nontreatment and thus will constitute medical
neglect. A conclusion that the CAA prohibit nontreatment of such infants, however, is not necessarily a conclusion that prohibition will effectively deter and address that behavior. Addressing the latter issue
requires consideration of both the CAA's past effectiveness in addressing nontreatment in analogous situations and factual differences that
may make the CAA more or less effective in responding to selective
nontreatment of HIV-infected infants.
B. Enforcement Predicaments
As discussed above in Part III.B, an apparent lack of enforcement
throws open to serious question the CAA's effectiveness in deterring
and addressing selective nontreatment of disabled infants. 20 5 Despite
this lack of effective enforcement by state agencies, however, the
Amendments and state legislation implementing their standards are
currently the only legal avenues for addressing nontreatment choices
made by a disabled infant's parents. 20 6 As such, the Amendments conceivably could enable an effective response if parental nontreatment is
distant, as opposed to near, future. Bolstering this linkage between the exceptions is the
Appendix's use of a futility standard in explaining the "merely prolong dying"
exception: "The Department interprets the term 'merely prolong dying' as referring to
situations where the prognosis is for death and . . . further or alternative treatment
would not alter the prognosis in an extension of time that would not render the
treatment futile." 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app. at 300 (1992).
203. The Appendix suggests that treatment is required for any condition that, while
not itself immediately life-threatening, "significantly increases the risk of the onset of
complications that may threaten the life of the infant." Id. at 298. By implication,
failure to treat a condition that negatively affects the infant's development or well-being,
but that does not increase the chance that a life-threatening complication will develop,
would not constitute medical neglect as defined by the CAA.
204. Of course, a physician exercising reasonable medical judgment may determine
that an infant infected with HIV is also "chronically and irreversibly comatose" or that
treatment would "merely prolong dying" or would be "futile in terms of the survival of
the infant" because the infected infant also suffers from another condition rendering the
infant's prognosis for death in the near future. For example, withholding treatment
from an HIV-infected infant whose head injuries in an automobile accident rendered her
comatose or who is also anencephalic would fall within one of the exceptions and thus
not constitute medical neglect. By contrast, my analysis focuses on an infant who is HIV
positive and concurrently suffers a remediable life-threatening condition.
205. See supra notes 142-151 and accompanying text.
206. Cf. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 630 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (noting that § 504 is not called into question when parents refuse to consent to
treatment). The ADA, while applicable to a far broader scope of actors than § 504,
presumably will not be read to extend to parental decisions regarding medical treatment
for minor children.
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ever viewed as a problem of great public importance and claims a position of priority on the agendas of state child protection agencies. 20 7
It is not in the context of parental decision-making, however, that
the most problematic instances of nontreatment based on HIV infection are likely to occur. Rather, one can plausibly speculate that the
parents of an HIV-infected infant may be less likely than the parents of
an infant suffering another severe mental or physical disability to withhold their consent to life-saving treatment. A reason for parents' decisions to withhold treatment from a disabled newborn frequently cited
during discussions of the Baby Doe controversy is the threat posed by
the infant's continued life to the family's emotional and financial stability. 20 8 For example, parents might justify the decision not to treat
based on the need to protect the quality of life of other children in the
family. In many cases involving an infant with HIV infection, by contrast, the family's living situation is already unstable, both financially
and emotionally. 20 9 In addition, the Medicaid program is likely to
cover much of the costs of the infant's medical care. 2 10 For these reasons, parents of HIV-infected infants may be less likely to feel that they
have a great deal to lose by consenting to medical treatment that will
211
sustain their infant's life.
207. Little mention has been made recently regarding state agencies' responsibility
to address medical neglect in the form of selective nontreatment. Congressional
hearings conducted in 1991 on the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act focused
on the need to stem an increasing incidence of child abuse and neglect through the
development of early intervention programs, but made no mention of the medical
neglect provisions of the federal statute. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment in
the 1990s: Keeping Old Promises, Meeting New Demands: Hearings Before the House
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-39 (1991).
208. SeeJeff Lyon, Playing God in the Nursery 210 (1985) (discussing parental fear
of financial and social constraints when choosing whether to permit medical treatment).
209. See supra Part II.B. for a description of the social context in which perinatal
transmission of HIV most often occurs.
210. For a discussion of Medicaid coverage of health services for HIV-infected
infants and children, see English, supra note 71, at 1553-57; see also Oleske, AIDS in
Our Children, supra note 4, at 438-39 (discussing percentage of medical costs of HIVinfected children covered by Medicaid).
211. Moreover, the parents of an infant infected with HIV may be less inclined
culturally to allow an infant to die because it is less than "perfect." Undaunted by the
risk of perinatal transmission of HIV, a substantial number of women who are infected
with HIV neither refrain from becoming pregnant nor choose an abortion once
pregnant. See Reproductive Behavior in HIV-Infected Women, supra note 48, at 1804
(citing finding that only 12 of 87 HIV-positive pregnant women and 11 of 101 HIVnegative pregnant women chose to abort their fetuses); Selwyn et al., supra note 48, at
3568 (reporting study showing that 14 of 28 women with HIV chose to carry
pregnancies to term). This willingness to become pregnant and carry to term an infant
that faces a significant risk of infection with HIV may in some cases reflect a lack of
access to family planning and abortion services, but may also bespeak both the value the
women's culture and religion places on childbearing, see id. at 3571, and the women's
perceived lack of other opportunities for achieving personal satisfaction. See Bayer,
supra note 81, at 69-70 (explaining that for an HIV-positive woman, "[t]here is a 50-80
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While one can speculate that parental nontreatment decisions
might be less likely to occur for infants with HIV than for infants with
other disabilities, nontreatment decisions made by the state are more
likely to occur. In the paradigmatic Baby Doe case, the parents decide
to withhold treatment from their disabled newborn. 2 12 By contrast,
because a significant number of infants infected with HIV will become
wards of the state, 2 13 medical decisions for those infants will be made
by the state or one of its agents. 21 4 In addition, those parents who retain custody of their perinatally infected infant may not be the actual
decision-makers for their infant's medical treatment; instead, the medical professionals treating the infant effectively may assume decisionmaking control. 21 5 Again, as compared to the paradigmatic Baby Doe
case, the danger of treating physicians assuming such control would
percent chance of having a healthy baby. From the perspective of an infected woman
whose own life prospects are not good... the chance of having a healthy baby might
seem worth the risks entailed."). These influences may also come to bear on parents
making medical treatment decisions for their perinatally infected infant.
For example, a survey conducted among IV drug using women who became
pregnant yielded some interesting findings. Of the seropositive women who became
pregnant 50% chose to terminate their pregnancy and 50% chose to continue
pregnancy; of the seronegative women, 44% chose termination and 56% chose to carry
to term. Among the reasons cited by seropositive women who chose to continue their
pregnancy were religious beliefs, the overriding desire to have a child, family pressure to
have a child, and reluctance to undergo abortion. Lack of access to abortion services
was not a factor in this study, for all participants were offered the option of referral for
abortion services covered in full by Medicaid. See Selwyn et al., supra note 48, at 3568,
3570.
212. Cf. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 633-34 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (noting that all 49 cases of nontreatment cited by the Secretary of HHS as
displaying a need for the promulgation of regulations under § 504 involved instances
where the infant's parents refused to consent to life-saving treatment).
213. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
214. Throughout this discussion, references to decisions made by "the state" will
include decisions made by agents of the state. See Vonner v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252, 256 (La. 1973) ("It is the Department, not the foster parents,
who has the legal custody of the child and, consequently, the right and responsibility to
provide for the physical, mental, moral and emotional well-being of the child."). But cf.
Jordy v. County of Humboldt, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that public agency is not liable for injury caused by foster parents' occasional negligence
in day-to-day supervision of children). Agents of the state who might make medical
treatment decisions for HIV-infected infants who are wards of the state include
guardians, foster parents, operators of emergency shelters for medically fragile children,
and representatives of child welfare agencies.
An example of a state agency's direct involvement can be found in In re C.A., 603
N.E.2d 1171 (111. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 610 N.E.2d 1264 (Il. 1993), discussed
supra note 200. In that case, Illinois's Department of Children and Family Services,
which acted as the court-appointed guardian, filed a petition seeking authority to
consent to the entry of a do not resuscitate order on the chart of a nine-month-old infant
with HIV. By the time the trial court's order granting the petition was affirmed by the
appellate court, the child was almost two years old. See id. at 1173.
215. See infra notes 244-246 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
dangers of physician override in neonatal decision-making.
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appear to be magnified in the case of an HIV-infected infant whose parents are more likely to lack medical sophistication, be physically absent
from the hospital, and receive less respect from the treating
2 16
physicians.
A decision not to provide life-saving treatment for an infant whose
HIV infection remains asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic, when
made either by the state for an infant in its custody 2 17 or by a treating
physician who has assumed decision-making control for an infant, appears to fall within the scope of the Child Abuse Amendments' definition of medical neglect 2 18 and thus should trigger the response
provided for in the Amendments. Yet the already substantial barriers
216. Such a case is described in Guillemin & Holmstrom, supra note 18, at
198-225. In this case, Darlene, a critically ill infant, was transferred from the NICU to
the general pediatric nursery, where she died. Although Darlene was not infected with
HIV, she shared many of the relevant characteristics of HIV-infected infants: plagued by
a number of severe health problems, Darlene was born to a mother who was single,
poor, and African-American. Darlene's transfer to the general pediatric nursery was a
result of the treating physicians' decision, which was made without meaningful input
from or intervention by the family or social workers. Although Darlene's mother,
grandmother, and social workers were optimistic and wanted to keep Darlene in the
NICU, the treating physicians' attitudes were negative regarding Darlene's prospects.
The physicians experienced difficulty in communicating with both Darlene's mother (a
single parent with learning disabilities) and her grandmother, perceiving the women as
volatile and unresponsive to reasonable argument. See id. at 224. By failing to
communicate with the family members, the physicians and staff effectively alienated
them from participating in the decision-making process. The authors suggest this
response may appropriately be regarded as a result of the unstable family situation
attributed to Darlene. See id. at 223-24.
217. In the face of tightening budgetary constraints, a growing population of drugexposed infants, and negative societal attitudes towards persons infected with HIV, the
danger that the state or its agent might decide not to provide life-saving treatment to an
infant infected with HIV does not seem fanciful. The provision of medical care even for
reasonably healthy children within the state's care is frequently sporadic and
disorganized. See, e.g., David P. Schor & Charles M. Abel, Back to Basics in Health Care
for Foster Children, Children Today, May-June 1985, at 13-14 (pointing to lack of
immunization of foster children as one manifestation of the neglect endemic to foster
care systems); Suzanne Daley, Health Violations Cited at Child Group Homes, N.Y.
Times, May 20, 1989, at 1.
218. The Amendments define "child abuse and neglect" as meaning "the physical
or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a
child by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare- .. " 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(4)
(1988). The statute goes on to define "person who is responsible for the child's
welfare" as including "any employee of a residential facility" and "any staff person
providing out-of-home care." 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(5). The latter definition makes clear
that agents of the state may be guilty of child neglect, including medical neglect.
Whether a physician's assuming effective, if not legal, control of medical decisionmaking for an infant makes the physician "a person responsible for the child's welfare"
is a closer question. If it does not make the physician so responsible, then the CAA
provide no deterrence for such behavior. Even if a physician who assumes control could
be found guilty of child neglect, the CAA's standards are unlikely to be enforced against
such behavior for reasons discussed in the text.
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to effective enforcement of the CAA's standards 219 seem likely to prove
even more acute in cases involving HIV-infected infants. In those
cases, a state's child protective services agency may be both violator
and enforcer. Depending on the state, a single agency or related agencies may be responsible for both responding to complaints of child
abuse and neglect (including medical neglect as required by the CAA)
and running the foster care system. For example, in New York State,
the Department of Social Services is ultimately responsible both for
dealing with complaints of child abuse and neglect and overseeing the
care and placement of foster children. Thus, the same state agency
may, on the one hand, either directly or through an agent decide not to
provide an infant with needed medical treatment and, on the other
hand, be responsible under the CAA for taking steps to prevent and
address such practices. Moreover, because the state agency depends
largely upon hospital personnel for reports of suspected medical neglect occurring within the hospital, 22 0 the agency may be unlikely to
receive information about nontreatment decisions effectively made by
treating physicians on the hospital's staff. The hospitals' failure to report seems probable in light of both the hierarchical structure of authority within neonatal intensive care units, 22 1 which lessens the
likelihood that caregivers such as neonatal nurses will break ranks even
if they disagree with the decision to withhold treatment, and the generally negative reaction by neonatologists to the requirements imposed
2 22
by the CAA.

For all these reasons, the state-administered child welfare approach to selective nontreatment embodied in the Child Abuse Amendments, while applicable, seems unlikely to provide an adequate
response to instances of selective nontreatment of an infant with HIV
infection, whether the nontreatment decision is made by the infant's
parents, by the state, or by a treating physician. Mindful of this conclusion, let us turn now to considering whether an antidiscrimination approach offers any greater promise.
219. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
220. The Amendments call for the state to have in place procedures, among others,
to provide for "prompt notification by individuals designated by and within appropriate
health-care facilities of cases of suspected medical neglect." 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b)(10)(B) (1988). In fourteen states, the state child protective services agencies
explicitly abdicate authority to the hospital staff or infant care review committees to
determine whether a child is illegally being denied treatment. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights, supra note 151, at 233-80 app. c.
221. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
222. See Kopelman et al., supra note 18, at 679 ("Most neonatologists who
responded to our survey indicated that they thought the current federal regulations
were a mistake."). The unlikeliness of full reporting is further supported by data
showing that, from 1985 until the third quarter of 1988, only seventeen state agencies
received any reports of possible violations of the Amendments, and the total number of
reports was only forty-one. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 151, at
233-80 app. c.
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VI. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE HIV-INFECTED INFANT
AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW

As discussed in Part III.A above, the Reagan administration's initial response to the death of Baby Doe was to issue regulations interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to prohibit the
withholding of life-saving medical treatment from a handicapped infant. 2 23 Thus, the administration treated the problem as one of dis-

crimination: Handicapped infants with life-threatening conditions were
being treated differently from "otherwise normal" infants with lifethreatening conditions, and this difference in treatment constituted unjust and illegal discrimination.
While commentators debated the wisdom of addressing selective
nontreatment as a discrimination problem, 2 24 the Supreme Court ultimately declined to decide whether section 504 might ever apply to
cases of selective nontreatment. Instead, the Court simply concluded
that the requirements that the regulations imposed on health care facilities and state child welfare agencies were not justified by the administrative record. Thus, the Second Circuit's pronouncement in University
Hospital that Congress did not intend section 504 to apply to selective
nontreatment remains the primary authoritative judicial response to
the question. In this Part, I argue that existing antidiscrimination law
can be interpreted to advance the law's goal of eradicating disability
discrimination in all public settings and still be construed with sensitivity to the complexity of medical decision-making. As so interpreted,
antidiscrimination law provides an appropriate and potentially effective
vehicle for addressing both selective nontreatment of infants with HIV
infection and other discriminatory medical decisions.
A. Section 504 and the ADA: Two Generations of Disability Discrimination
Law
The rationale employed by HHS in seeking to regulate selective
nontreatment under section 504 also supports treating some cases of
nontreatment of HIV-infected infants as illegal discrimination under
either section 504 or the more recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Both statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of

disability 2 25 and extend to discrimination based on asymptomatic HIV
223. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
224. Compare Brown, supra note 88, at 251 (arguing that the § 504 regulations'
civil rights approach represented an overly simplistic response to selective
nontreatment) with Martin H. Gerry, The Civil Rights of Handicapped Infants: An
Oklahoma "Experiment," 1 Issues L. & Med. 15, 42 (1985) (approving civil rights
approach).
225. Congress did not intend the change in terminology from "handicap" in § 504
to "disability" in the ADA to have any effect. Instead, the change simply reflects
Congress' adoption of currently preferred terminology. See The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1989, S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989); H. Rep. No.
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infection and AIDS. While section 504's application to HIV infection
and AIDS has been by judicial construction, 22 6 the ADA's legislative
history indicates that Congress expressly contemplated coverage of
HIV discrimination. 22 7 Thus, HIV-infected infants clearly fall within
the protective bounds of both section 504 and the ADA. 22 8 Given this
protection, the question that this Part must grapple with is whether and
how the decision to withhold needed medical treatment from those infants is legislatively proscribed.
This Article focuses on resolving that question with respect to the
ADA. 22 9 Although many of the points made regarding the applicability
of the ADA to selective nontreatment of HIV-infected infants could
also be made with respect to section 504, the ADA's sweeping scope,
explicitness of purpose, and legislative history230 lend support to its
applicability that cannot be duplicated with respect to section 504. Un485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50-51 & pt. 3, at 26-27 (1990). In fact, the
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992 amended § 504 to substitute the term
"disability" for "handicap." See Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102(p)( 3 2 ), 106 Stat. 4344,
4360 (1992) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West. Supp. 1993).
226. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1526 (l1th Cir. 1991); Doe v.
Attorney Gen. of United States, 941 F.2d 780, 790 (9th Cir. 1991); Severino v. North
Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179, 1183 (11 th Cir. 1991); Leckelt v. Board of
Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir. 1990); Martinez v. School Bd., 861 F.2d 1502,
1506 (1 1th Cir. 1988). This line of cases flows from the Supreme Court's decision in
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), which held that § 504's definition of
"handicap" may extend to contagious diseases, in that case tuberculosis, because society
regards people with such diseases as impaired.
227. Like the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicap," the ADA's definition of
"disability" has three prongs: (1) actual impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities; (2) a history of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as
having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. III 1991). The ADA's
legislative history recognizes the first prong as including HIV infection. See H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 101-596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1990), reprinted in H.R. Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 1 Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act 120 (1990)
[hereinafter Legislative History]. Moreover, even an infant whose own HIV status has
not been confirmed, but who was born to an HIV-infected woman and whose blood
contains HIV antibodies arguably suffers a disability under the definition's third prong if
other persons believe the infant is infected. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I) app. (1992) (a
person will be regarded as having an impairment if another person believes she has an
impairment that she does not actually have). It is more questionable, however, whether
an infant who is discriminated against because a 30% chance exists that he is HIV
infected is protected by the ADA.
228. Infancy does not remove a person from the scope of § 504's or the ADA's
protection. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 624 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
229. While this Article focuses on the applicability of the ADA, it relies frequently
on judicial interpretations of analogous provisions of § 504 as suggestions of how the
courts are likely to interpret the ADA. Section 2201 of the ADA expressly states that
"nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or the regulations issued by
Federal agencies pursuant to such title." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a).
230. See infra notes 235, 237.
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like section 504, which belongs to the first generation of disability
rights legislation and whose inclusion in the Rehabilitation Act was
marked by scant legislative history, 2 3 ' the ADA represents the culmination of years of legislative efforts by disability rights advocates to
achieve the enactment of comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation. 23 2 Moreover, both the ADA's express terms and its legislative his-

tory illustrate the Act's mandate of eliminating all forms of
discrimination against persons with disabilities in public life and ensuring their ability to participate fully in the opportunities and benefits of
our society.
Congress' findings in enacting the ADA demonstrate both
Congress' awareness of the scope of the problem of disability discrimination and its intent to adopt a correspondingly broad response to the
problem. Specifically, Congress found that "historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and...
such forms of discrimination.., continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem, '23 3 that such discrimination persists in the critical area
of "health services," '23 4 and that
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
23 5
participate in, and contribute to, society.

231. See Richard K. Scotch, From Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal
Disability Policy 49-59 (1984) (discussing the evolution and passage of the
Rehabilitation Act and § 504).
232. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of federal laws advanced specific goals of
disability rights advocates and laid the foundation for the ADA. See, e.g., Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1400-1485 (1988) (originally
enacted as Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975) (mandating a "free
appropriate public education" for all children with disabilities in the least restrictive
environment); Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2342 (1988)
(prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities in selling and renting of
public and private housing); Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1988) (enacted 1975) (establishing, inter alia, a system of
state protection and advocacy organizations for persons with developmental
disabilities); Air Carrier Access Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1374 (1990) (enacted 1986)
(prohibiting discrimination by air carriers against persons with disabilities). See
generally Jane West, The Social and Policy Context of the Act in The Americans with
Disabilities Act: From Policy to Practice 15-19 (1991).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). The legislative history notes that "discrimination
against persons with disabilities often results from false presumptions, generalizations,
misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious
mythologies." H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1990), reprinted
in Legislative History, supra note 227, at 302.
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Based on these and other findings, Congress announced the Act's purpose as "provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."' 23 6 A national solution was deemed necessary in light of the failure of existing federal and state laws to address adequately the
discrimination faced by disabled persons.2 3 7 Thus, Congress consciously chose to pursue a national solution by adopting a broad,
sweeping legislative approach rather than limiting the legislation to discrete types of discrimination. 238 In so doing, Congress expressly acknowledged the comprehensive impact that it intended the ADA to
have.
Another reason for focusing analysis on the ADA is that it prohibits
discrimination by a broader range of actors than does section 504,
which applies only to programs receiving federal financial assistance.2 3 9
By contrast, the ADA's mandate reaches virtually all economic actors
that offer employment, goods, or services to the public. Particularly
important for this Article's analysis is the ADA's coverage of public entities in Title II and public accommodations in Title III. Because a
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
237. See H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1990), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra note 227, at 304, 320.
238. The stated purpose of the Rehabilitation Act has evolved and broadened over
time. From its focus on "vocational rehabilitation and independent living" from the
time of the Act's passage through the mid-1980s, see 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988) ("The
purpose of this chapter is to develop and implement, through research, training,
services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated
programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living."), Congress has
broadened the Act's purpose to address broader issues of empowerment of individuals
with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 701(b) (West Supp. 1993) ("The purposes of this
chapter are-(1) to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment,
economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society ....
and (2) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a leadership role in promoting the
employment of individuals with disabilities .... ). Even this broadened statement of
purpose, however, is less comprehensive than the ADA's.
239. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Of course, extensive federal government funding of
social services and health care programs means that § 504 may in fact cover many actors
in these fields. See Gittler & Rennert, supra note 78, at 1343-44 nn.149-51 (listing
health, child welfare, and other social service programs receiving federal funds). For
example, a hospital that receives Medicaid or Medicare reimbursement qualifies as
"receiving federal financial assistance" within the meaning of § 504 and is thus bound
by its requirements. See Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Mass. 1991). In
addition, the court in Glanz found that a clinic may be held liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the acts of an employee physician. See id. at 636-37.
Moreover, the definition of "program or activity" for purposes of § 504 (added in 1988)
suggests that even an individual physician could be liable for violating § 504 if she
receives federal funds. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(b) (defining "program or activity" in
pertinent part as "all of the operations of ... [a] partnership .... or an entire sole
proprietorship ....which is principally engaged in the business of providing.., health
care").
Nonetheless, § 504's limitation to federally funded programs sets up a potential
roadblock to coverage in individual cases, a roadblock that the ADA never creates.
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"public entity" includes "any department, agency.., or other instrumentality of a State,"'240 state child welfare agencies responsible for infant wards of the state are subject to the ADA. And because "public
accommodations" include hospitals and the professional offices of
health care providers, 24 1 a hospital or physician treating an infant infected with HIV is subject to the ADA.
Of course, in most cases an infant's parents make decisions regarding their baby's medical treatment, and neither section 504 nor the
ADA extends to such quintessentially private, parental decision-making. 24 2 Nonetheless, because many infants infected with HIV become
wards of the state, 243 the ADA's public entity provisions may apply to
treatment decisions made for those infants, whether made directly by a
state agency or by foster parents or other agents of the state. Furthermore, the ADA's public accommodations provisions may be triggered
when, despite parental retention of legal responsibility for medical decision-making, the infant's treating physician effectively makes medical
decisions for the infant.
As Justice White recognized in his dissent from the Bowen plurality,
because physicians participate in formulating parental treatment decisions, "discrimination against a handicapped infant may assume guises
other than the outright refusal to treat once parental consent has been
given."' 244 In some instances, moreover, physicians may go beyond influencing parental decisions to assume the role of actual decisionmaker. This usurpation of decision-making authority seems likely to
occur not only when the parents willingly abdicate decision-making authority to treating physicians, 24 5 but also when the parents are frequently absent from the hospital or when the treating physicians hold
24 6
the parents' decision-making or caregiving capacity in low regard.
B. Responding to the Medical Complexity Argument
Although neither the ADA nor its legislative history specifically ad240. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). Like other private entities, a doctor's office and
a hospital are considered public accommodations if their operations affect commerce.
See id.
242. Cf. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 647 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (finding no role for government in parental decisions).
243. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
244. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 659 (White, J., dissenting). Cf.Johnson v. Thompson, 971
F.2d 1487, 1492 (10th Cir. 1992) (dictum) (accepting plaintiffs' arguments that if the
treating physicians' action "rendered parental consent a sham, such 'consent' cannot be
considered an intervening cause that makes section 504 inapplicable").
245. Cf. Weir, supra note 2, at 21 (asserting that infanticide may occur by "parents
abandoning a premature or defective infant to the medical staff in an NICU, with
decision-making about the infant's life or death being left to the physicians").
246. See, e.g., Guillemin & Holmstrom, supra note 18, at 198-225 (describing
appropriation of decision-making power by medical personnel when patient's family is
perceived as incompetent and unresponsive).
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dresses the legislation's applicability to medical treatment decisions,
simply reading the ADA's language suggests that its facial prohibitions
on discriminatory treatment apply to medical decision-makers who fail
to treat certain infants because of their HIV status. Congress recognized the persistence of discrimination against persons with disabilities
in health settings 24 7 and expressly extended the Act's mandate of eliminating disability discrimination to state agencies, hospitals, and physicians. 2 48 Accordingly, the ADA's prohibitions 24 9 would seem to
proscribe the failure by such actors to provide medical treatment to an
HIV-infected infant when the same treatment would be provided to an
uninfected infant. The factual hypotheticals posed by theJAMA survey
appear to demonstrate that such situations may exist. While 97%o of
respondents in the survey indicated they would provide open-heart surgery to an infant with a ventriculoseptal defect and no other concomitant conditions, only 42%o would provide the surgery for an infant with
a ventriculoseptal defect and HIV infection. 250 Approximately half of
the respondents would withhold treatment based on the infant's HIV
infection, a seemingly clearcut example of discrimination based on disability. Not only does this situation fall within the ADA's express terms,
but reading the ADA to prohibit such discriminatory medical decisionmaking also appears ethically sound. 25 i Just as an infant with a ventriculoseptal defect should not be denied open heart surgery because
she is African-American orJewish, so too she should not be denied the
needed surgical treatment because she is blind or HIV infected.
Despite the facial appeal of this argument, which mirrors the argument made by the Reagan administration in promulgating its Baby Doe
regulations under section 504, the argument faces several objections.
First, one can argue that although the ADA's prohibitions of disability
discrimination are by their terms sufficiently broad to encompass medical decisions made by doctors, hospitals, state social workers, or foster
parents for HIV-infected infants, the statute's legislative history con247. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
248. See 42 U.S.G. § 12181(7)(0.
249. Under Title II of the ADA, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Title III states the general rule applicable to
public accommodations as follows: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
250. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2978.
251. The ethical principle of nondiscrimination demands that in the allocation of
benefits (in this case, open-heart surgery) "no one be denied benefits based on
characteristics irrelevant to the purposes of the distribution in question" (in this case,
preservation of life through surgical correction of a heart defect). Arras, supra note 92,
at 97.
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tains no indication that Congress ever specifically contemplated applying the statute to those decisions. Thus, the ADA and its legislative
history by themselves do not clearly indicate whether or how the ADA's
antidiscrimination mandate should apply to medical treatment
2 52
decisions.
Perhaps a more fundamental objection, though, is that antidiscrimination law simply is not an appropriate mechanism for regulating
the complex process of medical decision-making. To wit, antidiscrimination law and the nondiscrimination principle of justice must
take as their premise that the persons seeking to receive benefits are
similarly situated except for the trait that prompts the discrimination;25 3 in other words, no distinction legally or morally relevant to the
distribution of the benefit in question exists between the persons. According to critics of the section 504 Baby Doe regulations, however,
this premise is faulty in many cases involving disabled newborns. While
it may be logically and morally correct to say that, except for having
Down syndrome, Baby Doe was similarly situated to an infant of normal
intelligence with an esophageal blockage and therefore should not have
been denied the benefit of treatment, it makes no sense to apply this
line of reasoning to an infant whose need for medical treatment is generated by a condition that, by definition, is never present in nondisabled infants. 25 4 Stated more generally, the argument is that the
nondiscrimination principle is logically inapplicable to a disabled patient who seeks medical treatment somehow related to her disability
because nondisabled but otherwise similarly situated patients do not
exist.
252. Accord Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the U.S.
Health System, Health Affairs, Fall 1992, at 248, 251 ("The ADA does not completely
clarify the distinction between the genuine exercise of clinical judgment and unlawful
discrimination."); see also Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The
Challenges of the ADA, 18 L. Med. & Health Care 331, 339 (1990) (noting that ADA
provides little guidance for deregulation of medical decision-making).
Three possible interpretations of the ADA in the context of medical decisionmaking are evaluated infra Part VI.B. 1-3.
253. This premise is reflected in the "otherwise qualified" language of § 504 and in
Title II of the ADA's limitation to "qualified individual[s]," 42 U.S.C. § 12132, for a
failure to qualify for the benefits at issue would be a legally and morally relevant
distinction. Although Title III's protection against discrimination by public
accommodations is not limited to "qualified" individuals (probably because one does
not normally think of needing to be "qualified" to eat at a restaurant, visit a museum, or
go to a doctor's office), the ability of public accommodations to impose some types of
eligibility criteria (e.g., ability and willingness to pay) is accepted as long as the criteria
do not screen or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities. See id. § 12182(a),
(b)(2)(A)(i).
254. See Arras, supra note 92, at 102. An infant needing surgery to correct the
myelomeningocele, or opening of the spine, associated with spina bifida exemplifies this
situation. Because nondisabled infants never have a myelomeningocele, an infant with
spina bifida cannot be similarly situated to a nondisabled infant with respect to its need
for corrective surgery.
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What I shall call the "medical complexity argument" was one of
the medical profession's primary objections to HHS's section 504 regulations, and the Second Circuit accepted this argument in finding section 504 inapplicable to medical decision-making for disabled infants:
[S]ection 504 prohibits discrimination against a handicapped
individual only where the individual's handicap is unrelated to,
and thus improper to consideration of, the services in question. As defendants here point out, however, where medical
treatment is at issue, it is typically the handicap itself that gives
rise to, or at least contributes to, the need for services. Defendants thus argue, and with some force, that the "otherwise
qualified" criterion of section 504 cannot be meaningfully applied to a medical treatment decision....
Second, in arguing that Baby Jane may have been "subjected to discrimination" the government has taken an oversimplified view of the medical decisionmaking process. Where
the handicapping condition is related to the condition(s) to be
treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say with certainty
that a particular decision was "discriminatory". 25 5
Acknowledging the force carried by the argument that the complexity of medical decision-making prevents the meaningful application
of the ADA to treatment decisions for persons with disabilities generally and, more specifically, for infants infected with HIV, could lead us
to adopt one of at least three possible responses. First, we could conclude that the ADA is simply inapplicable to medical decision-making
for the reasons stated by the Second Circuit. Second, we could read
the ADA to apply to medical decision-making only in those limited instances when the condition requiring treatment is unrelated to the patient's disabling condition. Finally, we could conclude that the ADA
applies to all medical decision-making, but interpret its antidiscrimination mandates as prohibiting nontreatment based on the mere existence of disability, while allowing consideration of the medical effects of
disability. Although the former two responses both find some support
in case law interpreting section 504, this Article asserts that the third
response is preferable because it would allow comprehensive implementation of the ADA's sweeping mandate against disability discrimination in a fashion concordant with existing ethical standards for
decision-making for disabled infants and competent patients.
1. ADA Inapplicable to Medical Treatment Decisions.-The cleanest and
easiest way to respond to the argument that the complex nature of
medical decision-making places it outside the ADA's protective realm
would be to accept the argument, much as the Second Circuit accepted
the same argument regarding the applicability of section 504. Adopting this approach would not render the ADA's reference to discrimina255. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1984).
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tion in the "health services" entirely meaningless, for the Act could still
be interpreted as ensuring physical access to facilities where health
services are provided 2 56 and prohibiting providers from turning away a
patient based on disability,25 7at least when the patient seeks treatment
unrelated to his disability.
In addition to the argument that applying a nondiscrimination
standard to medical decision-making is simply too difficult, this approach arguably is supported by Congress' failure to indicate its intent
that the ADA apply to individual decisions regarding medical treatment. The legislative history contains no evidence that Congress specifically contemplated such an application, and it can be argued that
of medical decision-makcongressional intent to intrude on the realm
258
ing should not be inferred in that absence.
This argument, however, founders when we consider making the
same argument with respect to other antidiscrimination legislation. It
seems apparent that a child welfare agency that has a pattern of deciding to immunize white children under its care but not African-American
children could not successfully defend its actions based on the lack of
reference to discrimination in medical decision-making in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.259 Moreover, in the ADA's
256. See Parmet, supra note 252, at 339.
257. For a discussion of how the ADA's prohibition against discrimination in health
services operates in the context of HIV-infected women and children seeking access to
health services, see Gittler & Rennert, supra note 78, at 1364-74. The legislative
history's examples of prohibited discrimination in health services deal only with
discrimination based on a disability unrelated to that service. For example, a doctor
specializing in burns cannot refuse to accept a burn victim because that patient is also
deaf, and a drug clinic cannot refuse treatment to a drug addict simply because the
patient has HIV. See H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1990),
reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 227, at 378-79. The legislative history does
not address a patient's access to treatment for the disability itself, nor does it address the
health care provider's decision-making processes regarding what treatment options to
recommend once the provider has established a relationship with the patient. It is the
latter process on which this Article's analysis focuses.
258. Cf. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 160 ("[T]he failure of congress to focus on
treatment decisions involving defective newborn infants strikes a telling blow to the
government's position" that section 504 applies to such decisions.). The Second Circuit
also cited prior congressional enactments reflecting a federal policy against the
involvement of federal personnel in medical treatment decisions and concluded that a
reversal of such a policy should not be inferred without dear evidence of congressional
intent. See id. Since 1984, however, a number of enactments, while not placing
decision-making authority in federal hands, have evidenced growing federal influence
over medical decision-making. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991)
(upholding regulations prohibiting federally funded family planning clinics from
engaging in counseling and referrals for abortion).
259. Cf. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 162 (Winter, J., dissenting) (analogizing
handicap discrimination to racial discrimination based on legislative history of § 504).
Although the majority opinion in University Hospital rejected Judge Winter's racial
analogy, it did so not because of a difference between the legislative histories of the Civil
Rights Act and § 504, but because it found the analogy to break down in the face of the
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sweeping language and announced goal of providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities," there is clear evidence that Congress must
have anticipated that the ADA's broad mandate would inevitably reach
beyond the examples of discrimination specifically described in the leg2 60
islative history.
Perhaps the strongest objection to simply finding the ADA inapplicable to medical treatment decisions is that such an approach goes too
far. That approach would leave the "easy cases," those to which the
medical complexity argument is factually inapplicable, unaddressed.
For example, decisions made at a state-run children's group home to
immunize all sighted children of normal intelligence but not blind children or mentally retarded children would not violate the ADA, 26 ' even
though these decisions clearly seem to embody the type of disability
discrimination that the ADA intends to prohibit. This outcome in easy
cases of discrimination is inconsistent with the ADA's philosophy and
suggests we should not allow the medical complexity characterizing
hard cases to immunize all medical treatment decisions from scrutiny
26 2
under the ADA.
2. ADA Applies under a Relatedness Standard.-Oneway to acknowledge the force of the medical complexity argument without simply surrendering the ADA's protections with respect to all medical treatment
decisions would be to read the ADA as applying only to those medical
treatment decisions in which the condition to be treated is unrelated to
the patient's disabling condition. This approach would be consistent
with University Hospital's conclusion that antidiscrimination law is inapplicable when "the handicap itself... gives rise to, or at least contributes to, the need for [medical] services."' 263 A few courts considering
relationship between handicap and the condition needing medical treatment. See id. at
157. In other words, the medical complexity argument holds particular power in the
context of disability discrimination, as opposed to racial discrimination.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (emphasis added). Of course, a dimmer view of
congressional awareness and intent could also be taken. Professor Wendy Parmet
argues that the ADA is "extraordinarily unclear about its impact on medical decisionmaking" and that the statute's failure to specify its impact on treatment decisions
"bespeaks a vision that sees disability as both limited and discrete." In light of the
statutory ambiguities regarding how the ADA applies to health services, Parmet predicts
that the judiciary will construe the ADA to have a narrower reach than initially appears
from its broad language. See Parmet, supra note 252, at 339.
261. Of course, such a failure might constitute medical neglect under the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984, but the difficulty of enforcing the Amendments' standards
has been discussed supra text accompanying notes 143-150. A failure to provide
routine immunizations is in fact an example cited in articles discussing weaknesses in the
foster care medical system. See supra note 217.
262. Accord Gostin, supra note 252, at 251 ("The physician's exercise of clinical
judgment cannot render all treatment refusals or referrals immune from review if there
is evidence that they were motivated by prejudice or irrational fear.").
263. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156.
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section 504 subsequently to University Hospital have recognized this approach as potentially viable, 264 although none has found it factually applicable. For example, in Gerben v. Holsclaw 2 65 the court considered
whether an infant with cystic fibrosis was subjected to a painful and
aggressive treatment plan because her incompetence to object effectively rendered her handicapped. Using a relatedness standard, the
court found that the treatment for cystic fibrosis was unrelated to the
infant's condition of being a nonconscious adult, but rejected the section 504 challenge because infancy is not a "handicap" under section
504.266

If we adopted this approach to interpreting the ADA's applicability
to medical treatment decisions, the threshold question would of course
be whether the condition for which the patient needs treatment is related to or results from the patient's disability. In many cases this question would be easy to answer. The decision whether to perform
surgery to correct the myelomeningocele of an infant with spina bifida
would not be covered by the ADA because the myelomeningocele is
itself a manifestation of the infant's disabling condition. By contrast,
the decision whether to perform surgery to correct the duodenal atresia
of an infant with HIV infection, as hypothesized by the JAMA survey,
would be covered by the ADA because medical research has not shown
duodenal atresia to be related to or caused by perinatal HIV infection.
This approach would lead to satisfactory results, at least with respect to
the applicability of the ADA, in cases like these where the relationship,
or lack thereof, between the disabling condition and the condition for
which treatment is required is clear.
In other cases, however, the line between medical conditions related to a disability and those unrelated may be harder to draw. The
difficulty in drawing that line is particularly acute when the disabling
condition is HIV infection because medical science is still in the early
stages of exploring the virus's different effects in both adult and pediatric populations. As a result, the issue of causality and hence relatedness
between HIV infection and a condition needing treatment may be unclear. For example, because all children are susceptible to many communicable diseases, immunizations are routinely recommended.
Children with HIV infection, however, by reason of their compromised
immune system, are both particularly susceptible to diseases and potentially susceptible to being harmed by the altered viruses contained in an
immunization. 26 7 This raises the issue whether the HIV-infected
child's need for immunization is "related to" his HIV infection so that
264. SeeJohnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1494 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992); Gerben
v. Holsclaw, 692 F. Supp. 557, 562-64 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also Bowen v. American
Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 655 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
265. 692 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
266. See id. at 562-63.
267. Cf. Mendez &Jule, supra note 52, at 645 ("With the exception of oral polio
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the ADA is inapplicable to a decision whether and how to immunize the
child.
Moreover, at least with respect to treatment decisions for patients
infected with HIV, the "related to the disability" approach fails to encompass the full range of medical complexity that HIV infection introduces into treatment decisions. This complexity results from the
very nature of HIV disease, which causes harm by so weakening a person's immune system that other opportunistic infections are able to
flourish. This heightened vulnerability to other infections means that
consideration of a patient's HIV infection may need to be part of the
treatment decision equation even when the condition requiring treatment is itself unrelated to the patient's HIV status. For example, if a
child with HIV infection suffers a perforation of her eardrum unrelated
to her infection, the relatively greater dangers posed by nosocomial infection from surgery to a patient with HIV infection may be a medically
justified consideration in deciding whether to treat the condition by antibiotics or by surgery. 268 Although the perforation is unrelated to the
patient's disabling condition, the disability may by necessity be implicated in making a medically sound treatment decision.
Thus, while it offers a superficially attractive response to the medical complexity argument, the "related to the disability" standard for
assessing the ADA's applicability to medical treatment decisions ultimately proves less than satisfactory. Rather than providing a clearcut
standard, this approach both creates difficult line-drawing problems regarding relatedness in some situations and fails in other situations to
respond adequately to the medical complexity argument.
3. ADA Prohibits the Use of Disability as a Proxy: The Medical Effects
Approach.-A third possible response to the medical complexity argument, and the response advocated by this Article, would be to read the
ADA as applying to all medical decision-making, but to focus attention
on what "discrimination based on disability" properly means in the
context of medical treatment decisions. In other words, what actions
by a person deciding on medical treatment for a patient with a disability
constitute illegal discrimination against that patient on the basis of her
disability? I will argue that such an approach represents an improvement over the relatedness standard discussed above, because a standard can be formulated to answer the foregoing question that deals
adequately both with those cases for which the relatedness standard
produces satisfactory results and those cases where that standard falls
short.
If the hypothetical cases discussed above are reconsidered, focusvaccine, for which a safe and effective ... vaccine alternative is available, the vaccines
given to HIV-exposed infants are the same as those used in other children.").
268. See, e.g., Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 634 (D. Mass. 1991) [hereinafter
Glanz 11] (doctor refused to perform ear surgery on AIDS-infected patient alleging that
surgery would pose significant health risks).
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ing not on relatedness between the disability and the condition needing
treatment, but on permissible factors for the decision-maker to consider, a pattern emerges. A state child welfare agency cannot consider
a child's blindness in determining whether to immunize the child.
While it is true that blindness is unrelated to the need for immunization, the ethical relevance of this lack of relatedness is that the child's
blindness has no medical effects relevant to determining what the
child's prognosis is or what treatment is in the child's best interests.
The blindness is simply irrelevant to making an ethical medical
decision.
Consider again a state-run group home deciding whether to immunize a child infected with HIV. While arguments can be made both for
and against finding relatedness between the child's need for immunization and her infection, what is indisputable is that in this case the child's
disability may have a medical effect-her greater susceptibility to infection-that is highly relevant to deciding whether immunization is in her
best interest and, if so, what form of immunization and possible followup is indicated. Thus, though its relatedness to a child's need for immunization is debatable, the HIV infection is relevant to making an ethical medical decision. Finally, the decision whether to treat the
perforated eardrum by antibiotics or by surgery can be analyzed the
same way. Although the child's HIV infection is causally unrelated to
the condition needing treatment, again the infection produces a medical effect that may be highly relevant to the treatment decision.
The contours of an alternative approach to interpreting the ADA
in the context of medical treatment decision-making thus begin to
emerge: While the ADA should prohibit treating a patient with a disability differently based simply on the disability's existence (for example,
the failure to immunize a blind child), the ADA should permit consideration of any relevant medical effects a disability produces in deciding
whether and how to treat a related or unrelated condition. This third
approach, which I shall call the "medical effects approach," seeks to
identify illegitimate discrimination by distinguishing between decisions
made based on the mere existence of disability and those made after
considering the medical effects of disability.
For example, to return to theJAMA survey, would the decision not
to provide life-saving corrective surgery to an infant infected with HIV
when the surgery would be provided to an uninfected infant constitute
prohibited discrimination based on disability? The answer depends on
whether the HIV infection has produced in this infant medical effects
relevant to deciding whether tO perform surgery. Answering this question requires not simply assessing "relatedness," but pursuing a
number of factual inquiries: How compromised has this infant's immune system become as a result of the infection? Is there alternative
nonsurgical treatment for the infant's condition? Has the infant's infection yet manifested itself in a way that provides reliable clues as to the
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infant's life expectancy, so that the benefits of achieving that life expectancy can be weighed against the invasiveness and risks of surgery? Or,
by contrast, does the infection remain asymptomatic so that no reliable
prediction of the infection's clinical course or life expectancy can be
made? This line of reasoning suggests that the decision not to perform
corrective surgery for an HIV-infected infant may in some instances be
9
legally and ethically justifiable. 26
Although the courts have not articulated a distinction between decisions based on the existence of disability and decisions based on consideration of the medical effects of disability, a few courts have engaged
in similar lines of reasoning. In Glanz v. Vernick, 270 the court considered
a section 504 action alleging that the hospital and physician had discriminatorily refused to perform ear surgery on a patient with HIV infection. The defendants moved for summary judgment, 2 7 1 arguing,
among other things, that the patient was not "otherwise qualified" for
the surgery because of his HIV infection. The court reasoned that section 504's "otherwise qualified" limitation allowed the defendants to
consider the patient's infection in terms of the risks that infection posed
both to the patient himself and to the physician, but cautioned that determining the patient's qualification for surgery required "an individualized inquiry and appropriate findings of fact." ' 2 72 Finding that the
plaintiff had produced facts supporting the conclusion that the patient
was "otherwise qualified" for surgery, the court denied the motion for
27 3
summary judgment.
269. This conclusion, however, makes the results of the JAMA survey no less
troubling, for the survey described only limited facts regarding its hypothetical cases
(e.g., the concurrence of HIV infection and duodenal atresia). As a result, respondents
lacked sufficient information regarding an individual infant's condition and prognosis to
engage in the analysis described in the text. Thus, it would appear that many
respondents used the simple fact of HIV infection as a proxy for such individualized
assessment.
270. 756 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1991).
271. Prior to moving for summary judgment, defendants had moved to dismiss,
arguing that under University Hospital § 504 did not protect a plaintiff claiming
discrimination in individual medical treatment decisions. After quoting with approval
Judge Winter's dissent in University Hospital, the court distinguished the case before it
from University Hospitalas not involving an infant and not requiring the court to override
parental authority. See Glanz v. Vemick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 45-46 (D. Mass. 1990)
[hereinafter Glanz I].
272. Glanz 11, 756 F. Supp. at 638.
273. Although Glanz II supports the proposition that applying antidiscrimination
law to medical treatment decisions requires an individualized assessment of the patient's
condition, I think the court interpreted the "otherwise qualified" limitation erroneously
by suggesting that the patient might not be otherwise qualified for surgery because of
risks posed by the surgery to the patient himself. Not only is this suggestion
inconsistent with the judicial origin of the "direct threat" standard, see School Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), it is also inconsistent with the principle of informed
consent, which leaves the decision regarding the acceptability of medical or surgical risk
to a competent patient. In other words, the risks of infection might be weighed by a
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Although the court in Glanz did not distinguish a refusal to perform surgery based on the mere existence of HIV infection from a refusal based on consideration of the infection's effects, it did recognize
that those effects (i.e., the patient's susceptibility to infection and the
possibility of transmission during surgery) should be individually assessed as part of determining whether the patient had been the victim
of unjustifiable discrimination. 27 4 This focus on the individualized assessment of a disability's effects also appears in Garrity v. Gallen,2 75 a
case involving the provision of rehabilitative services to mentally retarded persons. 2 76 In that case the court found that state officials had
violated section 504 by making placements and providing services
"based not on an individual assessment of the abilities and potentials of
each resident but on the generalized assumption that certain groups of
people.., are unable to benefit from certain activities and services."

2 77

The court found such "blanket discrimination" inconsistent with section 504's fundamental premise of "the need for individualized
treatment." 278
physician in recommending a certain treatment option, but the decision regarding which
treatment option to pursue ultimately belongs to a competent patient.
274. One could suggest that, based on this analysis, the medical effects approach is
actually more consistent with the "otherwise qualified" standard employed by § 504
than with the "individual with a disability" standard, which requires greater efforts
towards accommodation of the effects of a disability, employed in the employment and
public entity provisions of the ADA. The effect of this distinction, however, becomes
difficult to grasp in the context of medical decision-making. Consider again the example
of the HIV-infected child with a perforated eardrum, and assume that her immune
system is severely compromised. This medical effect of her infection may make the
decision-maker more likely to conclude that, because of the dangers of infection
resulting from surgery, treatment with antibiotics is in the child's best interests. One
way to describe the situation in antidiscrimination law jargon is to conclude that the
child was not "otherwise qualified" for surgical treatment. It seems equally accurate,
however, to say that the effects of the child's disability (i.e., her heightened susceptibility
to infection) could not be "reasonably accommodated." Even if one assumes that by
hypersterilizing surgical conditions and providing aggressive postoperative infection
control measures the susceptibility to infection could be "accommodated," I would
argue that this process of analysis regarding possible accommodations is subsumed
within a full assessment of the child's condition and prognosis to determine what
treatment is in her best interests.
275. 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981).
276. Although Garrity did not involve medical treatment, decisions regarding
rehabilitative services for developmentally or mentally disabled individuals are in many
ways analogous to decisions regarding medical treatment. In both instances, the
disabled person requires services for a condition that is frequently, although not
invariably, related to her disabling condition. In both cases, the effects of the disability
must be considered to determine what services will be of the greatest benefit to the
person.
277. 522 F. Supp. at 214.
278. Id. at 213-14. The court also found a § 504 violation in the defendants'
providing some, but not others, of the school's residents with individual service plans.
Which residents would receive a plan was decided not on the basis of any kind of
individualized assessment process, but on the basis of which buildings the residents
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What Glanz, Garrity, and the medical effects approach all find objectionable is a decision-maker's reliance on the mere existence of disability as a proxy for an individualized, factual assessment of the disabled
person's condition. That kind of proxy decision-making in the context
of medical treatment should ordinarily be seen as prohibited by the
ADA, for it is likely to reflect generalized assumptions and
prejudices 2 79 about disability that Congress sought to make off limits
by enacting the ADA. Moreover, as discussed in greater detail below,
the medical effects approach to interpreting the ADA harmonizes with
both existing standards of medical ethics generally, which require a
physician to base treatment recommendations on an individualized assessment of the patient, and the ethically preferable approach to treatment decisions for disabled newborns, which entails an individualized
prognostic strategy to determine what treatment option will advance
the infant's best interests. Thus, neither the medical profession nor
other health care providers should object to applying the ADA to medical treatment decisions consistently with the proposed approach, for
such an application neither ignores nor intrudes on the admittedly
complex process of ethically sound medical decision-making.
One could suggest that proposing a distinction between prohibited
discrimination based on the existence of disability and permitted consideration of the disability's medical effects is disingenuous. Certainly,
this distinction cannot be drawn throughout the ADA. 280 Still, the naoccupied, a classification that apparently reflected the severity of the resident's
disability. See id. at 214. Cf. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342
(D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that individualized assessment by public accommodation is
necessary in determining whether the participation of a disabled individual poses a
direct threat to the health and safety of others).
279. Of course, in those instances when the simple fact of a certain disability is
proven to have a high statistical correlation with certain medical effects, use of the
disability as a proxy for individual determination of those effects may be acceptable.
The example that springs to mind is anencephaly, a congenital defect in which infants
are born missing the cerebral hemisphere of the brain and with an open skull. Virtually
all anencephalic infants die within one week of birth. See P.A. Baird & A.D. Sodovnick,
Survival in Infants with Anencephaly, 23 Clinical Pediatrics 268, 270 (1984). Because of
this high level of statistical correlation, it should be permissible for a physician, having
diagnosed anencephaly in an infant, to make subsequent decisions on the assumption
that the infant's life span is limited to a week without pursuing an individualized
assessment of the infant's own predicted life span. Of course, permitting the use of
disability as a proxy for individual assessment in some cases raises the question of how
properly to limit that class of cases. It seems that those limits should parallel the limits
of proxy decision-making acceptable as a matter of medical ethics, but that the
boundaries should be drawn somewhat more tightly to protect against the influence of
stereotypes and prejudices within the medical profession.
280. Congress did not intend to prohibit an employer's consideration of a
disability's existence in making a hiring decision, but then to allow the employer to
refuse to hire the disabled applicant based on the effects of her disability. Title I of the
ADA governs private employment and generally prohibits discrimination by an
employer against a qualified "individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
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ture of medical decision-making seems to be sufficiently distinct from
most of the types of decisions that the ADA covers to justify a distinctive approach. 28 ' Ultimately, the issue is what it means to "discriminate" in the context of making medical decisions. Ethical medical
decision-making should take into account all medical factors--disability-related or not-affecting a patient's condition and prognosis.

28 2

Thus, to read the ADA as prohibiting a medical decision-maker from
considering medical factors flowing from a disability would put the disabled patient, whether a competent adult or a newborn, in a different,
arguably worse, position than the nondisabled patient, for the decisionmaker would be prohibited from fully assessing the patient's condition
and prognosis to determine what treatment option is in the patient's
best interests.
Another way of looking at the issue is that under the medical effects approach, a decision-maker's consideration of the medical effects
of a patient's HIV infection or other disability in order to allow treatment in the best interests of the patient does not even constitute "discrimination" in the broad sense of the word because the patient is
being treated the same as nondisabled patients: they should all have
decisions made based on a thorough assessment of their individual conditions and prognoses. By contrast, neither the ADA nor the medical
effects approach allows the use of disability as a proxy, for medical decision-making should not reflect prejudices or subjective assessments of
a patient's social worth or be based on subjective predictions, in social
2 83
rather than medical terms, of the patient's future quality of life.

position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Discrimination is
defined to include a failure to provide "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability." 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Thus, under Title I, the effects of an employee's or applicant's
disability triggers the employer's duty of reasonable accommodation, rather than
allowing the employer to discriminate.
281. The proposed approach arguably could also apply in contexts other than
medical treatment decisions. For example, decisions regarding rehabilitative services,
like those at issue in Garrity, 522 F. Supp. at 171, would seem well suited for this
approach. A consideration of all the different contexts where decisions should be
assessed under the proposed approach is beyond the scope of this Article, but a
common thread would seem to be decisions that are properly made in the best interests
of the recipient of the goods or services rather than in the economic interest of the
decision-maker.
282. One can imagine other factors, such as age or homelessness, that could be
viewed as illegitimate grounds for discrimination, but that could produce medical effects
that ethically should be taken into account in making individual treatment decisions.
For example, a patient's extreme youth, while not in and of itself a ground for denying
treatment, may be relevant to the patient's ability to metabolize a certain drug or the
ease with which broken bones will mend. Similarly, an ill child's homelessness should
not itself be a ground for denying treatment, but may be relevant to assessing what
treatment regimen is in the individual child's best interests, because one effect of
homelessness may be that an extended treatment regimen is less likely to be completed.
283. Another objection to the medical effects approach is that it may involve courts
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C. NormativeJustification of the Medical Effects Approach
Assuming that the proposed medical effects approach permits ap-

plication of the ADA to medical treatment decisions in a fashion that
responds to and answers the medical complexity argument, at least two

questions remain: Why should we, as a normative matter, apply the
ADA to treatment decisions in the absence of evidence of specific con-

gressional intent? Moreover, won't applying the ADA to individual
medical treatment decisions undesirably tie the hands of policymakers

who may seek to constrain the escalation of health care costs by rationing medical services based on their cost effectiveness?
1. Medical Ethics and CongressionalIntent.-The absence of evidence
of specific congressional intent with respect to the applicability of the
ADA to medical treatment decision-making raises two questions. First,
is that absence of specific intent in itself fatal to an argument that the
ADA should be interpreted to apply to medical decision-making? Second, if the answer to the first question is negative, does evidence of
Congress' general intent in enacting the ADA provide any guidance as
to the statute's applicability to medical decision-making?
The medical profession focused on the former question in opposing HHS's section 504 regulations by arguing that applying antidiscrimination law to selective nontreatment would intrude on and
in prolonged and complicated litigation attempting to determine whether a treatment
decision was based on the existence of disability or on the relevant medical effects of
disability, a task which some might characterize as second guessing medical judgments.
See United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (determining
whether a medical judgment is discriminatory "would invariably require lengthy
litigation primarily involving conflicting expert testimony to determine whether a
decision to treat, or not to treat, . . . was based on a 'bona fide medical judgment,'
however that phrase might be defined").
Yet, though the inquiry is frequently difficult in discrimination cases of all types, the
role of the finder of fact is to make judgments as to how and why people acted. For
example, in a case alleging discrimination in medical decision-making, the plaintiff may
be able to produce expert medical testimony as to why the plaintiff's HIV infection (or
other disability) created no medical effects justifying the withholding of treatment.
Likewise, the plaintiff may try to prove the decision-maker's past record of
recommending or providing treatment to nondisabled patients who were otherwise
similarly situated to plaintiff. "Just because the inquiry is difficult, the court is not
justified in ignoring the plain mandate of the statute and refusing the enforce it." Glanz
v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 46 (D. Mass. 1990). The same judge in Glanz II suggested
that the evidentiary approach to § 504 cases set forth in Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ.
of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981), would be appropriate for
determining whether a plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for the treatment at issue:
The plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case that he was otherwise
qualified for surgery, and only then does the burden shift to the defendant to
show that the plaintiff's handicap made him unqualified. The plaintiff,
however, must still be given an opportunity "to prove either that the reason
given by defendants is a pretext or that the reason . . . 'encompasses unjustified
consideration of the handicap itself.' "
Glanz II, 756 F. Supp. 632, 638 (D. Mass. 1991) (citations omitted).
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regulate the medical decision-making process, a result neither specifically contemplated nor intended by Congress in enacting section 504.
A similar argument is likely to be voiced in opposition to any contention that the ADA should be read to apply to medical decision-making.
This argument carried some force in the context of the Reagan administration's section 504 regulations, which sought to compel the treatment of handicapped infants regardless of any medical effects their
handicaps might have. This argument loses its force, however, when
raised in opposition to applying the ADA consistently with the medical
effects approach proposed in this Article.
As discussed in Part IV above, medical ethics generally require that
treatment recommendations for a competent patient reflect the individual patient's best interests, and the morally preferable standard for assessing treatment decisions made for disabled or otherwise imperiled
newborns requires that decisions be made in the infant's own best interests, based on an ongoing individualized assessment of the infant's
condition and prognosis. 28 4 These ethical standards are fully consistent with the proposed legal standard for applying the ADA. Under
either standard, for example, persons deciding whether an HIV-infected infant should undergo surgery to correct a ventriculoseptal defect can and should consider what effects the infection has on the
individual infant in terms of its condition and prognosis and the advisability of surgery. Under neither standard, however, can the decisionmaker base its decision simply on the fact of infection; in other words,
using the fact of infection as a proxy for individualized assessment is
neither ethically nor legally acceptable.
Rather than intruding on medical decision-making by introducing
new standards and considerations, adopting a medical effects approach
to applying the ADA to medical decision-making thus reaffirms existing
ethical medical practice. 2 85 Since the ADA can be applied to medical
decision-making in a manner requiring no change in how or on what
basis decisions should be made, the legislative history's silence with respect to the statute's applicability in this context does not in itself seem
dispositive. If anything, one could argue that Congress' failure to exempt medical treatment decisions from the ADA's coverage, as it did
284. See supra text accompanying notes 177-189. Although this standard is not
universally accepted, it, or a similar standard, has been adopted by a number of the
leading scholars and groups in the field of bioethics. See, e.g., Weir, supra note 2, at
194-95; Arras, supra note 92, at 105-06; Newborns Project, supra note 2, at 15-16;
President's Commission, supra note 177, at 214-17; Rhoden, supra note 185, at 39-40.
But cf. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 1318-22 (proposing quality of life standard that focuses
on infant's potential for relational capacity).
285. Applying the ADA to medical decision-making will certainly constrain the
practice to the extent that decision-makers will no longer be able to act inconsistently
with ethical standards without risking legal scrutiny of decisions that use disability as a
proxy. The day appears to be past, however, when the medical profession acted as sole
arbiter of the propriety of its members' actions.
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insurance underwriting decisions, 28 6 shows Congress' intent that the
statute's coverage otherwise be comprehensive. 28 7
So, if the absence of specific congressional intent is not alone fatal
to the proposition that the ADA should be read to apply to medical
treatment decisions, what does Congress's general intent in enacting
the statute indicate? Indeed, applying the ADA to medical treatment
decisions pursuant to the medical effects approach comports with
Congress' desire that the ADA function to protect vulnerable persons
from the ill effects of discrimination. Although much of the ADA's legislative history focuses on giving persons with disabilities equal opportunities for economic empowerment, the history also displays concern
for the historical social effects of disability discrimination. 28 8 For example, the legislative history includes testimony from the Commission
on the HIV Epidemic highlighting the serious repercussions of the
widespread discrimination against persons with HIV infection.28 9
In light of Congress' concern with protecting persons with disabilities not only from the adverse economic effects of discrimination, but
also from its social and personal costs, protecting disabled patients, including HIV-infected infants, against medical treatment decisions
286. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1992).
287. Moreover, the impact on existing medical practice will be limited because the
ADA's protection will not be triggered when a competent patient or a parent or other
family member is making the treatment decision, but only when an actor covered by the
ADA, such as a state agency, a hospital, or physician, decides what treatment will be
recommended or provided. Nonparental decision-making for a disabled infant provides
one example of such a scenario; others might include treatment recommendations for a
competent patient or actual treatment decisions made for a mentally incompetent ward
of the state or for a victim of spinal cord injury who also temporarily suffers cognitive
impairment. Cf. David R. Patterson et al., When Life Support is Questioned Early in the
Care of Patients with Cervical-Level Quadriplegia, 328 New Eng. J. Med. 506, 508
(1993) (warning against too hasty decision-making by family members or medical staff
for a temporarily incompetent patient).
288. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra note 227, at 53 ("People with disabilities as a group occupy an
inferior status socially, economically, vocationally, and educationally."); id. at 54
("discriminatory treatment of handicapped persons can occur in almost every aspect of
their lives"); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 274 (1990),
reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 227, at 304, 324 ("Discrimination produces
fear and reluctance to participate on the part of people with disabilities.").
As Arlene Mayerson of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund testified:
The discriminatory nature of policies and practices that exclude and
segregate disabled people has been obscured by the unchallenged equation of
disability with incapacity and by gloss of "good intentions." The innate
biological and physical "inferiority" of disabled people is considered selfevident. This "self-evident" proposition has served to justify the exclusion and
segregation of disabled from all aspects of life. The social consequences that
have attached to being disabled often bear no relationship to the physical or
mental limitations imposed by the disability.
Id. at 322.
289. See id. at 313.
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based on prejudices and inaccurate assumptions seems well within the
realm of the kind of discrimination that the ADA seeks to eradicate.
Moreover, although the ADA does not treat environmental or social
disadvantages as disabilities, because poverty, racial, or ethnic minority
status and lack of strong family support combine to make most HIVinfected infants particularly vulnerable, we, as a society, should be particularly vigilant in protecting those infants from discrimination on the
prohibited ground of disability.2 90 Applying the ADA to treatment decisions for infants infected with HIV reflects the ethos that Congress
sought to advance in enacting the statute.
2. Making Individual Treatment Decisions vs. Making Policy.-A final
objection to applying the ADA to medical treatment decisions is that
doing so would prevent policymakers from making informed, rational
decisions about what kinds of medical care our society is willing to pay
for. Some may argue that hard times call for hard choices and that the
ADA should not be interpreted to tie the hands of policymakers making
those hard choices by preventing them from considering disability,
among other factors, in deciding what we should pay for. In light of
media reports regarding the relative cost-ineffectiveness of much neonatal intensive care 2 9 1 and the growing costs of caring for, without curing, persons infected with HIV,2 92 this objection seems a particularly
likely response to this Article's focus on decision-making for infants
with HIV.
This objection, however, because it fails to distinguish between individual medical treatment decisions and policy decisions regarding the
funding or availability of medical services, is inapposite to this Article's
thesis. The former decision is made at the micro level and, as an ethical
matter, should focus on the individual patient's condition and prognosis and seek to advance his best interests. The latter decision, by contrast, is made at the macro or policy level by balancing competing
interests in society. In light of the different interests to be advanced,
the two types of decision necessarily differ in nature and process and, as
a practical matter, are normally made by different decision-makers. 2 93
This Article focuses on how the ADA should be interpreted to apply to
the former decision-an individual medical treatment decision.
The ADA presumably applies to policy decisions regarding funding for medical treatment-not according to the proposed medical ef290. See Rev. Raymond O'Brien, Discrimination: The Difference with AIDS, 6 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 93, 96 (1990) (advocating unique and special consideration
of HIV-infected persons because AIDS afflicts those already burdened by past histories
of intensive discrimination: homosexuals, drug-users, and minorities).
291. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, As More Tiny Infants Live, Choices and
Burdens Grow, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1991, at Al, A26.
292. See supra note 76.
293. For example, a state's legislature, in consultation with health officials, will
establish coverage provisions for the state's Medicaid program. An individual treating
physician, by contrast, decides what treatment to recommend for an individual patient.
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fects approach, but according to the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court in Alexander v. Choate.294 In that case the Court considered a section 504 challenge to Tennessee's policy of limiting Medicaid reimbursement for hospital stays to fourteen days per year. The Court
rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the policy's adverse impact on
disabled persons, who tend to have greater hospitalization needs, constituted a violation of section 504. Instead, while assuming that section
504 reaches at least some conduct having a disproportionate impact on
the handicapped, 29 5 the Court found the fourteen-day limitation acceptable because it was neutral on its face and did not "invoke criteria
that have a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped" or "distinguish between those whose coverage will be reduced and those
whose coverage will not on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait that
the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting or less likely of
2 96
having."
Thus, the standard erected in Alexander appears to permit policy
level decisions rationing medical care as long as the rationing criteria
do not have a particular exclusionary effect on persons with disabilities.
In August 1992 the Secretary of HHS applied this standard to Oregon's
request for Medicaid waivers allowing the State to proceed with a rationing scheme. Oregon sought to reform its Medicaid program to
cover all residents below the federal poverty line by implementing a
rationing scheme based on a 709-item list of "condition-treatment
pairs" prioritized in the order in which they would be funded by the
State. Oregon policymakers ranked the condition-treatment pairs
based on the results of a complex process using a Quality of Well-Being
scale to rank the effectiveness of various treatments in terms of their
medical outcomes and the extent to which the treatments advanced
"basic values," such as functioning, quality of life, length of life, and
29 7
social activity.
The Secretary rejected Oregon's waiver request on the grounds of
its apparent conflict with the ADA. 2 98 Because the prioritization pro294. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
295. The Court, however, rejected "the boundless notion that all disparate-impact
showings constitute prima facie cases under § 504." Id. at 299.
296. Id. at 302.
297. For a description of this process, see Robert M. Kaplan, A Quality-of-Life
Approach to Health Resource Allocation, in Rationing America's Medical Care: The
Oregon Plan and Beyond 60 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Rationing America's Medical Care].
298. Prior to the Secretary's rejection, various critics of Oregon's plan had focused
on the plan's implementation of a rationing scheme that affected only the poor, did little
to control provider fees or physician incomes, and was predicted to have a
disproportionate adverse effect on women and children. For a variety of perspectives on
Oregon's plan, see Rationing America's Medical Care, supra note 297. Prior to
Secretary Louis Sullivan's rejection of the plan, however, health policy analysts had paid
little or no attention to the potential effect of the Oregon plan on persons with
disabilities.
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cess for the condition-treatment pairs had included telephone surveys
of the general public that may have "quantifie[d] stereotypic assumptions about persons with disabilities" and adjustments made by policymakers on the basis of community values, including "quality of life"
and "ability to function," the Secretary found "considerable evidence
that [the list] was based in substantial part on the premise that the value
of the life of a person with a disability is less than the value of the life of
a person without a disability. This is a premise that is inconsistent with
29 9
the ADA."
Suggesting that Oregon revise its plan to bring it into conformity
with the ADA, the Secretary cited Alexander v. Choate as authority for the
proposition that Oregon could consider a wide range of factors, including "the cost of medical procedures, the length of hospital stays, prevention of death, and prevention of contagious diseases," in allocating
resources consistently with the ADA. 3 00 This approach, if adopted by
courts interpreting the ADA, would permit health policymakers to establish rationing schemes that do not rely on suspect criteria. For example, the ADA would seem to allow a state to limit its funding of
medical treatment for individuals having a one-year life expectancy of
less than fifty percent to provision of comfort care or to a set dollar
amount. This limitation, while having a significant impact on some persons with disabilities, such as persons suffering full-blown AIDS, would
also limit funding of care for some elderly persons with multiple organ
systems failures, for persons seeking some organ transplants, for some
extremely premature newborns, and for some victims of severe trauma.
Thus, it would avoid any particular exclusionary effect on persons with
disabilities. 30 1
299. Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, to
Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon, Aug. 3, 1992 (with accompanying three-page
"Analysis Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of the Oregon Reform
Demonstration").
300. Id. For further discussion of the Secretary's rejection of the Oregon plan, see
Alexander Capron, Oregon's Disability: Principles or Politics?, Hastings Center Rep.,
Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 18; Paul T. Menzel, Oregon's Denial: Disabilities and Quality of
Life, Hastings Center Rep., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 21.
In November 1992, after attempting to respond to the Department's concerns by
eliminating all references to quality of life and cutting certain information obtained from
the telephone surveys, Oregon resubmitted its plan. See Diane S. Lund, Medicaid
Reform Plan Revised, Resubmitted, Am. Med. News,'Dec. 7, 1992, at 14. The Secretary
of HHS approved the proposal on March 19, 1993, conditioned upon Oregon's meeting
a number of restrictions designed to prevent the scheme's discrimination against
persons with disabilities. For example, in deciding what funding priority a treatment for
a given condition will receive, Oregon cannot consider whether the treatment will
eliminate all of a patient's "functional limitations," so that treatment that is effective in
responding to a condition will not be given a lower priority simply because it does not
respond to pre-existing disabilities. See Robert Pear, U.S. Backs Oregon's Health Plan
for Covering All Poor People, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1993 at A8.
301. The ADA's express requirement (not present in § 504) of a public entity's
"reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices," 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp.
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Although difficulties in applying this standard can be easily
imagined, Alexander v. Choate's standard clearly focuses on medical resource allocation decisions made at a policy level to balance and resolve
competing societal interests. The locus of individual medical treatment
decisions, by contrast, should remain centered around the individual
patient's medical condition and best interests. Granted, the ability to
implement a treatment decision or recommendation for an individual
patient may be affected by the independent decision by policymakers
regarding what medical services a state program will fund,3 0 2 but this
interaction does not mean the two decisions must or should be governed by the same standard. Applying the ADA to individual treatment
decisions pursuant to the medical effects approach proposed above will
not subject policymakers to any greater constraints than they already
face in making rationing decisions.
D. Recommendation
In light of the foregoing analysis, the medical effects approach to
applying the ADA to medical treatment decisions seems to offer the
best alternative for addressing the incipient problem of selective nontreatment of infants infected with HIV. The proposed approach both
responds to the medical complexity argument without simply deferring
to it and harmonizes with current ethical standards of medical decisionmaking. The latter point is significant for two reasons: First, as discussed above, it largely defuses the argument that Congress's failure to
extend the ADA specifically to medical treatment decisions should preclude that application. Second, any opposition by the medical profession to an application of the ADA that merely requires physicians to act
consistently with the profession's own ethical standards will be difficult
to justify.
III 1991) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"), seems unlikely to lead courts
interpreting the ADA to adopt a standard different from Alexander v. Choate's. In that
case the Court recognized, based on regulations issued under § 504, that a public
benefit "cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified
handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure
meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may
have to be made." Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1984) (footnote omitted).
The Court, however, rejected as "simply unsound" the disabled plaintiffs' contention
that because of their greater need for extended inpatient care, the state had to provide
the disabled with more than fourteen days of coverage in order to provide meaningful
access. See id. at 302-03.
302. For example, a physician may recommend a liver transplant for a patient based
on the physician's individualized assessment of the patient's condition and best interest
but may be unable to perform the transplant because the state made a policy decision
not to fund such procedures. Although the outcome in this case is the same as if the
physician had engaged in the rationing herself, the division of responsibility suggested
in the text assures that the physician is not subjected to a conflict of interests in seeking
to advance both the patient's best interests and society's interest in conserving
resources. See Hirshfeld, supra note 160, at 1840-42.
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Concluding that the ADA should be interpreted as applying to
medical treatment decisions pursuant to the proposed medical effects
approach, however, does not answer the question: How do we get from
here to there, particularly with respect to nontreatment of infants with
HIV infection? Although a conclusive, detailed recommendation regarding how best to implement the proposed approach is beyond the
scope of this Article, some general observations and a preliminary recommendation are in order. One response to the question of how to get
from here to there would be to leave to the courts the role of interpreting the ADA in the medical treatment context and to leave to parties
claiming nontreatment and their advocates the responsibility of propounding a medical effects approach. Claims of discriminatory medical
decision-making could be brought by plaintiffs in private civil actions,
by HHS in compliance actions under the public entity provisions of the
ADA, 3 0 3 or by the Attorney General in an enforcement action under
the statute's public accommodations provisions.3 0 4 This alternative requires waiting until harm sufficient to justify legal action occurs to a
party who either has access to the courts or the knowledge to refer the
complaint for agency or Attorney General investigation and enforcement. Nonetheless, these enforcement options may be adequate to
provide competent adult patients with disabilities a forum in which to
advance the medical effects approach. As a practical matter, however,
even if HIV-infected infants are gravely injured by discriminatory nontreatment, the likelihood that lawsuits will be brought or complaints
filed on behalf of members of this "ultimate minority" seems relatively
small.3 0 5 Furthermore, even if the medical effects approach is argued

in court, the relatively conservative nature of the current federal judiciary suggests that courts may not be willing to rule creatively in the absence of evidence of specific congressional intent.3 0 6 Our wait for
judicial adoption of the medical effects approach could be long.
An alternative approach would be for the Department of Justice
303. Regulations issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) essentially allow
complaints claiming discrimination by a public entity to be filed with either DOJ itself or

the federal agency designated to investigate alleged violations by the specific type of
public entity involved. Complaints filed with DOJ will be referred to the appropriate

designated agency. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170, 35.171 (1992). The regulations designate
HHS as having responsibility for implementing compliance procedures for all public

entities engaged in "activities relating to health care and social services, including ...
the operation of health care and social service providers and institutions." 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.190(b)(3).
304. Regulations issued by DOJ under the public accommodations provisions of
the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12188, in addition to allowing for private suits, also provide for
investigations by the Attorney General of allegations of statutory violations and for civil
actions by the Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.501-36.503.
305. Cf. Gittler & Rennert, supra note 78, at 1386-87 (describing variety of

obstacles to obtaining relief under antidiscrimination laws for women and children with
HIV infection).

306. See Parmet, supra note 252, at 339.
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(DOJ) to promulgate regulations applying the ADA to medical treatment decisions pursuant to a medical effects approach and establishing
a compliance or enforcement mechanism specific to this context. Issuing regulations that impose binding obligations on medical providers
or state agencies, however, would tempt the fate that befell HHS's section 504 regulations in Bowen. 3 0 7 Empirical evidence of the extent of
discriminatory nontreatment of HIV-infected infants, or of other disabled patients, simply has not been gathered. DOJ currently is unlikely
to be able to develop an administrative record containing sufficient evidence of an existing problem to warrant legislative rulemaking.
Another option, however, is available to the Department ofJustice:
despite the lack of hard evidence regarding the measure of discriminatory treatment or nontreatment decisions, the agency can issue an interpretive rule without going through the notice and comment process
required by the Administrative Procedure Act for legislative rulemaking.30 8 An interpretive rule, while not binding on private parties, the
agency itself, or the courts,30 9 allows the agency to express its interpretation of what existing law requires. 310 Thus, by issuing an interpretive
rule, DOJ could give the public, including hospitals, physicians, and
state child welfare agencies, clear notice as to what the ADA means in
the context of individual treatment decisions for all patients with disabilities without undergoing the time, expense, and evidentiary requirements of notice and comment rulemaking.
Of course, one could view the issuance of an interpretive rule without binding force as a weak-kneed response, little better than no response at all. I would argue, however, that the issuance of an
interpretive rule, at least as an initial response, not only is fitting in
light of the current uncertainty regarding the extent of discriminatory
medical decisions, but may serve to advance the ADA's goals better
than either legislative rules or judicial interpretations. The ADA calls
for the pulling down of barriers for persons with disabilities and the
dispelling of mistaken and prejudiced attitudes held by so many in our
society. In some instances, these goals may be better advanced by promoting self-examination and education than by either further legislation or litigation. 3 11 This focus on self-awareness and behavioral
307. See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
308. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
309. See Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980). By enforcing
its interpretation of existing law, the agency does give the interpretation some binding
effect. On judicial review, however, the agency's interpretation, while given some
weight, is not determinative. Instead, the agency must defend the interpretation as if it
had not issued the rule at all. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
310. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
311. As two commentators have remarked on this point:
The availability and accessibility of legal relief for women and children with
HIV infection is only one indicia of the effectiveness of antidiscrimination laws.
Equally, if not more important, is whether and to what extent
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change is reflected in some of the regulations implementing the ADA.
For example, public entities are required to engage in a self-evaluation
of their existing policies and practices to identify and correct any that
are inconsistent with the ADA,3 12 and the preferred remedy when an
investigating agency finds noncompliance by a public entity is the negotiation of a voluntary compliance agreement.3 13 DOJ's issuance and
dissemination of a rule interpreting the ADA to apply to individual
medical treatment decisions and describing the rationale behind the
medical effects approach could operate as an influential step in this ed3 14
ucation process.
The evolution over the past twenty years in public attitudes towards persons with mental retardation and with disabilities generally,
and the resulting decrease in the number of physicians recommending
nontreatment of infants with Down syndrome,3 15 illustrate the potential for success in a consciousness-raising approach. In addition, rather
than immediately approaching medical decision-makers in an adversarial posture, initially issuing an interpretive rule seeks to encourage
them to perform their own ethical duties. At the same time, though,
DOJ and HHS can implement the interpretive rule in pursuing the
compliance and enforcement procedures already established under the
ADA.3

16

antidiscrimination laws will actually serve to prevent the occurrence of
discrimination against these women and children. Underlying the enactment of
these laws is the assumption and the expectation, that such laws will produce
social change through the promotion of behavioral and attitudinal changes
towards those with HIV infection, and that there will be substantial compliance
with such laws.
Gittler & Rennert, supra note 78, at 1387. Cf. Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: What it Means to All Americans, 64 Temp. L.Q. 375, 384 (1991) ("The
ADA is social legislation to end barriers, not an instrumentality for continuous and
acrimonious litigation. Still, we do need some consciousness-raising about Americans
with disabilities, especially since our mistaken attitudes are often so well-meaning and so
ingrained.").
312. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.105 (1992).
313. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.173 (1992).
314. Of course, education regarding legal requirements is not the only education
whose need is suggested by responses to the JAMA survey. In a letter commenting on
the survey's results, the Chairman of the American Academy of Pediatricians Task Force
on Pediatric AIDS remarked: "The need for renewed and continuing efforts to educate
health care workers is evident from this article." He also noted, consistently with this
Article's thesis, that "medical ethics dictate that therapeutic decisions for the infant
should not be determined solely on the basis of the HIV serologic status of the mother
or infant." Stanley A. Plotkin, Infants at Risk for the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 267 JAMA 1469, 1469 (1992). The influence of education and experience
was apparent in the results of the survey itself, which showed that respondents who
reported more experience with infants thought to be infected with HIV were somewhat
more likely to recommend more treatment for infants at risk for or known to be infected
with HIV. See Levin et al., supra note 5, at 2979.
315. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 303-304.
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Of course, if issuing an interpretive rule adopting the medical effects approach proves ineffective and discriminatory nontreatment of
HIV-infected infants or discriminatory medical decisions for other patients with disabilities swells into a common problem, a more aggressive response may then be called for. One possibility would be the
adoption of some type of ombudsman program within DOJ's or HHS's
Office of Civil Rights for the monitoring of medical treatment decisions
for disabled infants and children made by, for example, state child welfare agencies. Or, if evidence is gathered demonstrating that discriminatory nontreatment has become a significant problem, the
Department ofJustice could then issue regulations specifically targeted
to the problem identified and providing for more stringent regulatory
oversight. Today, however, the early days of the ADA present DOJ
with a public primed for education as to the Act's meaning and philosophy. Consequently, the issuance of an interpretive rule applying the
ADA to medical treatment decisions currently presents the best first
step for getting from here to there.
CONCLUSION

Evidence of physician attitudes favoring the withholding of needed
medical treatment from infants infected with HIV compels a reassessment of the applicability and adequacy of existing law in dealing with
selective nontreatment. Although we can hope to have learned some
lessons from the Baby Doe controversy of the mid-1980s, whether the
legislation emerging from that controversy, the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, has ever adequately dealt with the problem of nontreatment remains far from clear. Today, the medical and social
characteristics of most infants infected with HIV introduce new variables into our assessment of that legislation. At stake are the lives of
infants who, for reasons of class, race, and HIV infection, are both particularly vulnerable to having their lives devalued and relatively likely to
have decisions regarding their medical treatment made by someone
other than their parents. These factors, when combined with the prognostic uncertainty characteristic of perinatally transmitted HIV infection, are likely to diminish further the Child Abuse Amendments'
ability to assure an effective response to nontreatment of these infants.
The Americans with Disabilities Act, by contrast, offers greater
promise as an adequate legal response to nontreatment based on HIV
infection. Although the ADA's applicability to individual medical treatment decisions is unclear from the statute's face and legislative history,
normative considerations amply justify interpreting the ADA as covering such decisions. Applying the ADA to treatment decisions pursuant
to the medical effects approach proposed by this Article respects the
legitimate complexity of the medical decision-making process, but prohibits the interjection of illegitimate considerations of disability into
that process. Use of the medical effects approach would not create new
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burdens, unanticipated by Congress, for medical decision-makers;
rather, the approach simply would harmonize legal protection with existing ethical standards. Although using the medical effects approach
to judge the legitimacy of treatment decisions for infants infected with
HIV doesn't promise easy answers in hard cases, it does offer a sensitive way of ensuring that the ADA's revolution reaches infants infected
with HIV and all patients with disabilities.

